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The purpose of this study is to find out what rules the English
Parliament has adopted from time to time for the regulation of
railway finance, and to ascertain, as far as possible, why these
rules were adopted, how they have been applied, and to what
results they have led.
In this study, the writer used the series of the so-called finance
acts as the back bone. 'After having become familiar with the
provisions in these finance acts and having classified these
numerous provisions into a number of divisions, he then traced,
as far as he could, the parliamentary debates upon these meas-
ures. He also endeavored to compare the original bills with the
amended ones as well as to examine other contemporary bills
which had anything to do with these finance bills, with the hope
of understanding the position of the legislators. The writer also
took care to examine the popular, the railway, as well as the
expert financial writers' opinions prevailing during those years
when these regulative measures were adopted or agitated. For
this purpose the London Times, the Railway Times, and the
Economist were most frequently consulted.
In the following pages, the writer has endeavored first of all
to trace the development of the general legislation on railway
finance so that a fairly comprehensive idea of the nature of
legislative regulation may be gained. Then follows a review
of the efforts of parliament to secure proper restriction upon the
issue of capital securities, attention being given, in the first
place, to share capital. Although loan capital forms only about
one-third of the total railway capital, the method of control has
loomed large in the English system of regulation. Accordingly
the questions of limitation upon the borrowing powers of the
railway companies, the registration of railway securities, as well
as the regulation of loan capital itself have been treated in some
detail. The attitude of Parliament toward railway stock water-
ing is also shown. To the important features of control of ac-
counts, government audit, and inspection two chapters are de-
voted.
Most of the information contained in this study is obtained
from such original sources as the British Statutes at Large, re-
ports of parliamentary and departmental committees, parliamen-
tary debates, direct communications from offices of the Board
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GENERAL LEGISLATION ON RAILWAY FINANCE
As England was the pioneer of railway building so was she the
first to make experiments in the regulation of railway finance.
English statesmen had recognized the importance of regulating
railway finance before any other country had seriously consid-
ered the question. As early as the railway itself was introduced,
we find traces of efforts which were made by the English Parlia-
ment in this direction.
One thing which especially stands out to the credit of the
English legislature is the fact that it had learned a great deal
about the regulation of railways during the first fifty years of
railway enterprise and had then arrived at certain important
conclusions which, in some other countries, have not been prop-
erly understood until very recently. From the early thirties,
English legislators have recognized that the interest of the rail-
ways is bound up with that of the public and that the interests
of the two cannot be separated. 1 Herein lies a partial explanation
of the fact that Parliament practically has never enacted laws
which might properly be called hostile to the railway companies.
The English railways, like those of the United States, are pri-
vate enterprises, and under private operation. The part played
by both Governments is that of a supervisory nature. The Gov-
ernments of both countries have thought of purchasing and
owning their railways, 2 and both have refrained from adopting
that course.
The systems of regulation of the two countries are also similar.
1 See the remarks of Mr. Homes in the House of Commons, 1836. Han-
sard 's Parliamentary Debates, series 3 (hereafter called Hansard), v. 46,
p. 1336.
2 Detailed provisions were made in the Railway Regulation Act, 1844
(7 & 8 V. c. 85), for Government purchase of railways under certain con-
ditions.
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The early railway charters in the United States "reveal almost
at a glance," says Prof. B. H. Meyer,
3
"their common origin in
the English law." The principles underlying our federal laws,
as well, bear much resemblance to those accepted in England.
But in spite of such great similarities there is a striking differ-
ence between the two systems of regulation. This difference,
however, lies not so much in the regulations themselves as in the
manner and emphasis of regulation. First of all, the United
States has never attempted any strict regulation of railway
finance, while England has always regarded the regulation of
this branch of railway enterprise as essential. Then again in
England there is only one kind of regulation namely, that
adopted and enforced by the national legislature, while in Amer-
ica the numerous systems of state regulation have been of greater
importance or at least have given the railways more trouble than
the federal regulation, though recent developments indicate a
large increase of the importance of the latter. The railways in
England, therefore, do not have any such complicated contro-
versies as have resulted in the United States from the conflicting
regulations of the state and federal governments.
England also has enjoyed from the beginning many advan-
tages, which other countries envy. There has always been a
class of enterprising capitalists ready to embark in railway un-
dertakings and a class of men qualified by ability and business
habits for the duties of railway directors, officers, and engineers.
Therefore, instead of having trouble in persuading capital to
embark in railways when the enterprise was first introduced, as
was generally the case in other countries, England found it
necessary to caution capitalists from investing too readily. Her
problem in the beginning was not to induce investors to come
forward, but to caution them to be steady and to protect them
from being swindled by "bubble" schemes. Her difficulty has
not been to extend her railway system but to prevent superfluous
construction.
The English railway system had its origin in the enterprise of
individuals interested in the different localities. The efforts
were not fostered by the legislature as objects of national con-
cern, as was often the case on the continent, but were regarded
s Annals of American Academy of Pol. and Social Science, vol. 10, p. 390.
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as projects undertaken for the profit of their promoters, which
Parliament might sanction for public advantage. In dealing
with these undertakings the legislature followed the policy which
had been pursued with success and benefit to the country since
the middle of the eighteenth century, of allowing private enter-
prise to develop and manage inland navigation. Under this sys-
tem each project was considered entirely on its own merits, and
sanctioned by a private act of Parliament which contained the
entire statute law applicable to the undertaking.*
In the regulation of railway finance, as in other branches of
government activity, each country has adopted a policy deemed
at the time to be most suitable to its own special requirements.
"The continental system is a paternal system in which the gov-
ernment overlooks and controls all the acts of the companies.
The American system is one of complete freedom. Neither sys-
tem is exactly suited to our (English) requirements, or our
characteristics. But the English system is like the American, in
so far as it is based on principles of freedom.
' ' This remark of
the Royal Commission on Railways of 1865-67 5 regarding the
rate system of Europe and America applies equally well in the
case of railway finance. Thus the general policy of the Board of
Trade, the Government office which has much to do with rail-
ways, "has rather been to favor the utmost liberty to public
companies to arrange their capital in any way they pleased.
' ' 6
But at the same time the English Parliament recognized that
for the public advantage it is desirable that a railway should
yield a reasonable return to its investors.
7 When a railway pays
little or no dividend on its capital, it has been feared that work-
ing expenses may be cut down injuriously, with the resulting dis-
advantages of insufficient or inefficient service. Then again, the
embarrassment of one company in failing to furnish reasonable
returns on its capital might discourage other investors from com-
ing forward to put their money in the beneficial railway enter-
prise, which fact would result not only in the checking of the
railway industry itself but in the hampering of the growth of all
* Beport of Eoyal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. vii.
5 Report of Royal Com. on Railways, 1867, p. liL
e Evidence before Select Committee on Railway Stock Conversion, 1890,
p. 37.
7 Report of Select Committee on Railway Borrowing Powers, 1864, p. iii.
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other industries and commerce in general. Furthermore, Eng-
land has for years recognized the value of encouraging the cir-
culation of capital, as shown by her effort to provide for the in-
vestment of all trust funds. These and other reasons led Parlia-
ment to attempt, from the beginning of railway enterprise, to
regulate railway finance not for the direct interest, of the gov-
ernment but for the security of the investors. 8 From a close
study of the efforts of Parliament in regulating railway finance,
one cannot fail to be impressed by the feeling that the English
legislature has constantly borne this in mind.
There were in England, during the early years of its railway
history, as there are now in the United States, many people who
did not believe in government regulation of railway finance for
the protection of investors. A leading lawyer in London said,9
"I do not see why the Legislature should interfere to protect
them (railway investors) more than other people. If they choose
to take shares upon those conditions, it is their own affair." A
prominent financial paper 10 also said that "as a principle, we
believe there is nothing more objectionable than an attempt on
the part of a government to find prudence for the people. It re-
moves a great weight of personal and individual responsibility
and caution, and creates a reliance on public officers as the only,
however imperfect, substitute.
' '
These opinions changed radically at times/1 but gradually
people began to appreciate the fact that certain regulations are
indispensable for the protection of the investors in such a com-
plicated business as railways, where it is well nigh impossible
for the layman investor to ascertain the value or safety of se-
curities issued, and where the confidence of the multitude of in-
s Report of Committee, April 24, 1837, p. xxvii, Parliamentary Papers,
1837, vol. 14, part 1.
9 Evidence before Select Committee on Eailway Companies' Borrowing
Powers, 1864, p. 20.
10 Economist, February 8, 1845.
11 The Economist said that at one period, '
' men loudly complain of any
impediment, however right it may be, which the restriction of acts of Par-
liament throw in their (railways') way," while at another time, "they
evince the greatest impatience that Parliament will not at once disregard
every general principle and interfere by compulsory means to put a stop to
a course undertaken with their own free-will." Economist, April 11, 1846.
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vestors has an immediate and serious effect upon the commerce
of the whole nation.
This general policy has changed from time to time, although
not as violently as it has in some other countries or as it has in
the regulation of other branches of railway enterprise in Eng-
land itself. 12 The change of policy has been due, on the one
hand, to the change of public opinion and the circumstances of
the time; and, on the other hand, to the changes within Parlia-
ment itself. It may be said safely that English railway policy
has largely depended upon a varying and conglomerate body of
legislators,
' ' who may be assumed to have had no special famili-
arity with the subject on which they were legislating.
" 13 As
Parliament has power to adopt any general or special measures to
regulate any branch of railway enterprise as it sees fit, one may
readily expect that occasional deviations from the adopted prin-
ciples would be made.
The nature of the English system of regulation is also charac-
teristic. Railway finance in England is regulated by two sets of
rules :
A. General laws applicable to all companies.
B. Special laws applicable to particular companies.
The general laws are based on broad principles and are em-
bodied in the general acts of Parliament. These general acts are
applicable as a whole or only by incorporation in the special acts
of the companies as the case may be. The special acts, which are
enacted to govern individual companies, resemble the charters
in the United States, but are obtainable only from Parliament by
fulfilling certain requirements.
In the first place, the special act creates an incorporated com-
pany with all the corporate privileges attaching to such incor-
poration. In the next place, it gives power for, and prescribes
rules governing the raising of capital. Then it grants the com-
pany the necessary powers to take land, lays down the rules gov-
erning meetings of the company, the construction of the road,
and finally it defines the right of the public in using the railway.
It also outlines the powers of the company, for example in charg-
ing tolls. The fact that out of a total number of forty-four sec-
12 J. S. Jeans, Railway Problems, 1887, p. 64.
13 w. W. Acworth, Elements of Bailway Economics, 1905, p. 132.
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tions of a recent railway bill " fourteen are devoted to financial
matters, fairly indicates the importance attached by Parliament
to the regulation of railway finance.
In these special acts are included not only the special regula-
tions made to meet the individual conditions of the company, but
also various provisions contained in the general companies acts.
A clause is uniformly inserted to subject the company to "the
provisions of any general act relating to railways now in force,
or which may hereafter pass.
' ' 15
It follows, as a consequence of Parliament having granted to
each company in its special act its corporate privileges, that
when the company desires to alter the terms of that incorporat-
ing act, to enlarge its original capital, or in any way to vary the
conditions under which the capital is to be raised, a new applica-
tion to Parliament becomes necessary.16
The most important of the general acts governing railway
finance are the Companies Clauses Acts, 1845 and 1863, Railway
Companies Securities Act, 1866, Railway Companies Act, 1867,
Regulation of Railways Act, 1868, and Railway Regulation Act,
1871. All except the first two acts named above are applicable
to all railways without incorporation in the special acts.
In the enactment of special acts, Parliament is guided by a set
of standing orders as well as its model bills and clauses.
While the development of English legislation on railway
(finance has been a continuous one, still it may be divided into
three periods. The years from 1801 to 1844 form the first
period, 1845 to 1871, the second period, and 1872 to date, the
third period.
Although railway finance has received much consideration
from the beginning, during the first period it was regulated in a
more or less haphazard manner. The legislative measures then
taken were modelled after the special canal and turnpike enact-
ments. There was no general law governing railway finance.
The second period, covering the twenty-seven years from 1845
to 1871, is by far the most important in the history of English
legislation on railway finance. Concurrent with the railway
i* The Coventry Railway Bill, 1910, now withdrawn.
is Standing Order No. 1686 of the House of Commons, 1906.
is Report of the Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xlii.
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mania and disastrous railway panics which formed a special
feature of this period, the English system of financial legislation
underwent rapid evolution and was subjected to repeated tests.
The financial problems of railways formed a common topic of
conversation and were kept constantly before the eyes of Parlia-
ment. Numerous inquiries were put on foot, and attempts made
to bring the system of legislation to a higher state of efficiency.
As a result of this unparalleled activity of both the public and
Parliament, all the important general acts governing railway
finance were passed during this period. The rules which were
then adopted have remained unchanged, and few additions have
been made. The regulations which England uses to-day in gov-
erning railway finance, with the single exception of the Railway
Accounts Act of 1911, are exactly those adopted prior to 1871.
Be these acts efficient or not, the fact that they have seen service
for over forty years without being modified clearly indicates
either one or the other of two theories. First, it may mean that
the English system had been developed to such completeness prior
to 1871 that no modification has become necessary or, secondly,
it may mean that after the exertion during the .sixties, the Eng-
lish have been undergoing a state of reaction and have since be-
come too inert to modify these rules. While both hypotheses are
to a certain extent permissible, history shows the first to be the
more reasonable.
As has been indicated before, no legislation on railway finance
has taken place since 1871. From that year on has been a period
of application of principles already adopted during the first two
periods. Stock-watering received consideration in 1890, but no
general legislation or new principle was evolved. Moreover, the
present outlook indicates that with the exception of some legisla-
tion on railway accounting, few material changes are likely to
take place in the near future.
While the general purpose of all the legislation is to afford se-
curity to the investors, yet the place of emphasis of each period
is distinct and different from those of the other periods. Thus
the early legislation was largely for the purpose of insuring the
bona fide character of railway enterprise before granting Parlia-
mentary recognition and of demanding, though without a true
understanding of its significance at the time, publicity of rail-
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way affairs. Different from almost all other nations, as already
stated, the English did not have trouble in inducing investors to
embark in railway enterprises. On the contrary, she had to ex-
ercise considerable restraining influence. Thus the most prom-
inent topic of legislation during the early period was the matter
of preventing
' ' bubble ' ' schemes by securing an efficient system
of subscription contracts and of requiring substantial deposits of
money on each share subscribed, before permitting railway enter-
prises to receive Parliamentary sanction.
The question which received the greatest emphasis during the
second period was how to restore the confidence of the investing
public. The early regulations proved to be too indefinite, and
railway finance was found to demand more public interference.
Therefore, efforts were mostly directed toward finding methods
of regulating railway finance rather than to the discovery of new
principles.
Coming to the third period, we find the place of emphasis has
returned to that of the first period, especially in the matter of
publicity. The most important inquiries made during this period
have invariably resulted in the demand for greater publicity. In
spite of this similarity in emphasis, however, there is neverthe-
less a distinct difference, in that what has been done during the
third period is more definite and has been done with a much
clearer conception of what publicity means in the regulation of
railway finance than during the first period. After forty years'
experiment, England has remained where she was four decades
ago, as far as the standing rules are concerned ; but she seems to
have determined upon the relative emphasis to be applied to her
system of regulation in the future.
In tracing the historical development we find that prior to
1844 English legislation on railway finance was limited to the
provisions embodied in the numerous private acts. Each com-
pany had its own special acts which contained the entire statute
law applicable to the undertaking of that company. 17
Early legislation was greatly influenced by the current con-
ception of the railway as a turnpike. Time and again we find
acts passed which dealt jointly with stage roads and railways as
if the two were similar. The Duke of Wellington is said to have
IT Report of Eoyal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. vii.
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stated that in dealing with railways it was above all else neces-
sary to bear in mind the analogy of the King's highways.18 This
remark, misleading as it appears now, was well representative of
the current belief.
Then again, the early acts followed very closely in their gen-
eral scope, the provisions which had been applied to canal com-
panies. The earliest canal acts, however, gave no power of bor-
rowing,19 while the railways had been permitted to borrow from
the beginning, to a certain extent. Thus the act of May 21,
1801,
20 the earliest railway act, providing for the construction
and maintenance of a railway from Wandsworth to Pitlake,
stated,
' '
Proprietors may raise 30,000 by shares of one hundred
pounds each, to be numbered and deemed as personal estate.
Names of proprietors to be entered in a book, and tickets of their
shares distributed to them. Proprietors may raise 15,000 more
if necessary, by subscription or mortgage."
Before 1847 considerable laxity, however, prevailed in the
manner of framing the provisions governing the raising of cap-
ital. But the great burst of railway extension in 1836 awakened
some legislative activity, and the committees of Parliament
on railway bills began to feel the necessity of enacting
clauses conducive to the public welfare. A select committee was
appointed to inquire into the matter, but no legislation took
place.
21
However, the restrictions imposed by Parliament, in
1837 and subsequently on the obtaining of railway acts, tem-
porarily arrested speculation.
In 1839 a select committee was again appointed to inquire into
the state of railway communication, and as a result of its recom-
mendations a general "saving" clause was inserted in the Croy-
don railway bill.22 In 1840 another select committee was ap-
pointed by the House of Commons to inquire into railway af-
is C. F. Adams, Railroads, p. 82.
19 The first act in which these powers appeared was passed in 1770. By
degrees the borrowing powers of public companies were restricted to one-
third of their share capital. See Report of Eoyal Commission on Bailways,
1867, p. vii.
20 41 George 3, c. 33.
21 Quarterly Review, v. LXXIV, p. 239.
22 The "saving" clause inserted in the Croydon bill reads:
' ' And be it further enacted that nothing herein contained shall be
deemed or construed to exempt the railway by this or the said recited acts
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fairs. 23 Although no general legislation took place, commit-
tees seem to have done considerable good in throwing light
upon the nature of railway transportation.24
Under this irregular system of legislation numerous charters
were granted and liberal encouragements were sometimes given
to the construction of railways. Then came that disastrous rail-
way mania of 1844, and England "awoke one day" as C. F.
Adams dramatically describes it, "from dreams of boundless
wealth to the reality of general ruin.
' ' 25
To see what could be done to improve the situation, a Parlia-
mentary committee was appointed early in 1844. It recom-
mended, and Parliament resolved that the following "saving"
clause, which had been inserted in railways bills in 1839, should
be uniformly inserted in all railway bills approved by Parlia-
ment. The clause was as follows: "And be it further enacted
that nothing herein contained shall be deemed or construed to
exempt the railway by this or the said recited Acts authorized to
be made from the provisions of any general Act relating to such
Bills which may pass during the present session of Parliament,
or of any general Act relating to railways which may pass dur-
ing the present or any future session of Parliament."
The committee gave to the question of railway legislation a
more comprehensive consideration than it had hitherto received.
As a result of the inquiries of this committee, provisions were
authorized to be made, from the provisions of any general act relating to
railways which may pass during the present or any future session of Par-
liament. " Hansard, v. 47, pp. 682-684. Compare with a similar clause
resolved by Parliament to be inserted in all railway bills, since 1844, which
appears in the next page.
23 Eeport of Boyal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. x.
24 This committee was the first body of officials to point out to Parlia-
ment that the right reserved to the public by the early railway acts of run-
ning their engines and carriages on the railways was practically a dead
letter, for the reason that (1) no provision had been made for ensuring to
independent trains, etc., access to stations and watering places along the
line, (2) the rates of charges limited by the acts were almost always too
high to permit independent parties to work their trains, (3) the necessity
of placing the running of all trains under the complete control of one man-
agement interposed much difficulty in the way of independent traders.
Ibid., p. x.
25 C. F. Adams, Railroads, p. 85.
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made, in the Railway Regulations Act, 1844, 26 for the suppres-
sion of loan notes which had been issued without legal authority
during the period of rapid railway extension.
By this time the provisions of the special acts governing each
company had become very complicated and numerous. The num-
ber of clauses contained in some of these acts had gradually in-
creased from 95, as in the act for the Wandsworth and Croyden
Railway, 1801, to 381, as in the act of the Lancaster and Carlisle
Railway passed in 1844. As Lord Somerset 27 remarked in the
House of Commons, there were an "immense" number of stat-
utes relating to these railway matters which occasioned a great
amount of uncertainty. In order to obtain greater uniformity
in the general provisions inserted in railway acts and to render
them more concise, the select committee of 1844 2S recommended
that the numerous clauses in railway acts which
' '
were common
to all and undisputed
' '
should be consolidated into a general act.
In the following year, Parliament following the recommenda-
tions of the select committee of 1844, for the first time passed
three clauses consolidation acts, containing the clauses which
were applicable to companies in general and which had been
usually inserted in the private acts, as well as some other general
provisions which Parliament deemed it desirable to enforce. This
was done with the hope of securing uniformity. The acts, how-
ever, did not prevent committees of either house of Parliament
from dispensing with some of these provisions in particular cases.
One of the three general acts had to do with the regulation of
railway finance. This act 29 contained provisions for regulating
the manner in which the companies' capital should be raised, the
further borrowing of money, the rights and responsibilities of
shareholders, the powers and duties of directors, the declaration
of dividends, the keeping and auditing of accounts, and, in a
general way, the manner in which the companies' financial af-
fairs should be conducted. 30
The expectations of the legislature in enacting the general act
26 7 & 8 V. e. 85 ss. 19-21.
27 Hansard, v. 77, p. 170.
28 Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xi.
29 The Companies Clauses Act, 1845, 8 V. c. 16.
30 See also Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xii.
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were fully and quickly realized. The consolidation of the nu-
merous clauses brought about a great degree of certainty and
uniformity, and made the law more accessible and intelligible to
the public.
It must be remembered that, at the time when the Companies
Clauses Act, 1845, was passed, the great railway mania was at its
height. The profitable returns afforded by the earlier railways
attracted a large amount of capital. Consequently competing
lines were proposed to most of the important centers of popula-
tion. Parliament, as the report of the select committee of 1844
showed, sanctioned many such lines for the purpose of encour-
aging competition, with the belief that the remedy for the evil
consequences of any monopoly which a railway was thought to
possess, was to be found in the construction of a competing
line. 31
' ' There has certainly never before been any one object of
speculation,
' '
said the Economist in 1845,
' ' into which all classes
and ranks of men have entered so warmly as at this time into
railways. There seemed to be no business too absorbing, no pro-
fession too grave, and no privacy too secluded, to be able to keep
off this universal mania." 32
Reaction soon followed action with equal force. The feverish
railway extension led to a demand for capital for investment
larger than the resources of the country could supply. As the
railway fever was intense, so was the railway collapse complete.
At the end of 1847 an act 33 had to be passed to extend the time
for the construction of many railways, and in 1850 another act 34
to enable railway companies to abandon powers of proceeding
with portions of their undertakings, and to release them from
the conditions which had been attached to such powers. The
complete collapse may be shown by the fact that of the 8,592
miles of railway sanctioned in the three sessions of 1845, 1846,
and 1847, no less than 1,560 miles were abandoned under the
power of the Railway Abandonment Act. 35
The financial difficulties caused by the pressure for capital led
the House of Lords to appoint a committee in 1849 to consider
31 Report of Eoyal Commission on Eailways, 1867, p. xvii.
32 Economist, February 1, 1845.
ss See Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xvi.
3* Abandonment of Railways Act, 1850, 13 & 14 V. c. 83.
35 Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xviii.
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whether the railway acts did not require amendment, with a view
of providing for a more effectual audit of accounts, to guard
against the wrong application of the companies' funds. 38 This
committee recommended, for the first time in railway history,
the adoption of a uniform system of accounts and government
audit. 37 No immediate legislation, however, took place.
These and other events which took place during the later
forties and the fifties brought to light many new problems in
railway finance, as a result of which additional provisions differ-
ent from those contained in the Companies Clauses Act, 1845,
were frequently introduced into railway bills. Accordingly, the
Companies Clauses Act of 1863,38 was enacted to extend the
former clauses act. This act of 1863 contained four new prin-
ciples, of which the first three had to do with railway finance.
The first of these three related to the cancellation and surrender
of shares, the second had to do with the creation of additional
capital, and the third governed the creation and issue of deben-
ture stocks.
During this period, the railways, in addition to their tendency
toward extension, had a general policy of "buying up" every
thing, in order to keep out all other lines from their own districts,
at the same time invading as far as possible those of other lines. 39
This of course proved as costly to themselves as it was to their
enemies. Heavy debts were contracted "for the purpose of se-
curing old traffic against intruders and for developing new traffic
for extensions and branches. ' ' 40 These struggles developed to
such an extravagant extent that in spite of the favorable gross
incomes, the dividends were low. Therefore, some shareholders
' '
sincerely believed that if the Committee-rooms of the House of
Commons were closed for five years, it would be the most impor-
tant thing that had ever been done to protect railway property."
But Parliament apparently failed to realize clearly the serious
nature of the situation. It had adopted a number of restrictions,
but it failed to see to it that these restrictions were enforced.
36
37 Much attention was given to the question of uniform accounts. The
subject will be taken up more fully in Chapters VII and VIII.
38 26 & 27 V. c. 118.
39 London Times, February 9, 1863, p. 9.
<o London Times, February 23, 1863, p. 8.
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Consequently the speculative schemes as well as established com-
panies found it quite easy to get around the Parliamentary re-
strictions. Men of straw were secured to sign up subscriptions
for shares. Borrowed money was produced as paid-up portions
of shares for deposit. Furthermore, not only was the legal limit
of borrowing powers in many cases exceeded by the excessive
issue of debenture, but a sort of note called Lloyd 's bonds 41 was
issued for amounts of money many times in excess of the statu-
tory borrowing powers. As, according to the existing law, only
the securities issued within the parliamentary limits were legal
and hence valid, much confusion and difficulty followed the ex-
cessive issues, which in turn greatly damaged the credit of rail-
way companies. Further money, consequently, was difficult to
obtain.
Parliament, as most governments would do when in difficulty,
appointed two select committees, one in 1863 and the other in
the following year, to investigate the matter. These two select
committees made a number of good recommendations for the bet-
terment of railway finance, but no action was taken by Parlia-
ment to give effect to these recommendations until 1866, when
the Companies Securities Act, 1866,42 was passed, requiring,
under penalty for failure, the railway companies to have regis-
tered officers and to deposit with the registrar of joint stock com-
panies statements of their borrowing powers and half-yearly loan
accounts. In the act were also set forth the particulars to be
specified in these statements and half-yearly accounts. The act
also prohibited railway companies from borrowing any money
before depositing the statement of their borrowing powers just
referred to. Moreover, the directors were required to declare
"each for himself" on every mortgage deed or bond, or certifi-
cate of debenture stock, that the specific security was issued
under the borrowing powers of the company as registered.
This measure, useful as it has proven to be, was far from being
effective in dispelling the chaos. The "arcadian simplicity of
the early times" where most railway bills before Parliament rep-
*i They are a sort of railway exchequer bonds, representing what in the
United States is called a floating debt, which is to be capitalized and paid
off sometime or other. They bear the name of the parliamentary draftsman
who originated them.
42 29 & 30 V. c. 108.
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resented the enterprise and capital of a number of bona fide in-
vestors had long passed away. Instead, the "speculative ele-
ment" prevailed. Subscription of railway shares actually be-
came, in some cases, a process of "selling in the market of the
powers conferred by the Legislature." 43 Contractors' schemes,
instead of railway corporations, became the center of railway
activity. These contractors' schemes soon became unable to sup-
port their undertaking, and they had to resort to the "finance"
companies 44 for help. As the latter were nothing but paper cre-
ations of credit, founded on works that were not or could not be
completed, and as these finance companies themselves offered no
security, the result could be readily foreseen. Not only did the
finance companies fail to bolster up the contractors' schemes, but
they were both dragged down to mutual ruin.45 Thus came the
terrible collapse of 1867. There was so much confusion and dis-
trust of what was taking place in the railway companies, "that
all which the railway boards now say is searched between the
lines
;
is suspected of ambiguity even when plain ; is taken in a
sense unfavorable to the railway when doubtful ; is believed when
it is against the board, and disbelieved when for the board." 48
The panic was a bitter, but a beneficial lesson, as a result of
which several fundamental principles were evolved. It was real-
ized 47 that the difficulties were to a great extent caused by the
mistaken view taken by Parliament originally in copying the
provisions of the old canal bills for the regulation of railway
finance, without taking account of the difference between the se-
curities issued by the canals and those by the railways, and with-
out weighing the consequences of so large an amount of per-
manent works being provided for by a floating instead of a fixed
debt.48 With the idea that a railway, like a canal or a turnpike
is London Times, May 15, 1866.
4* These finance companies were formed for the avowed purpose of pro-
viding the capital which would enable the contractors to carry on their
works. See Hansard, vol. 183, pp. 857-858.
45 Ibid.
46 Economist, December 21, 1867.
47 Hansard, vol. 185, pp. 784-785.
48 Under the canal bills, the loans raised were precisely like mortgages of
any other landed estates and were usually for seven or fourteen years, and
the total amount was said to be small. Under the railway bills, altogether
over 120,000,000 had been taken from the floating capital of the country
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road, was to be open to all the world, so that anybody might
place his own engines and carriages on the line and run them,
on condition that he paid the company certain tolls for the privi-
lege, Parliament, in granting a lien on the tolls, gave what it
then considered to be as good a security as the mortgage on a
landed estate.49 Therefore, the security for railway debentures
was made to cover only the permanent road-bed and the tolls, as
railway charges were then called, of the undertaking; and the
rolling stock was excluded.
The revelations of 1867 made clear the vast differences between
the railways and the canals, and made Parliament realize the de-
sirability of extending the lien of railway debentures to the
rolling stock of the companies. Consequently the Companies
Arrangement and the Debenture Holders Bill were introduced in
the session of 1867. After considerable deliberation by a special
committee the two bills were fused, as they were, into the Rail-
way Companies Bill. The purpose of the bill, as outlined by the
Duke of Richmond, was to give greater security to railway prop-
erty and to all classes of shareholders.50
The procedure connected with the passage of this
" finance'*
bill was entirely different from that connected with the bills of
former years. It received a very thorough investigation in the
committee as well as in both houses of Parliament. Indeed, the
bill came out from the committee room in a very different form
from that in which it was originally sent. The committee dis-
cussed every clause in the bill and had a division upon almost
every one of the clauses. There was so much objection on all
sides, that "if all their objections prevailed, there would not be a
single clause left in the bill.
' ' 51
The bill received royal assent in August, 1867, and became the
Railway Companies Act of that year.52 The novel, and by far
the most important feature of the Act, was the provision made
for the protection of the rolling stock and plant from seizure,
under much shorter dated securities, which were not mortgages in the usual
sense of the term and could not then be held by trustees. According to IL
C. E. Childer, Hansard, vol. 185, pp. 784-785.
**l~bid., p. 786.
so Hansard, vol. 188, pp. 489-490.
si Hid., pp. 157-161.
52 30 & 31 V. c. 127.
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thus affording additional security to the debenture-holders and
insuring the convenience of the public. Besides providing for
the creation and issue of debenture stock and new capital, and
stipulating the rules governing the abandonment of railways, the
act made it possible for the companies to adopt ' ' schemes of ar-
rangement" in case they became unable to meet their engage-
ments. 53
Moreover for the first time all restrictions upon the rate of in-
terest on debentures were removed, and henceforth the com-
panies were given the liberty to arrange and pay whatever rate
of interest suited them best instead of being handicapped
by the rate sanctioned by Parliament, as had been the case
before.
Another new provision introduced was that no dividends
should be declared until all accounts of the company were audit-
ed and a declaration made by the auditors to the effect that the
proposed dividends were bona fide.
Just about this time, the Royal Commission on Railways of
1865-1867 made its report, in which special attention was called
to the importance of a uniform system of accounts for the effec-
tive regulation of railway finance. Although its work has often
been regarded as a failure,54 its conclusions regarding the impor-
tance of uniform accounting have proven sound and of great
value.
Almost simultaneously with the report of the Royal Commis-
sion; the railways and the public also became aware of the great
importance of adopting some uniform system of accounts. Mem-
bers of Parliament began to realize the inadequacy of the old
system which permitted each railway to adopt its own system of
accounts and to keep it in its own way. This irregularity in ac-
counting was recognized not only as one of the causes of the
panic, which was then not yet over, but was considered as unde-
sirable in itself. It was quite generally recognized
55 that there
was no cure for the mischief of delusion, nor any hope for rail-
way property, except by the introduction of a principle of ac-
counting in which nothing would be admitted as profit but the
ss Hansard, vol. 189, p. 159; also see ss. 6-22 of Act.
s* A. T. Hadley, Railroad Transportation, 1903, p. 169.
ss London Times, November 8, 1867, p. 6.
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surplus of actual receipts over actual expenditures. Consequent-
ly much agitation took place. A number of bills 5<J for the regu-
lation of railway accounts were introduced into Parliament as a
result of which the Regulation of Railways Bill, 1868, was pre-
pared and introduced by the Board of Trade. In preparing this
bill, the Board of Trade not only gave careful consideration to
the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Railways and
took advantage of the experience of the previous years, but con-
sulted frequently a number of railway accountants and other ex-
perts. Parliament also gave the measure unprecedented atten-
tion. It no longer, for the time being at least, had any fear of
general and sentimental opposition to sane measures on this sub-
ject. The only question before it, therefore, was what should be
done to restore to railways their lost confidence and what meas-
ures should be adopted to prevent future malversation in railway
finance. 57
Under such favorable circumstances, the bill received unusual-
ly careful consideration instead of the former party quibbles,
and obtained royal assent in July, 1868. Henceforth all railway
companies were required to prepare and present, semi-annually,
a statement of accounts and balance sheets according to the
forms perscribed. The officers were subjected to severe penalty
for falsifying such accounts or statements. A system of gov-
ernment inspection and audit was also adopted.
The part of the act dealing with accounts and audit was at
once recognized as of a novel nature, and hence received much
discussion.58 In spite of the fact that the act contained seven
parts, of which only one dealt with accounts and auditing, it has
been called, with good reason, an accounting act. Although the
general usefulness of a uniform system of accounts was felt, the
true import of such a system was not fully recognized. Much
less was it recognized that this measure was to be the culmination
of a century's work in legislation on railway finance. Neverthe-
less, this was the case. With the exception of the enactment of
the Railway Regulation Act, 1871,59 dealing with railway statis-
ss The Eailway and Joint Stock Companies Account Bill and the Com-
panies Audit of Accounts Bill, etc.
57 Hansard, vol. 191, p. 1536.
ss Economist, March 21, 1868.
59 34 & 35 V. c. 78.
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tics, and the insertion, since 1890, of some special clauses in the
special acts governing the watering of stocks, no general legisla-
tive measure has been adopted since. Even the somewhat anti-
quated requirement of semi-annual accounts as well as the forms
of these accounts adopted prior to 1871 have been in use until
very recently. The system of accounts had, indeed, for some
time been recognized as inadequate and a departmental commit-
tee with a number of well known economists, statisticians, and
accountants as members, recommended in 1909 its modification.
A bill was actually introduced to give effect to the committee's
recommendation, but nothing had been done until 1911 when a
new accounts act was passed.
60 Hence with little qualification,
we may say that English legislation on railway finance was
closed by the passage of the Railway Regulation Act, 1871, and
with the exception of accounting what guides England to-day in
regulating the financial affairs of her railways is exactly what
guided her four decades ago.
To describe briefly the present scope of English legislative
control of railway finance, we may say that before incorporation,
the entrepreneurs are required to produce sufficient evidence that
all the proposed share capital has been subscribed for by bona
fide investors and that a deposit varying from 5 to 10 per cent
of the total estimated cost of the undertaking has been made.
The conditions under which the share capital may be raised and
the privileges and responsibilities of the subscribers, as well as
the rules governing the issue, cancellation, and surrender of such
shares are prescribed in detail. Preference shares with a fixed
rate of dividend may be issued according to the regulations laid
down by Parliament, and ordinary shares may be "split" into
preferred and deferred portions under certain conditions. Stock-
watering is permitted, but it must be done in the open, and a
record of such operations must be made in the company's ac-
counts.
The companies are given power to borrow on mortgage to the
extent of one-fourth of their total paid up capital. But such
borrowing powers are not to be exercised until all the shares of
the company are taken and one-half of the total on such shares
has been paid up. Only the securities issued within the statu-
-
GO 1 & 2 Geo. V, Cap. 34.
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tory limits are regarded as legal securities, to enjoy the special
privileges given by law to mortgages.
In incorporation and in raising additional capital, the com-
panies are required to state in each and every case the purpose
for which money is raised, and they are prohibited from apply-
ing any money so raised to purposes other than those approved
by Parliament.
Annual accounts of all the incomes and expenditures are to be
kept according to the uniform system of accounts adopted in
1868, as revised in 1911, and annual statistical returns must be
made to the Board of Trade according to the rules prescribed in
the Railway Regulation Act of 1871 and the Railway Companies
(Accounts and Returns) Act of 1911. Government audit and
inspection of the company's affairs may be resorted to under
certain special circumstances.
Aside from these restrictions, the English railways are per-
mitted to do as they please in managing their financial matters,
subject to the common law of the country. But Parliament has
power to pass any general law governing railway finance as it
sees fit. Railway companies may change their original terms of
incorporation, or vary the conditions under which their capital
may be raised or spent, or effect any other modifications regard-
ing financial affairs; but in each and every case, they are re-
quired to apply to Parliament for special permission.61
England, we have stated, undertook to regulate railway finance
long before some other countries realized the importance of this
branch of government activity. Thus, it may well be asked in
the beginning, (1) Why did England deem such actions neces-
sary? and (2) what led her to adopt her unique policy? The
first question may be answered by stating that England has long
recognized that public advantage requires that railways should
6i In practice, the permission can usually be obtained without any diffi-
culty, if there is no serious opposition. The following passage from an
editorial of the Economist, April 9, 1870, to a large extent expresses the
situation :
The
"position (of Parliament) towards applicants for powers is very
simple. It is the mere dispenser of an authority which the applicants wish
to possess, and which it confers upon them in order that the country may
gain. Both parties are quite free in the matter. The companies to make a
profit apply for the power, and Parliament believing that its constituents
will gain, assents to the demand."
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yield reasonable returns to those who invest in such undertak-
ings and that a certain amount of government interference is
required to help investors to identify the securities issued by
railway companies, which they are asked to take up. To raise
a sufficient barrier against swindling operations and to protect
the public from "bubble" schemes, seem to be objects underly-
ing all the legislative actions of Parliament.
In answer to the second question as to why Parliament has
adopted its particular policy in regulating railway finance, it
may be said that although Parliament attempted to adopt more
stringent measures for realizing the purposes just referred to, it
was constantly reminded of the fact that England is a country
of free enterprise. The general principle was well established
that the state should interfere as little as possible with what is
being or is capable of being performed by private enterprise.
There has been even considerable cry that "the cost of a railway
is a matter with which the public and Parliament have no con-
cern.
' ' 62 The idea that an enlightened view of their own in-
terest would always compel railway officers to have due regard
to the general advantage of the public has always been kept
prominently before the attention of the government. More-
over, Parliament is an elective body, and has consequently been
influenced by popular conceptions in dealing with such scientific
questions as the regulation of railway finance.
Moreover, by the time Parliament had fully realized the im-
portance of more strict regulation, its laissez faire rules had
been established, and an enormous amount of capital already
invested in the railway business. Parliament therefore felt that
it would be unjust to withdraw in any way the early conces-
sions which led to the investments. The constant desire to make
railway investments safe securities on the one hand and to in-
terfere with railway management as little as possible on the oth-
er, seems to have caused Parliament to adopt its unique system
of regulation of railway finance which seems to differ from that
of all other countries.
62 London Times, June 4, and June 12, 1886.
CHAPTER II
LEGISLATIVE SUPERVISION OF CAPITALIZATION
A SHARE CAPITAL
The greater part of English railway capital is raised by the
issue of three classes of instruments/ varying in security and
interest The net income is liable in the first instance to the
claims of the debenture holders, then to tho.se of the holders of
preference shares, and ultimately to those of the holders of or-
dinary shares. 2
In general a railway raises its capital in the first instance by
issuing ordinary shares. When this class falls to a discount, or
for some other reason, the company has recourse to inviting
subscriptions to preference or guaranteed shares. The holders
of the latter class of stocks are, to a certain extent, not only
proprietors but semi-creditors of the company, in that the net
income of the company is first of all secured to them in priority
over the ordinary stock holders. When the ordinary and pref-
erence stock are both taken up and, theoretically, paid for in
cash to the amount of the nominal value, then the company may
use its authority, granted by Parliament, to borrow money on de-
benture, mortgage, or otherwise, to the extent of one-third of
the amount raised by shares or one-fourth of the total capital. 3
Among the several important features into which the parlia-
1 Formerly railway securities were divided into five classes: ordinary,
guaranteed, preferential, loans, and debenture stock. About 1870, the sec-
ond and third classes as well as the fourth and fifth classes were merged.
In addition to these principal classes, there are also various subordinate
issues such as rent charge stocks which are practically guaranteed stocks,
and preferred and deferred stocks. The latter two, however, are but com-
ponents of the ordinary stock. There is another very rare class (according
to Wm. J. Stevens, British Railways, p. 4), called the contingent right stock
which shares in dividends with the ordinary stock after a certain rate on
the latter has been paid.
2 See London Times, August 27, 1871.
3 Cf. John Fraser, British Eailroads, 1903, pp. 26-27.
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mentary committee on railway bills would make inquiry before
recommending the passage of such bills were the financial affairs
of the applying company. 4 They would scrutinize, first of all,
the amount of the capital to be raised by the company, whether
by the creation of shares or by loans. Thus besides considering
the location and nature of the line, special engineering difficul-
ties, expected traffic, etc., the committee on railway bills in 18M,
as in the case of the Brighton and Chichester Railway, considered
carefully the following questions :
5
1. The amount of the proposed capital and the amount of
loans to be raised.
2. The amount of shares subscribed for and the deposits paid
thereon.
3. The names and places of residence of the directors with
the amount of shares taken by each.
4. The number of shareholders who might be considered as
having a local interest in the line, and the amount of capital
subscribed by them, together with their names and addresses.
5. The number of other shareholders and the capital taken
by them.
It was only after being satisfied with respect to these points
as set forth in the bill, that the committee would recommend
its passage. The manner in which these provisions governing
share capital of railway companies were embodied in the special
acts is illustrated by the following passages from the London and
Croydon Railway Act of 1837 : 6
"CXXXVI. And whereas the probable expense of making
the railway and other works hereby authorized will amount to
the sum of 1,800,000, and sums exceeding that amount have been
subscribed under the subscription contracts . . . ; be it en-
acted, That, notwithstanding any thing in the several subscrip-
tion deeds or contracts . .
.,
the capital of the company here-
by incorporated shall be 1,800,000 divided into 36,000 shares of
50 each; and that such shares shall, as soon as conveniently
may be after the passing of this act, be apportioned and di-
vided to and amongst the several provisional Committees or pro-
visional Directors . .
.,
in the proportion herein-before men-
tioned. . ."
The act further permitted the company to increase the num-
ber of shares by diminishing the amount in value of each share
4 Railway Times, October 5, 1839.
s Ibid., April 25, 1844.
6 Hereafter called the Croydon Railway Act.
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in order to facilitate the allotment of such shares among the
subscribers.
As these clauses became numerous and complicated Parliament
consolidated them and a number of other provisions into gen-
eral provisions to be applicable to all companies. Thus in the
Companies Clauses Act, 1845, provisions were made to the effect
that the capital of the companies should be divided into shares
of the prescribed number and amount and that such shares
should be numbered in arithmetical progression. 7 All the pro-
visions as being outlined in the private act just referred to were
also set forth with precision. Further provision was made to
enable railway companies to convert their borrowed money into
share capital under certain conditions.
8
In England, as in other countries, the railways were given
compulsory power to take land; but they were not allowed to
exercise such power until they produced a certificate under the
hands of two justices certifying that the whole of the capital or
estimated sum for defraying the expenses of the undertaking
had been subscribed under contract binding upon the subscrib-
ers.
9 Companies were also forbidden to reduce their capital by
the payment of dividends ; 10 but they might reduce their capital
in case the commissioners of railways authorized the abandon-
ment of a part of their undertaking and the commissioners fav-
ored such a reduction of capital. 11
As has been referred to, the Companies Clauses Act of 1845
7 Companies Clauses Act, 1845, 8 V. cap. 16.
8 " 56. It shall be lawful for the company, if they think fit, unless it be
otherwise provided by the special act, to raise the additional sum so author-
ized to be borrowed, or any part thereof, by creating new shares of the
company, instead of borrowing the same, or having borrowed the same, to
continue at interest only a part of such additional sum, and to raise part
thereof by creating new shares; but no such augmentation of capital . . .
shall take place without the previous authority of a general meeting of the
company.
"57. The capital so to be raised by the creation of new shares shall be
considered a part of the general capital, and shall be subject to the same
provisions in all respects, whether with reference to the payment of calls,
or the forfeiture of shares on nonpayment of calls, or otherwise, . . .
"
9 Lands Clauses Act, 1845, 8 V. cap. 18, ss. 16-17.
10 Companies Clauses Act, 1845, s. 121.
11 Abandonment of Railways Act, 1850, 13 & 14 V. cap. 83, s. 28.
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required that the capital of the companies should be divided into
shares of the prescribed number and amount. The holders of
the shares were entitled to enjoy the proprietary privileges ac-
cording to the number of shares owned,12 and were at liberty to
transfer their shares. A provision, however, was inserted in the
Companies Clauses Bill, 1845, to the effect that no shareholder
should make any transfer of shares in respect of his subscription
until he had paid all calls for the time being due on such shares
held by him.
This provision met with much opposition in Parliament. It was
objected to on the ground that it was not only too hard a meas-
ure, but it would prevent the solvent shareholder from disposing
of his shares until all the calls were paid up, thus giving an ad-
vantage to the insolvent holders, as it did not matter much to the
latter whether he effected a transfer or not. It was contended
that a call might be made for a particular day, and it would not
be proper to prohibit the transfer of shares in the interim.13
To this objection, it was retorted that a call once made would
form a debt, and hence should be settled first. It was further
urged that the adoption of the clause would put an end to the
extremely harmful practice of railway speculation which was
very common at the time. These speculators, it was pointed out,
would often enter into engagements without the least probability
of their ever being able to meet them; and when they became
deeply involved for calls, they would shake off their responsibil-
ity by transferring their shares to men of straw. Thus after
considerable discussion, the clause was agreed to.14
Further provisions, however, were made in the early special
acts, to the effect that transfers of shares and stocks should be
made by deed and should be registered in the registers of the
companies concerned, and that until such registration was made,
12 On account of the fact that many people subscribed to shares without
any idea of ever paying for them, a provision was made in the Railway Con-
struction Facilities Act of 1864 (27 & 28 V. cap. 121, s. 28) to render it
unlawful for any company to issue any share created under the authority of
a certificate of the Board of Trade nor should any such share vest in the
person accepting the same, unless and until a sum not less than one-fifth
part of the amount of such share had been paid up.
is Hansard, vol. 77, p. 929.
i* Ibid.
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the seller of the share should remain liable for all the calls and
the purchaser should have no part or share of the profits of the
undertaking, nor any voting power in respect of such trans-
ferred shares. 15 Forms of certificates of both shares and trans-
fers of shares were also prescribed.
So far so good ; but Parliament seemed to have failed at the
most important point. It did not stipulate the time within which
such registration should be executed. When the prospects of a
company were good, the proviso that failure to register would
deprive the purchaser of his proprietary privileges was sufficient
to insure proper expeditious registration, but when the pros-
pects of a company were bad, it was entirely different. Conse-
quently, purchasers of railway shares often would hold the trans-
fer in their possession so long as it suited their convenience;
the seller of those shares having no means of compelling the
purchasers to register the share, would remain always liable for
the payment of the calls. The law subjected these sellers to the
liability of paying calls, but afforded them no means of repos-
sessing themselves of their shares.
16
Consequently the original
holders having disposed of their shares in the market and after
the lapse of years when call upon call had accumulated to a
frightful amount, were sometimes subjected to legal proceedings,
''because none of the many parties through whose hands these
shares had subsequently passed had chosen to render themselves
liable by conforming with the requirements of the company's
act" 17 The brokers also took advantage of this unfortunate
situation by arranging schemes whereby it was made possible
that from the moment the deed was stamped for the first time,
the transfer should pass from hand to hand possibly for many
months without the payment of any duty upon the several trans-
actions subsequent to the first.18
The inconvenience resulting from such illegal transfer of
shares was seriously felt.
19
Therefore, it was urged, before the
is Companies Clauses Act, 1845, ss. 14-15, and s. CLV of the Croydon
Railway Act, 1837.
is Evidence before the select Committee of the House of Commons, 1839.
Railway Times, November 9, 1839.
17 Railway Times, November 9, 1839.
is Second Beport of select committee of the House of Commons, as ap-
peared in Railway Times, October 5, 1839.
i Railway Times, November 9, 1839.
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select committee of 1839 that some measure should be adopted
to limit the period within which transfers of shares and stocks
should be registered.20 It was also suggested that unless regis-
tration was made within the specified time, the transfer should
lose its validity and the share should revert to the selling party.21
No action, however, was taken by Parliament to effect these re-
forms. But in 1850, a provision was made in the Abandonment
of Railways Act of that year,22 again providing that unless a
share had been duly registered and calls on it fully paid, it
would not entitle its holder to the proprietary privileges. No
provision, however, was made to stipulate a uniform limit of
time within which such registration should take place. Hence
the regulations governing the registration of transfer of shares
remained as defective as before, and nothing further has been
done since.
The payment of calls also received much consideration in 1845.
Companies were empowered by the Companies Clauses Act of
that year
23 to make calls for the payment of money upon the
shareholders by serving on each shareholder a notice at least
twenty-one days before making the call ; but no successive calls
should be made at less than the prescribed intervals. The ag-
gregate amount of calls made in any one year was also pre-
scribed. Every shareholder was held liable to pay the amount
of the calls made in respect of his shares ; and in case of failure
to pay such calls on or before the proper time, he should be
liable to be charged with interest for such unpaid calls at the
legal rate. The railway companies were further empowered to
sue and recover with interest from such defaulting shareholders
the amounts of the calls due, for which purpose the production
of the register of shareholders was prima facie evidence of such
defaulting parties being shareholders of the company and of the
number and amount of their registered shares.
Moreover, the directors after serving proper notice might at
any time after the expiration of two months from the day ap-
pointed for payment of such calls, declare the forfeiture of such
defaulted shares on which calls were due and unpaid. After
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 13 & 14 V. cap. 83, s. 6.
23 8 V. c. 16, 21-28.
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such declaration of forfeiture being confirmed by a general meet-
ing the company might sell such forfeited shares.24 To safe-
guard the interest of the shareholders, however, it was provided
that no 25 company should sell or transfer more of the shares of
any such defaulters than was sufficient to pay the arrears, etc.,
then due from them. In case the money produced by any such
sale was more than what was needed to pay for such arrears,
interests, etc., the defaulters might claim the surplus.
The matter of cancellation and surrender of shares was fur-
ther amplified by the Companies Clauses Act, 1863, 26 so as to give
the companies greater liberty in such matters and to make the
payment of calls of even greater consequence to the sharehold-
ers.
27
Provision was also made to the effect that the last registered
holders of such forfeited shares should not only be precluded
from all rights and interest in respect of such shares, but should
also be held liable to pay all arrears of calls, interest, and ex-
penses due in respect of the share at the time of the cancellation,
notwithstanding such forfeiture. 28
Moreover, companies were authorized to cancel forfeited shares
with the consent of holders and to accept, on such terms as they
saw fit, surrenders of any shares which were not fully paid up ;
but they were forbidden to "pay or refund to any shareholder
any sum of money for or in respect of the cancellation or sur-
render of any shares.
' ' 29
24 Ibid., ss. 29-33.
25
Ibid., ss. 34-35.
26 26 & 27 V. e, 118, s. 4.
27 Section four of this act provides: "Where any share ... is after
the passing of this act declared forfeited under and in pursuance of the pro-
visions ... in The Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, . . .
and the forfeiture is confirmed by a meeting in accordance with the same
provisions, . . . and notice of the forfeiture has been given, then,
. . . if the directors of the company are unable to sell the share for a
sum equal to the arrears of calls and interest and expenses due in respect
thereof, the company at any general meeting held not less than two months
after such notice is given may, in ease payment of arrears of the calls, in-
terest and expenses due in respect thereof is not made by the registered
holder of the share before the meeting is held, resolve that the share instead
of being sold shall be cancelled, and the share shall thereupon be cancelled
accordingly.
' '
28 26 & 27 V. c. 118, 8. 6.
29 26 & 27, c. 118, s. 10.
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When a railway company desired to raise additional capital,
it should apply to the Board of Trade for permission, 30 and the
latter after being satisfied that the applying company had com-
plied with the requirements of the established rules governing
notices, etc., might settle a "draft of certificate" to authorize
the company to raise the prescribed amount of additional capi-
tal for the purpose set forth in the certificate. For the purpose
of raising such additional capital, the company was at liberty
to issue new shares or stock or to make loans, unless the certifi-
cate provided to the contrary.31 New shares or stocks issued un-
der such circumstances, or for the conversion of its loans into
share capital, as well as for raising additional sums of money in
lieu of borrowing should be considered as a part of the general
capital and should be subjected to the same provisions in all
respects as the existing shares, except as to the time for making
calls and the amounts of such calls, which the company was au-
thorized to determine as it saw fit from time to time.32
In order to safeguard the interests of the shareholders, it was
provided by the Companies Clauses Act of 1845 33 that if at the
time when the augmentation of capital took place the existing
shares were at or below par, the new shares might be of such
amount and issued in such a manner as the directors saw fit, but
that if at the time of the augmentation the existing shares were
at a premium, then, unless it was otherwise provided by the
special act of the company, the sum to be raised should be di-
vided into shares of such amount as would conveniently allow
the same to be apportioned among the shareholders in proportion,
to the existing shares, and such new shares should be offered to
the existing shareholders in the proper proportion by letter.
The latter provision, beneficial as it was to the shareholders,
seemed to have been more or less abused by .some of the share-
holders through their neglect in acknowledging their acceptance
of such offers. Consequently, a similar provision was made in
the Companies Clauses Act, 1863,34 with the proviso that in case
the company's offer to any shareholder was not accepted within
30 Eailway Companies Act, 1864, 27 & 28 V. cap. 120, s. 3.
si Ibid., s. 4 and Schedule iii.
32 Companies Clauses Act, 1863, 26 & 27 V. cap. 118, s. 12, and Com-
panies Clauses Act, 1845, 8 V. cap. 16, ss. 56-57.
33 Companies Clauses Act, 1845, 8 V. cap. 16, sa. 58-60.
s* 26 & 27 V. cap. 118, ss. 17-21.
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the time limit and in the absence of any special arrangement to
extend such time limit, then the company might dispose such
new shares and stocks in whatever way it saw fit, "but so that
not less than the full nominal amount of any share or portion
of stock be payable or paid in respect thereof." The latter pro-
vision prohibiting the disposal of shares at a discount, however,
was repealed afterwards.
In several of the bills of the session of 1859 and 1862, power
was sought to accept surrenders of shares liable to be forfeited,
and to extinguish, without sale, the interest of the holders of
shares which had become forfeited, and thereupon to cancel or
merge the surrendered and forfeited shares, and in lieu of such
cancelled shares to issue new shares to an aggregate amount, lim-
ited in some cases to that remaining unpaid in respect of the
cancelled or merged shares, and in others extending to the ag-
gregate amount of the whole of the cancelled or merged shares.35
The Board of Trade thought that such irregularities were unde-
sirable, and during those years repeatedly urged that the aggre-
gate amount of the new shares which might be issued in lieu of
the old shares should in all cases be restricted to the aggregate
amount remaining unpaid in respect of, the cancelled or merged
shares, so that the sums which had been already raised by means
of the old shares might not be raised a second time. It believed
that if further sums were required for the companies' undertak-
ing, it would be better that authority to raise them should be
sought as a power to raise additional capital, for by so doing the
nominal capital of the company would correspond with the
amount which the company would have been authorized to raise
by shares if the cancellation or merging did not take place. 36
Following these repeated recommendations of the Board of
Trade, Parliament inserted a clause in the Companies Clauses
Act, 1863, 3T to the effect that the companies might issue new
shares in lieu of cancelled or surrendered shares
;
but the aggre-
gate nominal amount of such new shares should not exceed that
of the old shares after deducting the amount actually paid up
in respect of such old shares.
ss Report of Board of Trade on Railway Bills, 1861, pp. 22-23.
se Hid.
ST 26 & 27 V. c. 118, s. 11.
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By the same act,38 railway companies, after having created
new shares or stock, were permitted to cancel such new shares or
stock should they decide not to issue the whole of such new
shares.
As stated above, between the ordinary shares and the deben-
tures or loans of a company are the preference shares. The lat-
ter bears a specified rate of dividend which shall be met out of
the company's net income before any ordinary shareholder may
receive any dividend. Prior to 1863, the interest or guaranteed
dividend on these preferential shares was cumulative. If it is
not paid in one year, then it must be paid together with the
dividend due in the succeeding year in full, before the ordinary
stocks could receive anything. But in the Companies Clauses
Act, 1863,
39 a provision was inserted to the effect that preference
shares should be entitled to dividends only out of the profits of
each year; and if any year ending on the 31st of December,
''there are not profits available for the payment of the prefer-
ential dividend . . . for that year, no part of the deficiency
shall be made good out of the profits of any subsequent year, or
out of any other funds of the company."
With regard to the creation and issue of preferential stocks,
the same act40 provided that where any company was author-
ized by any special act to raise any additional sum by the issue
of preference shares or stock with the sanction of a general meet-
ing it might create and issue (according as the authority given
by the special act extends to shares only, or to stock only, or to
both) such shares or stock as the company from time to time saw
fit. It was, however, further provided that such stock should
not affect any guarantee, or any preference or priority in the
payment of dividend or interest, granted by the company under,
or confirmed by, any previous act.
The act also required that the terms and conditions to which
any preference share or stock was subjected, should be clearly
stated in the certificate of the preference share or portions of the
preference stock.
41
ss ibid., s. 16.
39 26 & 27 V. c. 118, s. 14.
40 26 & 27 V. cap. 118, s. 13.
*i Companies Clauses Act, 1863, 26 & 27 V. c. 118, a. 15.
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After the adoption of those provisions regarding preference
shares, there was for a number of years a constant tendency for
the proportion of preferential capital to grow more rapidly than
that of the ordinary capital. Thus in 1858 the ordinary and
preference capital were outstanding in the proportion of 56 to
44, while in 1870 and 1871 the relative proportions were re-
versed, becoming 43 to 57 and 42 to 58 respectively.
42 Such
changes might have been brought about by two entirely different
causes. In the first place, when railway enterprise became es-
tablished, it might be reasonably expected that the preference
capital would tend to increase more rapidly than the ordinary.
When a railway pays large dividends on its ordinary shares, it
can raise money on easy terms by issuing preference or deben-
ture stocks at fixed rates of interest. This seems to have been
largely the case in England. On the other hand, when a com-
pany pays little or no dividend on its ordinary shares, it will be
compelled to resort to the issue of such preferential shares for
raising money, in order to avoid heavier sacrifices.
Another class of shares or rather another nomenclature given
to the ordinary shares, known as preferred and deferred shares,
has come into vogue since 1868. These, in reality, do not con-
stitute any separate class of shares, but simply represent two
divisions into which the ordinary shares are divided. All the
rules governing the ordinary shares are also applicable to these
preferred and deferred stocks, except that special rules have
been adopted to govern the process of, and the conditions under
which, the division may be executed.
The first known instance of "stock splitting," by which the
ordinary shares are divided into preferred and deferred, took
place in 1854 in the case of the Great Northern.43 During that
year 12 having been paid on each 20 share of that Company, a
panic seized upon the public mind and grave doubts were enter-
tained as to whether the boldly competitive scheme of that com-
pany could be successful in the face of adverse circumstances.
At the same time the London and North-Western authorities
were not slow to take advantage of the situation in making
things uneasy for their competitors. In order to push the thing
Capt. Tyler's annual report to the Board of Trade, 1873, p. 4.
Railway Times, May 2, 1868.
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along, the directors of the Great Northern adopted the proposi-
tion, not to forfeit the shares and confiscate the whole of the
payments thereon, but to lay aside 10 for the defaulting sub-
scribers, and to give the remaining 2 as a bonus to future sub-
scribers with the whole of a dividend up to 3%, calling the
holdings of the old subscribers, B., or deferred, and those of the
new subscribers, A., or preferred stocks. This procedure speed-
ily restored confidence in the undertaking and carried it through
its vicissitudes.
This affair received considerable attention
;
but it was not until
1868 that stock splitting became a burning question. In that
year, the South Coast and other companies applied for power
to divide their ordinary stocks into preferred and deferred or-
dinary", at the option of the shareholders.
44
Consequently strict
regulations were adopted in the Regulation of Railways Act of
that year
45
specifying with great elaboration the precise condi-
tions under which the division of stocks might be effected.
There was no debate on this clause
;
but there was one in the
House of Lords on a similar clause of the South Coast Railway
Bill of that year just referred to, from which the clause in the
Regulation of Railways Act was copied. When the South Coast
Railway Bill was in the House of Lords, the clause giving power
for splitting stocks was struck out. But when the bill was con-
sidered in the House of Commons, the original clause was re-
inserted in the bill. Finally when the bill came back to the up-
per house of Parliament again, a motion was again made to omit
that clause. Lord Redesdale very strongly opposed the division
of stocks, on the ground that such a practice would favor stock
jobbing.46
On the other hand, the Duke of Richmond, who was then pres-
ident of the Board of Trade, supported the clause on general
principles. He maintained that "the tendency of Parliament
had been not to interfere with the financial arrangements of these
companies; providing, of course, that Parliament saw that no
injustice was done to mortgages, or other parties. . ." He
** Evidence before Select Committee on Railway Stock Conversion, 1890,
p. 37.
45 31 & 32 V. c. 119.
46 Hansard, 193 : 1545.
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further claimed that to prohibit the splitting of stocks was en-
tirely opposed to the recommendations of the Railway Commis-
sion,
47 which went very fully into the question, and gave it as
their opinion that it was the more judicious course for Parlia-
ment to relieve itself from interference in the financial affairs
of railway companies. Instead of proving injurious, he believed
the proposed subdivision of stocks would tend to give all parties
concerned an additional interest in seeing that the directors did
their duty.
48
After considerable discussion, the clause was adopted with
thirty contents and seven non-contents.49 Since then the regula.-
tions governing the splitting of shares have been elaborated but
not modified, and railway companies have been given the liberty
to divide their shares under these or similar regulations.50
Commenting upon this clause, the Railway Times 51 said that
it was certainly to be regretted that "the Legislature should
have lent itself to a system capable of further propagation of so
vile a mischief," and it concluded that "we have only to hope
that the nuisance may become so prevalent as to ensure its own
corrective."
But the hope of the Railway Times was not realized. On the
contrary, not only has the practice of "splitting" spread, but it
has also developed into the widespread "stock-watering" which
was not even thought of at the time when Parliament first gave
its permission to stock splitting. A comparison of the following
clauses of a railway bill passed in 1890 52 with the part of the
Regulation of Railways act, 1868, quoted above, may serve to
show the vast difference between the
; regulations governing
"splitting" as adopted in 1868 and the degenerated practice
which took place afterwards. The second clause of the Bill of
London and South-Western Railway passed in 1890 provides:
The company would create ordinary stock of two classes, (1) preferred
4% ordinary stock, and (2) deferred duplicate ordinary stock, both classes
47 He probably referred to the Eoyal Commission on Railways, 1867.
48 Hansard, 193 : 1545.
49 Hansard, 193: 1549.
so In the Model Bills and Glauses of the House of Lords, 1909, eight
clauses (pp. 24-25) were devoted to the regulations governing the division
of stocks.
si Railway Times, August 8, 1868, p. 819.
52 Railway Times, May 17, 1890.
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of which to be in substitution of a corresponding amount of paid-up ordi-
nary stock; that is to say, 100 of the preferred and 100 of the deferred
ordinary stock should be substituted for every 100 of the existing ordinary
stock.
But, it may be remembered, what was permitted in 1868 was
a mere "splitting," "preferred and deferred ordinary stock
shall be issued only in substitution of equal amounts of paid-up
ordinary stock,
' '
while the later practice was actually
' '
duplica-
tion," wherewith stock certificates bearing a face value of 200
were given for every 100 paid in.
The chief reason which led the companies to indulge in stock
splitting was that they thought the divided stocks would com-
mand higher prices than the solid property. But the Railway
Times both in 1868 and 1891, the years in which stock splitting
began and reached its highest point of development, respectively,
have proven by the market quotations of the two kinds of stocks
of several companies that the expectation of the companies was
by no means well founded in many cases.53 On the other hand,
the same paper 5
* showed that much confusion resulted from the
splitting of stocks. Investors were in many instances led to
take up one section of these divided stocks under the delusion
that the deferred portion (as in the case of the Great Northern,
the originator of the scheme, just referred to) had been previous-
ly paid up. As this was far from being the true state of affairs
in many instances, much disappointment and suspicion arose.
Therefore, Parliament was blamed for being too ready to comply
with "every request made to it by speculators in the most des-
perate condition.
' ' 55
In England it has been held from the beginning of railway
legislation
56 that it is not the legitimate business of a railway
company to apply to one purpose the funds which have been
raised for another and that it was the duty of railway com-
panies to keep up the value of their capital assets no divi-
dends may be paid out of capital.57 In the early railway acts
s 3 See Railway Times for November 14, and November 28, 1868, and
May 23, 1891, p. 606.
si Rail-way Times, May 2, 1868.
ss Ibid.
ss See Report of Committee on Railway Companies Powers, 1864, p. 58.
57 Section CLXX of the Croydon act of 1837 provided "That all the
money to be raised by the said company by virtue of this Act shall be laid
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of incorporation provisions were made as to the purpose for
which the company was incorporated and the proper mode of
applying the capital raised. Thus in the first Companies Clauses
Act 5S a specific provision was made to the effect that all the
money raised by the company should be applied, first, in paying
the costs and expenses incident thereto, and, second, in carrying
the purposes of the company into execution. It was further
provided by that act that, unless expressly provided to the con-
trary, companies might receive and apply to the purpose of the
company any calls to be made, notwithstanding mortgages.
59
Thus both the private and the public general acts required
that the company should first of all apply its capital to the
payment of expenses already incurred for forming the company,
and then to the execution of the purpose for which the company
was incorporated.
The financial difficulties and pressure for capital caused by
the extravagant extension of railways during the forties led to
considerable violation of the foregoing provisions. Therefore
the Lords' committee of 1849 was instructed to devise means to
guard against the application of funds to any other purpose than
those authorized by Parliament. This committee recommended
that railway companies should be required to explain in their
capital accounts not only how money was raised but the under-
takings to which it was applicable and the manner in which it
was actually spent.
60
During the latter part of the fifties and the first part of the
sixties, in many railway bills for constructing new works, pro-
visions were not made for raising additional capital; but the
companies were permitted to apply to the new works any money
out and applied, in the first place, in paying and discharging all costs and
expenses of applying for, obtaining, amd passing this Act, or preparatory
or relating thereto, incurred; . . . and the remainder of such money
shall be applied in and towards purchasing lands, and making and main-
taining the said railway and other works, and in otherwise carrying this
Act into execution
;
and that the expenses incurred by the several provisional
committees or boards of directors for the said . . . lines . . . shall
be raised and paid by the subscribers to the said several lines ... in
proportion to the amount of their respective subscriptions. . ."
68 8 V. c. 16, s. 65.
698 V. e. 16, s. 43.
60 Report of Eoyal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xviiL
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which they might have been authorized to raise by previous acts
and which might not be required for the purposes for which the
money was originally raised. In order to protect the sharehold-
ers from the danger that might arise from the application of the
funds of railway companies to purposes not sanctioned by Par-
liament and not in contemplation at the time when their powers
were obtained, both Parliament and the Board of Trade thought
that it was very important to take advantage of every suitable
opportunity to ascertain and limit the amount of money that
might be raised and to define clearly its application.61 Moreover,
the Board of Trade emphasized this point for several years suc-
cessively beginning 1859.62
When the Companies Clauses Act of 1863 was passed, a clause
was devoted to specifying the application of money raised by the
issue of debenture stocks, thus giving effect to the recommenda-
tion of the Board of Trade.63 It enacted that money raised by
debenture stock should be applied exclusively either in paying
off money due by the company on mortgage or bond, or else for
the purposes to which the same money would be applicable if it
were raised on mortgage or bond.
In the Railway Construction Facilities Act of the following
year,
64
provision was again made to the effect that railway com-
panies
' '
shall apply every part of the money raised only for pur-
poses for which it is by the certificate (of the Board of Trade)
authorized to be applied."
In practice, however, there seemed to be considerable violation
of these rules, especially by the smaller lines. A striking exam-
ple may be found in the case of the Brecon and Merthyr Railway
Company. After having repeatedly violated the law in raising
its capital,
65 this company authorized the issue of 20,000 for the
ei Board of Trade annual report on Eailway Bills, 1860, p. 22.
62
Ibid., 1863, p. 19.
es 26 & 27 V. c. 118, sec. 32.
e* 27 & 28 V. c. 21, sub-sees. (4) and (5) of see. 29.
65 This railway about 66 miles long waa originally contracted to be con-
structed by a certain Savin at 10,000 per mile; but act after act had since
been obtained by its directors and the contractor for increasing the capital,
until, instead of the original authorized capital of 700,000, the shares and
debentures issued to the contractor for its construction amounted to
2,000,000. In this amount there were no less than ten kinds of preference
shares, each ranking in order of date, and fourteen issues of debentures
46 RAILWAY FINANCE IN ENGLAND [46
construction of, and with a special hypothecation on, a branch
called the Ivor & Dowlais, which latter was authorized in 1865
but not yet commenced in 1867. It was also found that the act
of 1865 had already authorized the creation for the construction
of this line, of shares and debentures to the amount of 20,000
and had specially provided that the money should only be applied
of this line of shares and debentures to the amount of 20,000 and
had actually been issued under the name and were then existing;
but that the money was not applied to the line, which was left
entirely untouched.
Moreover, this kind of irregularities seemed to have continued
for some time. Thus in 1869 a complaint, which had many
parallels in railway affairs, was made against the Caledonian
Railway by the Forth and Clyde Navigation Company, with
whose undertaking and many others the Caledonian had amal-
gamated. The charge was that the absorbing company had ap-
plied the money raised under the special borrowing powers of
the particular undertaking to general purposes, to the amount
of more than 100,000, in breach of an engagement with the
absorbed company. In this connection, the Economist said 66
that in many cases even where there was not any apparent ob-
jection, the public had been "not a little injured" through the
diversion of the borrowing powers conferred. It further said
that "if the Legislature lays down rules ... in order to
secure the proper execution of undertakings which it authorized
and which it has a claim to see executed by virtue of the priv-
ileges conferred . . . care should be taken to have the rules
put in force, and a breach of them . . . ought to be ren-
dered impossible."
Another form in which capital has been applied to purposes
other than those authorized by Parliament is the payment of
dividend out of capital. This practice has been prohibited since
the early thirties. Thus in the Croydon Act of 1837 the pro-
also ranking in order of creation. Then the company again obtained from
the Board of Trade, under the general Railway Act, 1864, and without any
sanction for new lines, powers to create 570,000 of fresh preference stock
and 190,000 of fresh debentures stock for which they could not find any
market. See London Times, November 13, 1867, p. 4.
ee Economist, November 6, 1869.
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vision was made 67 to the effect that no dividend should be made
exceeding the net amount of clear profit at the time being in
the hands of the company, nor whereby the capital of the said
company should in any degree be reduced.
During the forties there seemed to be a need for a relaxation
of these restrictions. During that period many railway com-
panies received their capital by instalments and had to pay in-
terest pending construction.68 When calls were made at a time
when a high rate of interest could be obtained the subscribers
were unwilling to meet such calls. ''To obviate this difficulty"
it was suggested that
' '
it was not unreasonable for railway com-
panies to resort to the unbusiness-like practice of allowing in-
terest 69 on calls before a railway is opened, and consequently
before it has any revenue. The interest was therefore charged
to capital, and served to swell the capital expenditures.
" 70 It
must be stated that in some cases the payment of such "interest"
out of capital during construction appeared necessary, for in
such cases it was ' ' utterly ridiculous to hope for the payment of
deposits unless interest be allowed upon them during the con-
struction of the line. Men cannot afford to lock up their capital
in a total sacrifice of present results for the chance of any future
proceeds, however abundant.
" 71 In still other cases, the prac-
tice was known as being advantageous to all concerned.
On the whole, however, it seemed that the payment of divi-
dends out of capital was not desirable. It was well known as
Lord Somerset pointed out 72 that many companies had gone on
paying dividends out of their capital stock, as if they were in a
most flourishing condition. These companies sometimes went on
paying dividends out of their capital until their capital no longer
existed.
Under such circumstances, Parliament saw fit to insert a clause
in the Companies/ Clauses Act, 1845,
73
stipulating that
' ' the com-
er i v. c. cxix, s. CXCIII.
es Hansard, 78: 48.
69 Interest here is used really in the sense of dividend.
70 Bail-way Times, April 27, 1844.
71
Ibid., July 25, 1846.
"Hansard, 78: 48-49.
" 8 V. c. 16, s. 121.
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pany shall not make any dividend whereby their capital stock
will be in any degree reduced."
The
.general interpretation given to this clause, as shown by
the debate in Parliament, was that it was not to prohibit the pay-
ment of dividends from the interest of capital or pending con-
struction, but, to prevent the payment of dividends out of the
capital stock after the works were completed and when no profits
had been obtained. 74
In 1847 after the panic which followed the great railway ex-
tension of 1845, a standing order was passed by the House of
Lords which remained in force for many years, providing that
in every railway bill a clause should be inserted prohibiting the
payment of interest out of capital. 75
The Companies Act, 1862,76 also provided in the first schedule
that.no dividend should be paid except out of profits earned.
But this latter regulation was not compulsory on the companies
registered under that act, for they were empowered by section
14 to make rules of association excluding the regulations in the
first schedule, and were thus practically enabled to make what
regulations seemed best to the shareholders. Consequently a
curious anomaly arose out of the conflict between the standing
order and the Companies Act, 1862.77
In the Railway Construction Facilities Act, 1864,78 provisions
were again made prohibiting the application of capital for the
purpose of paying interest or dividend on account of calls made.
In 1867 a clause was inserted in the Railway Companies Act of
that year
79 which prescribed in detail the conditions under
which a railway might declare any dividend. It said that no
dividend should be declared by a company until the auditors had
certified that the current half yearly accounts contained a full
and true statement of the financial condition of the company,
and that all proper expenses had been deducted from revenue.
But the act further provided that "if the directors differ from
the judgment of the auditors with respect to the payment of any
74 Hansard, 78: 48.
75 Railway Times, March 16, 1889.
76 25 & 26 V. c. 89.
77 Report of select committee, 1882, p. iii.
78 27 & 28 V. e. 121, sub-see. (3) of s. 29.
79 30 & 31, V. c. 129, s. 30.
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such expenses out of the revenue of the half year, such difference
shall, if the directors desire it, be stated in the report to the
shareholders, and the company in general meeting may decide
thereon, subject to all the provisions of the law then existing,
and such decision shall, for the purpose of the dividend, be final
and binding." Taking advantage of this last proviso, many
railway companies, like the Brighton,80 charged large sums to
their capital account, in opposition to the opinion of the ac-
countants and auditors that the same should have been charged
to revenue. After violating the law in this manner, they would
then legalize their illegal act by calling a general meeting of the
company and abide by the decision of the meeting which accord-
ing to the law should be
' ' final and binding.
' ' 81
One of the chief reasons which led to the evasion of the law
was that, as a member of Parliament remarked in 1867, "There
is nowhere to be found a clear definition of working expenses,
that is to say there is nothing to define the charges which ought
to go to make up the working expenses of a company, before you
arrive at the profit upon which the debenture interest forms the
first charge.
' ' 82 The government itself was said to be unable to
distinguish working expenses from capital charges. When once
it was asked to define and determine what constituted the profits
of a railway, the Board of Trade appointed a committee to con-
sider the matter. This departmental committee reported, how-
ever, that
' '
it was too complex and difficult a matter for them to
undertake, and they recommended that the question be referred
to a small body of experts specially appointed for the purpose.
The Board of Trade was consequently asked to appoint such a
committee, but it declined to do it.83
Under such circumstances, it became an easy matter for rail-
ways to disregard all principles of accounting, if they saw fit.
The gross income representing the returns from which the work-
ing expenses must be deducted before any money should be
used for dividends, was a definite quantity and could not be
meddled with
;
but the working expenses were not, and might be
"switched." So some of the railway directors, in order to make
so London Times, November 18, 1867, p. 8.
si See Fraser, British Eailways, 1903, p. 117.
82 Hansard, 186: 1030.
ss Fraser, British Eailways, 1903, pp. 52-53.
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their business appear "rosy," often charged part of such work-
ing expenses to capital and declared dividends out of capital.
84
Moreover, the matter of charging certain items of current ex-
penses, such as the purchase of engines, etc., to capital was
viewed with more or less approval hy the shareholders. In some
cases it was not considered at all improper or injurious, still less
dishonest, to defray a portion of the current expenditure out of
money borrowed, and treat as net income or profit what then ap-
peared as the remainder. These shareholders even would often
exact dividends whether earned or not, and would connive at
the means so long as the immediate end was secured. A decent
dividend not only enriched their pockets, but kept up the market
value of their shares. Five per cent in hand, with their holdings
at par, even temporarily, appeared far more comfortable than
three per cent with the stock at a discount, in spite of promising
hopes. Therefore, accounts were "cooked" on the one hand and
"swallowed" on the other. 85
In 1882 an open effort was made to remove the restrictions
prohibiting the payment of dividend out of capital. 86 A com-
mittee was appointed by Parliament to consider the matter.
This committee, after six sessions and a month's work, report-
ed ** tnat the prohibition of the payment of interest out of cap-
ital was in accordance with "sound financial principles and acts
as a protection to the public." In special cases, however, the
committee recommended that it might be permissible, subject to
strict rules,
88 to pay interest upon capital during construction.
s* London Times, October 29, 1867, p. 6.
as London Times, November 18, 1867, p. 8.
se Eailway Times, March 16, 1889, p. 374.
87 See Report of Select Committee, 1882, Parliamentary Paper, 1882,
vol. 13, p. iii.
ss The rules recommended were briefly :
(1) Clauses denning the amount of interest, and the terms for which it
is payable, to be inserted in every bill, and to be specially reported on by
the Board of Trade before being submitted to the committee (on Railway
Bills).
(2) Such interest to be an addition to the authorized capital of the
undertaking.
(3) Power of issuing debentures to be reckoned on the capital exclusive
of such addition for interest.
(4) Payment of such interest to continue only during construction of
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Although the effort of the railway companies was unsuccessful,
it brought about much agitation, as a result of which the House
of Lords in 1886 modified its standing order so as to give power
to railway companies, under certain strict provisions, to pay in-
terest out of capital.
89
The relaxation of the earlier regulations, however, was not ac-
companied with such good results as was expected.90 On the
contrary, much evil was done. The effect of paying interest out
of capital, as observed a writer,
91 has been to give a certain
particular stock an altogether fictitious value, and genuine in-
vestors have been victimized. The same writer also alleged, not
without reason, that the dividing up of principal money as
profits and the lack of restraint as to their enormous expansion
of capital expenditure, regardless of its productivity of revenue,
can, and did, only eventuate in a diminution, or even entire ces-
sation, of dividends on ordinary stocks.92
The result of charging working expenses to capital has proved
to be equally objectionable. It necessitated the overburdening
of the business with large capital charges, which sooner or later
would give much embarrassment to the property.93 In so far as
the public was not clearly aware of these manipulations, the
practice proved exceedingly illusory. It was merely a matter of
white-washing the true state of affairs by throwing expenses on
the revenue of the future. Indeed, the besetting evil of railway
finance, as observed the London Times, 9* "has arisen from the
the works, or for such less period as the committee may think fit to author-
ize, according to the circumstances of the case.
(5) The rate of interest to be fixed by the committee, but in no case to
exceed 5 per cent.
(6) The prospectus and share certificates to contain on the face of them
an intimation that interest is payable out of capital during construction
only.
The committee also recommended that these provisiona should be enacted
in a general act, instead of mere modifications of the standing orders. See
Report of Select Committee, May 19, 1882, Parliamentary Paper, 1882,
vol. 13.
** Railway Times, March 16, 1889, p. 373.
so Ibid.
91 Fraser, British Railways, 1903, pp. 108-109.
92 Ibid., p. 144.
93 London Times, November 18, 1867, p. 8.
94
Ibid., October 29, 1867, p. 6.
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confusion of two things capital and revenue.'' Some of the
most serious disputes, which affected in a remarkable degree the
property of some important companies, turned entirely upon the
mystification over the charging of these two items. Directors
were charged with carrying to capital, expenses which belonged
to revenue; and proprietors demanded that capital accounts
should be closed. The general effect was that fictitious dividends
made it almost impossible to estimate the value of any railway
property.
From the foregoing pages, it is clear that most of the regula-
tions governing the share capital of railway companies were
adopted prior to 1845. It is only in a very few instances where
any changes have been made after the passage of the Companies
Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845. But these changes, although
few in number, have proven of great importance as well as of a
unique nature. Indeed, it is largely in the adoption of her regu-
lations since 1845 concerning such matters as the creation of pre-
ferred and deferred stocks and the application of capital that
England especially differed from other countries.
A special feature revealed is the fact that practically all the
measures concerning the share capital of railway companies, as
we have seen, were adopted as a matter of course. With the ex-
ception of those concerning stock splitting and the application of
capital practically all the rules governing railway share capital
were adopted without any debate in Parliament. Nor did they
receive much discussion from the public. This, however, is not
the case concerning the regulation of the other branches of rail-
way finance as we shall see in the following chapters.
CHAPTER III
SUPERVISION OF RAILWAY CAPITALIZATION
B LOAN CAPITAL
In the earlier years of the English railways, loan capital con-
sisted of mortgages or bonds, which were commonly called de-
bentures, and which resembled the bonds issued in the United
States. In later years a class of securities called debenture-
stock came into vogue. The debenture-stocks were similar to the
debentures in that each of them represented a debt with a fixed
rate of interest against the company. They were, however, dis-
tinctly different in two respects. First, the debentures were
usually issued for limited periods, while the debenture-stocks
were usually perpetual; and second, the former were repre-
sented by deeds issued by the company to cover large lump sums
of money, whereas the latter were issued in the form of circulat-
ing certificates, in coupon form, to represent smaller amounts.
Debenture stocks, however, were little known until the fifties.
Accordingly, Parliamentary regulations applied at first to the
temporary debentures or mortgages, but were gradually modi-
fied to take care of the permanent debenture-stock.
The cardinal policy of Parliament, as a member of Parliament
said,
1 to which opinion he subscribed, has been to make the de-
benture capital of railways a secure investment. With this goal
in view, Parliament has endeavored to regulate the loan capital
of railways from the beginning of the enterprise. In each of the
special acts, which created the company or enabled it to prose-
cute its work, the amount of the loan capital as well as the man-
ner in which the company might raise it were invariably set
forth in detail. Aside from some occasional and slight irregu-
larities, the proportion of the loan capital was usually limited
to one-third of the share capital of each company.
2 This was done
i Hansard, vol. 183, p. 785.
2Cf. infra, Chap. IV.
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to give security to the debentures or mortgages. Before a com-
pany could raise any additional capital by loans or in any way
alter the provisions of its incorporation act it was required to
appear before Parliament for a special act granting such power.
Thus from the beginning railway companies were subjected to
explicit regulations set forth in their special acts in raising
money by loans. The following passage from the London and
Croydon Railway Act of 1837 3 may serve to illustrate how and
under what conditions railway companies were permitted to
raise money by loans:
And be it further enacted, that it shall be lawful for the said company,
by an order of any general or special geiieral meeting of the said company,
after one-half of the said capital shall have been paid up, from time to
time to borrow and take up at interest any sum in addition to their said
capital of one million eight hundred thousand pounds, not exceeding in the
whole the sum of six hundred thousand pounds, on the credit of the said
undertaking, as to them shall seem proper; and the said company and di-
rectors . . . after an order shall have been made for that purpose at
any general or special general meeting . . . hereby empowered to mort-
gage, assign, and charge the property of the said undertaking, and the
rates, tolls, and other sums arising or to arise by virtue of this Act, or any
part thereof, ... as a security for any such money to be borrowed as
aforesaid, with interest; . . . and a copy of the order of any general
or special general meeting . . . authorizing the borrowing of any such
sum of money, certified by one director or by the secretary or clerk of the
said company to be a true copy, shall be sufficient evidence of the making
of the order; . . . and all which mortgages, assignments, and charges
shall be made under the common seal of the said company by deed duly
stamped, in which the consideration for the same shall be truly stated. . .
The forms to be used for such mortgages as well as for the
transfer of the same were prescribed. Provisions for the regis-
tration of the execution and the transfer of such securities were
also set forth in detail.4
For the security of the creditors, section CLXI of the same
act provided that in case of non-payment of interest as specified
in the act, by an order of two justices of the peace, "some per-
son may be appointed to receive the whole or such part of the
said rates, tolls, or sums as are liable to pay such interest so due
and unpaid. . ."
The time for repayment of the principal was required to be
s 1 V. c. CXIX, sec. GLX.
* Cf. infra, Chap. V.
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clearly specified in the mortgage deed,
5 and if no time was speci-
fied, the holders of such mortgages might demand payment after
twelve months from the date when the loan was made, "upon
giving six calendar months' notice in writing to the secretary or
clerk of the 'company. . ."
6 If the company failed to meet
such demand of repayment of the principal due and if such
principal in the aggregate amounted to the sum of 20,000, two
justices might order the appointment of receivers 7 as in the case
of non-payment of interest.
From these provisions, it is clear that besides the limitations
upon the borrowing powers of railway companies, two distinct
principles were laid down, (1) the real security of the mortgages
was limited to the ' ' undertaking,
' ' 8 the tolls and rates of the
company, and (2) these mortgages were for limited periods, and
were liquidated or renewed upon the expiration of such periods.
Both of these principles, as will be shown more fully, gave rise
to much difficulty afterwards, the one on account of its own de-
fect which was not foreseen at the time and the other because of
the wrong conception of it by the public.
These special provisions regarding loan capital soon became too
numerous and hence difficult for the railways to follow. Under
such circumstances, it was but natural that many irregularities
took place in making loans, notwithstanding the intention of
Parliament to prevent them. To simplify matters, Parliament
devoted no less than twenty sections of its first Companies
Clauses Act 9 to regulations governing loan capital of railways.
In this general act, the miscellaneous provisions scattered in the
numerous special acts governing the limit of borrowings, the
registration of mortgages and transfers, the appointment of re-
ceivers, etc., were amplified and set forth in a compact form.
The forms of mortgages and transfers contained in the special
acts were also improved upon by making the provisions more
specific and more adaptable to the new conditions. The powers
of re-borrowing and of conversion of loans into share capital




s By undertaking was meant the business of the Company.
Companies Clauses Act, 1845, 8 V. c. 16.
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garding the evidence of authority for borrowing. Formerly, as
seen in the Croydon Act, nothing was required to show that the
company had complied with the requirements set forth in its pri-
vate acts as to the requisite subscription and payment of one-half
of its capital, etc., before borrowing. The only evidence neces-
sary was a copy of an order of a general meeting certified by a
director, or the secretary, or even the clerk of the company. By
the general act of 1845, however, a new provision
10 was made to
the effect that in addition to such a certified copy of an order of a
general meeting, a certificate of a justice of the peace showing
that the definite portion of the company's capital, stipulated in its
special act, had been subscribed and paid up, should be presented
before a company made any loans. Thus the financial affairs
were placed, to a certain extent, under the supervision of a pub-
lic officer.
In examining these clauses of the act one cannot help being
impressed with the great care which Parliament took in order to
make the loan capital of railways a safe investment. Indeed, if
these provisions had been conscientiously followed they might
have proved effectual to carry out the intentions of Parliament
and to prevent much difficulty which occurred later.
It must be remembered that the aforesaid general act was
passed during a period of railway speculation. This and its
subsequent collapse, which took place two years later, furnished
a good test of the usefulness of the provisions concerning finance
just referred to. Up to 1848 about 175,000,000 had been in-
vested in railways, of which about 40,000,000, or one-fourth,
was raised by loans. On account of the collapse of 1847, ex-
orbitant rates of interest had to be offered
;
and notwithstanding
such inducements, some of the best lines could not be completed
for want of funds.11 During the collapse, railway credit was
greatly damaged. Whatever loans were made, were only for
short periods. In order to clear off the wreckage of 1847, Par-
liament in 1850 passed the Abandonment of Railways Act 12 ' ' to
facilitate the abandonment of railways and the dissolution of
railway companies. . ." This act provided that the com-
10 Companies Clauses Act, 1845 (8 V. e. 16), sec. 40.
11 C. L. Webb, Letter to H. Labouchere, Board of Trade, on Railways,
1849, p. 26.
12 13 & 14 V. c. 83.
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panics' share as well as loan capital should be reduced propor-
tionately with the amount of the work abandoned. 13 Aside from
this incidental provision contained in the Abandonment Act of
1850, nothing was done to alter the rules laid down in the Com-
panies Clauses Act of 1845 during the period. Even the de-
rangements caused by the crisis of 1847 failed to induce Parlia-
ment to adopt any new or to modify its old measures. But be-
ginning about 1850 complaints against the existing system of
loans began to be made by numbers of investors. As the deben-
tures issued under the existing system were by deed for large
lump sums, people with money to invest were debarred from
placing it in such debentures because they could seldom find
such as would suit them in amount and length of time to run.
Some companies also expressed dissatisfaction with the incon-
venience and expense attending the existing system of arranging
their debenture debts. 1* It was felt that the securities for money
lent to railway companies should be issued for more convenient
amounts and that they should also be made easier of transfer-
ence. Therefore, it was urged that divisible debenture stocks be
issued and the existing system of stamps and registration re-
modeled. But it was at once recognized that it would be diffi-
cult to get rid of the stamps, since the government would not
forego its revenue from this source. To meet this difficulty, a
proposal was made that the government should not be stripped
of its tax, but only it should receive it in a different way. In
lieu of the existing system of stamps, each company should pay a
fixed annual sum to the government, calculated on an average
of, say the preceding three or four years, or in some other way
satisfactory to both parties. Then the debenture stock certifi-
cates might be issued without stamps and passed from hand to
hand without registration. In support of this system, besides
other arguments, the success accompanying a corresponding
change in the East India Company's bonds, made under similar
conditions, was cited.
15
To do away with registration would apparently save some
is Sec. 28, 13 & 14 V. c. 83.
i* Railway Times, Dec. 31, 1853, p. 1354.
!5 The bonds of the East India Company were once stamped, but in 1835
the company obtained powers under the Act 5 & 6 Win. c. 64 to pay an
annual sum in lieu of stamp duty. Cf. Railway Times, Sept. 25, 1852.
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trouble
;
but it was apprehended that such a course might create
confusion and also impair the security of the debenture-holders.
To avoid such danger, it was proposed: (1) Any company wish-
ing to avail itself of the power of the act should be required to
show that, on the average of the preceding three years, its net
annual profit had been equal to 10% on its debt; (2) the amount
of the debt should in no case be increased after the application
to Parliament for adoption of the act; (3) that such company
should be bound, under penalty, to publish quarterly in the
London Gazette, a statement showing the amount of its debt,
the sum required for payment of the quarter's interest on the
same and the actual amount of net profit earned during the same
quarter. It was thought that, with these particulars before
them, the public could at once detect any irregularities in a com-
pany's loan capital, and that in the absence of any irregularities,
a profit equal to 10% of its loan capital would constitute a suf-
ficient security to the company's debenture holders.
The division of debentures Into convenient units representing
100 to 1,000 was enthusiastically expected to have an impor-
tant and beneficial effect. Instead of a person who wished to sell
say 5,000 railway debentures having to wait until he could find
another person having that exact sum to invest, he would be
able to divide the amount among a number of purchasers. By
this process, transactions would be greatly facilitated and the
market extended. Moreover, when the debt was spread over a
great number of persons, it would not be so easy for a combi-
nation of large money-lenders to demand repayment of loans at
inconvenient times so as to embarrass the company for their own
benefit. Thus a great difficulty with which the companies had
to contend would disappear.16
Following these agitations further efforts were made during
the years from 1851 to 1853 to effect an alteration of the exist-
ing debentures by the issue of stocks carrying a fixed rate of
interest and affording other owners the same privileges as the
debentures, in lieu of the existing bonds.
17
Parliament, how-
ever, failed to see the necessity of passing any act to accom-
plish the changes; but self-interest induced a number of com-
panies to convert their debentures into such perpetual debenture
is Eailway Times, Sept. 25, 1852, pp. 100-109.
IT Eailway Times, Dec. 31, 1853, p. 1354.
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stocks. The innovation was looked at askance. The idea was
still rife that loans were only a temporary charge which ought
to be gotten rid of as soon as possible. Anything which had to
do with perpetuating such loans at once aroused suspicion. In
commenting upon such practices, the Railway Times 18 said that
such operations were "suggestive of grave reflection." It la-
mented that railway companies should change their debts into a
permanent part of their capitalization, and regarded such a
change as an unmistakable evil. It urged that those companies
which had borrowed to a large extent "would do well to make
up their minds to pay off debentures . . . before they par-
take of any dividends, no matter how moderate or legitimately
earned." "Every proprietor who is capable of serious thought,
and who desires to leave an unincumbered estate to his children
should make it his duty to strive for an extinction of the loan
debt of every company with which he is connected. . ." It
was the general idea that when a company was out of debt it
was out of danger. But it soon became clear that the debts of
railways, once contracted, were going to remain. The compa-
nies clearly realized the usefulness of these debenture stocks.
This class of securities would enable persons who had no specu-
lative desires, who had no enterprising tastes, who had no prac-
tical knowledge, to aid in the successful completion of splendid
undertakings; they would enable such persons to obtain the sin-
gle object which they desired a fixed secure income.19 But
what was of far greater importance was the fact that debenture
stocks would save the companies from being swamped by de-
bentures falling due at unfortunate times. This great advan-
tage, however, was not clearly recognized until some years af-
terwards. It was the need of money which gradually led* a
number of railway companies to use debenture stocks.
Beginning with the fifties, it became quite general for rail-
way companies to apply to Parliament for powters to create this
class of stock for the purpose of paying off mortgages and bond-
ed debts, or as a means of raising money in lieu of borrowing
on mortgages or bonds. 20 Therefore, it became important that
the legal powers under which the old debentures should be ex-
is Ibid., May 8, 1852, p. 473.
i Economist, May 2, 1863, p. 477.
20 Board of Trade, General Eeport on Shares, Loam, etc., 1860, p. 17.
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tinguished and the debenture stocks created, should be clearly
defined. No general legislation took place. What Parliament
did was to insert clauses in the bills of the companies seeking
powers to make such conversions of new issues. In these special
acts, Parliament prescribed in detail the manner in which such
conversions of debentures or the creation of new debenture
stocks might be effected. The following passage from the Act
of 1851 of the London and Northwestern Railway 21 which was
one of the most important companies using this class of securi-
ties, may serve to show in what way Parliament legislated on the
issue of such stocks:
That it shall be lawful for the company from time to time, with the con-
sent of three-fifths of the votes of the shareholders present in person or by
proxy at any general meeting of the company convened with due notice of
that object, to resolve that any portion of the borrowed capital of the com-
pany, or any debenture or other security for which or for the interest
whereof the company are lawfully liable, . . . not exceeding an amount
to be defined in and by such resolution, may be converted into stock of the
company of like amount, either by agreement with the holders of such mort-
gages or bonds respectively before the same respectively became due, and
issuing stock of a corresponding amount, instead of reborrowing the same
so paid off; and also, with the like consent, from time to time, to resolve
that the whole or any part, to be defined in and by such resolution, of the
moneys which the company shall have authority to raise by borrowing under
the powers of any of their Acts, . . . shall or may be raised by the cre-
ation and issue of stock of a corresponding amount, instead of borrowing
the same; and also, with the like consent, to attach to the stock so author-
ized to be created and issued for any of the purposes aforesaid a fixed and
perpetual irredeemable yearly dividend or interest at any rate not exceed-
ing the rate of 3 10s. for every 100 thereof; . . . and the stock so
created and issued shall be a charge upon the tolls and undertaking, and
lands, tenements, and hereditaments of the company, but shall be distribut-
able, transmissible, and transferable, . . . and the said interest or
dividend shall forever have priority of payment over all other dividends on
any other stock or shares of the company, whether ordinary or preference,
or guaranteed, and the stock when so created shall be termed ' ' London and
North Western Debenture stock
;
' '
provided that nothing herein contained
shall in anywise prejudice or affect the rights of the holders of mortgages
or bonds of the company. . .
Four distinct principles were set forth in this clause: (1)
Debenture stocks might be issued in redeeming debentures fall-
21 15 V. e. cv. Quoted by John Whitehead in his book on Guaranteed
Securities, 1859, pp. x-xi.
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ing due as well as for raising additional loan capital within the
company's powers; (2) the rate of interest was fixed with the
consent of Parliament; (3) the security of such stock should
consist in a charge upon "the tolls and undertaking, and lands,
tenements, and hereditaments" of the company; and (4) such
stocks were to be "distributable, transmissible, and transferable
as personal estate." It must be remembered that some of these
principles were not new, but were copied from those governing
the issue of the older forms of securities. On close perusal, it
may be seen that the provisions contained in the clause were
such as to make the debenture stocks a safe and clearly-defined
investment. Indeed, Parliament had by this time recognized
to a certain extent the necessity of this class of securities for the
improvement of the financial condition of the railways, and
commenced to take steps to give the holders of debenture stocks
every possible protection and security. Thus in the act just
referred to provisions were made to the effect that if written
demand for the payment of dividend due on any debenture
stocks was not met satisfactorily within thirty days, the pro-
prietors of such stocks holding an amount of nominal value of
20,000 or upwards might, without prejudice to their right to
sue, require the appointment of a receiver.22
By these provisions, the debenture stockholders were given
the power to recover the arrears of their interest either by bring-
ing suit in any competent court or by requiring the appointment
of receivers. It may be noticed, however, that only the interest
was secured, and the principal was not mentioned. There was
some dissatisfaction over this fact, but it was generally con-
ceded 23 that so long as the interest was made sure, the principal
would take care of itself, for what the average investor wanted
was not so much the possession of his principal but a regular and
reliable income that grew out of the principal. This was es-
pecially true when his security was easily marketable.
The chief reason why Parliament took such precautions to
give great security to the holders of debenture stocks was that
there was an abundance of money ready for investment and
the only thing necessary to induce investors to come forward
22 15 V. e. cv. XII.
23 Economist, Feb. 23, 1867.
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was indisputable security.
24 With, this point in view, Lord
Redesdale in 1856, endeavored to insert a clause in the railway
bills of that session, making the railway directors personally
liable for any illegal issue of debenture stocks; but this prop-
osition, which if adopted might have prevented much trouble,
was " killed" in the committee room.25
But it must also be noticed that what Parliament did was for
the protection of the holders of legal securities. If one's se-
curity was legal, he was safe, but no protection was extended to
the holders of illegal securities. Parliament prescribed the rules
governing the issue of railway securities, and laid down the
principle that securities issued in violation of these rules were
illegal and hence not within the protection of law. Per se this
doctrine appeared proper and good. But how were the investors
to know which securities were legal and which were not? Par-
liament gave adequate protection to the holder of legal securities,
but it failed to enable the investors to distinguish the legal from
the illegal. Hence in spite of the repeated and apparently earn-
est efforts of Parliament much dissatisfaction existed. Com-
plaint was heard everywhere as to the difficulty of distinguish-
ing the legal from the illegal security. 26
To determine the legality of a security required an under-
standing of a number of acts of Parliament which the ordinary
investors could hardly construe correctly without a lawyer 's aid.
Yet if these acts were not justly construed and precisely obeyed
the debenture would give no effectual charge upon the line, and
hence the holder of it would have no legal claim to priority over
even a contracted debtor of the company. Furthermore, the
nature of the law was such that a debenture which was once
bad would remain bad. A debenture which was invalid at its
issue because it was in excess of the borrowing powers, would
not be improved because other debentures were paid off. The
contract was illegal when it was executed, and it could not gath-
er legality by subsequent payments to third parties. 27
2* Railway Times, Aug. 4, 1855, p. 781.
25 Hid., April 26, 1856, p. 514.
26 It was often heard in bank parlors, ' ' How do we know this debenture
is worth anything? The validity depends on its accordance with the bor-
rowing powers of the company, and what those powers are, or how they
have been exercised, we do not know." Compare Economist, July 11, 1863.
27 Economist, May 2, 1863.
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In spite of this unsatisfactory state of affairs, the use of de-
benture stocks continued to become more extensive. To insure
uniformity in practice and to facilitate the use of such stocks,
the Board of Trade repeatedly recommended, 28 during the latter
part of the fifties, that provisions should be made in a general
act embodying the principles governing the issue of such stocks.
Consequently Parliament in 1863 codified into general law the
various provisions scattered in the special acts as well as some
of the recommendations of the Board of Trade. A large part
of the Companies Clauses Act of that year 29 was devoted to the
regulation of debenture stocks. Provisions were made as to the
creation and issue of debenture stocks, the priority of such
securities, the limit of the rate of interest and the enforcement
of payment of such interest either by action or by the appoint-
ment of receivers. The companies were also required to keep
a register of debenture stocks issued and to deliver certifi-
cates to holders of debenture stocks, etc. In short practically
all the provisions contained in this act governing the creation
and issue of debenture stock were modelled after those govern-
ing the creation and issue of the earlier forms of securities, and
which had been heretofore inserted in special acts.
The improvement, however, was not enough to meet the sit-
uation. The act provided, in great detail, for the regulation of
the debenture stock itself, but it did not afford any effective
means for the enforcement of the regulations. It gave further
protection to the holders of legal debentures; but it again failed
to evolve any means by which one might be enabled to tell which
debenture was a legal one and which was not. In brief, it
stopped short at the point where action was demanded. Hence,
in spite of the act, little improvement was made to clarify the
doubt which prevailed. In the meantime gross encroachments
upon the acts of Parliament were made.
Being at a loss as to how to mend the situation, Parliament
appointed a select committee in 1863 to inquire as to what
should be done to prevent such encroachments ; 30 and the work
of this committee was continued by another select committee
appointed in the following year. Both of these committees
28 Board of Trade, General Report on Railway Bills, 1861, p. 23.
29 26 & 27 V. c. 118, Part III.
so Cf. infra, Chap. IV.
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were of the opinion that holders of statutory debentures duly
registered, should have a right to recover and secure the pay-
ment of all principal and interest due to them in priority to the
holders of other obligations not issued under the authority of
Parliament. 31 They also recommended that the right of the
public to the use of the railways should be protected and that
the rolling stock and plant of a railway should never be seized
by creditors. Moreover, the committee recognized the evil re-
sulting from the lack of means to establish the legality of de-
bentures. Therefore it was also urged 32 as a modified protec-
tion to the holders of such debentures that there should be a
semi-annual declaration in the gazette of the state of the bor-
rowing powers of the company and an endorsement upon each
certificate. This was not expected to render it impossible for
the companies to issue debentures beyond their borrowing pow-
ers; but it was hoped that the knowledge of the fact that their
misconduct would be palpably and continually kept before their
own eyes, would be a powerful force in restraining the directors
from exceeding such borrowing powers to any considerable ex-
tent. Many plans 33 for verifying the legality of debentures
were proposed, of which one advocated that there should be an
examination of the debenture accounts by a public department,
and that a stamp should be affixed to the debenture whose le-
gality had been ascertained. It was also urged that the chair-
man and secretary of the railway company should be required
to certify under their hands the amount of debentures at any
time issued, and should be made liable to penalty if the amount
was false, or if the debentures issued were in excess of their bor-
rowing powers. The great weakness with a scheme like that was
that it did not provide for the most common case in which
debentures were issued by mistake. As the directors were liable
in almost all cases under such a scheme except that of mistake,
it was readily recognized that such a scheme would not prove
very effective.
It was also proposed that all debentures illegally issued should
be made binding on the company and have a claim prior to the
dividends of the shareholders. This was based on the usual as-
31 Select Committee of 1864, Report, pp. III-IV.
32 Evidence before select committee of 1864, p. 27.
as Economist, July 11, 1863.
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sumption that the shareholders appointed the directors who
managed the business and should, therefore, be liable for their
misconduct. But it was recognized that
' '
considering how little
!real influence most shareholders, in fact, have in the appoint-
ment of the directors, it appeared rather hard to reduce their
dividends if the directors are dishonest. . . " 34
Parliament, however, was not ready to adopt any of these
propositions. So the situation drifted from bad to worse. The
goodness of debentures and the repayment of the money bor-
rowed, as in the case of the Great Eastern,
35 became the subject
of a complicated controversy even between the directors and the
deputy chairman of the company. The one would say that bad
securities had been issued, while the other would deny the
charge; and the world had to judge between them. In some
cases debentures were issued when no real capital whatever had




''receipts" were exchanged between a financial
agent and the company by which transaction "apparent cap-
ital" was created. Thus the parliamentary requirements and
restrictions were utterly disregarded. But this case was not
the worst. Some men who were known to have "the greatest
repute for integrity and the highest standing," went so far as
to "pawn" debentures not only in an illegal manner, but even
for fraudulent purposes. As revealed in the case of the London,
Chatham and Dover Railway, 37 supposedly genuine debentures
issued by the company were found later to have "nothing in
them." In defence of the company, one of its directors de-
clared that those "debentures were not debentures at all." He
admitted that he had obtained money on them, but he said
"They were not worth anything." They were "quasi things"
and the good securities were elsewhere. It was no wonder,
therefore, that the whole basis of railway credit was utterly
shaken.
To make things still worse, the treacherous instrument called
Lloyd 's bonds 38 also appeared in the financial market about
a*
Economist, July 11, 1863.
35 Economist, Aug. 12, 1865, p. 970.
36 Economist, Oct. 27, 1866.
37 Economist, Oct. 27, 1866.
38 For a description of these bonds cf. supra, p. 19.
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this period. What followed was but natural. Distrust and dis-
satisfaction over railway securities was felt everywhere. It
was urged that the government should see to it that the law was
complied with. A loud cry 39 was also raised demanding that
government should stamp all the debentures issued as it stamped
money and "ascertained the qualities of schoolmasters/' 40 so
that only the allowed number would be permitted to circulate.
Nothing, however, was done by Parliament to meet the de-
mands. In the meanwhile the railway panic of 1865-1867, which
was the result as well as the cause of the growing distrust in
railway debentures, was setting in, during which a number of
companies suffered great embarrassments. The credit of some
railway companies like that of the South Eastern was greatly
injured on account of the pressure brought about by the re-
newal of their debentures. Other companies, like the London,
Chatham and Dover, met with "utter and disgraceful failure" 41
due to similar causes. What was even of greater consequence
was the effect of such happenings upon the credit of the whole
railway system. The accidental circumstances of mere neigh-
borhood to the "exploded" companies was construed into some
participation in their faults. In the midst of this chaos, a royal
commission was appointed to examine the whole matter, with a
view toward government purchase as a solution of the problem.
Parliament intended to postpone all action until the commission
had finished its work; but the prevailing difficulties made early
action necessary. Therefore, in 1866 the Railway Companies
Securities Act 42 was passed for the purpose of remedying the
situation.
By 1867 the panic subsided ; but the old ominous controversy
over the nature and value of railway securities was still rife.
In fact it held all other financial matters in abeyance. Of the
aggregate railway capital of about 450,000,000 more than 27%
represented debenture debts,43 the number of investors in such
securities numbered no less than 100,000.44
sa Economist, Nov. 17, 1866.
40 Ibid., Oct. 27, 1866.
41 Ibid., 1866, pp. 1484-1485.
42 29 & 30, V. e. 108. Cf. infra, Chap. V.
43 London Times, Feb. 6, 1867, p. 9.
4* Hansard, 185: 297.
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Meanwhile the current belief was that a man lending money
upon a debenture, lent it upon a mortgage not only of the in-
come, but also of the property of a railway company. But this
belief was shattered by the decision of the Lord Justice in the
London, Chatham and Dover Company's land case,46 in which
the principle governing the question was laid down at some
length. It was held that the holders of railway debentures were
not only without any immediate hold on the general property
of the undertaking as distinguished from its income, but were
not entitled to any claim to the rents or proceeds from the sale
of the company's surplus land. In other words, the debenture-
holders had only a hold on the tolls and earnings of the line and
not on the property of the company. The whole question seem-
ed to have turned on the interpretation given to the word "un-
dertaking" in the security which the debenture-holders received,
for their money. The popular idea was that by that term the
debenture-holders were mortgagees of the whole property and
effects of the company. But the court held that the object and
intentions of the legislature were to create a railway "which
was to be made and maintained, by which tolls and profits were
to be earned, and which was to be worked and managed by a
certain company. . ." "The whole of this when in operation
is the word contemplated by the Legislature, and it is to this
that the name undertaking is given."
This decision and the financial depression of 1865-1867 brought
to light the following broad and practical points regarding rail-
way debentures.46
First. The Court of Chancery would not undertake to man-
age a railway for the debenture holders. It was true that in
45 During those years many companies acquired, either accidentally or
involuntarily, more land than they ultimately needed, and such lands sooner
or later were resold, so that the proceeds might revert to the capital of the
concern. The London, Chatham and Dover more than other companies, had
a considerable amount of such lands which was valued at about 1,000,000.
The debenture-holders, naturally enough, desired to establish their claims
upon this as well as other properties of the company, and applied to the
Court of Chancery for a receiver to take and hold for their benefit the pro-
ceeds from the disposal of such lands when sold and the rents in the mean-
time. It was on this claim that the decision referred to in the text was
rendered. Cf. London Times, February 6, 1867, p. 9.
Economist, Feb. 2, 1867.
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some cases the Court of Chancery did, for limited periods, un-
dertake the management of large concerns; but this was done
with the view of winding up that concern. But it could not
wind up a railway. A railway was, as had been recognized
then, an unending business and the court could not wind it up.
Second. The debenture-holders could hardly manage the rail-
way in case their interest and principal were in arrear, even if
they wanted to do so. They were not a corporate body. They
could not appoint directors to manage for them. The majority
of all but one had no more legal capacity than the one.
Third. The debenture-holders had not even a preferential
claim or mortgage on any outlying surplus land.
Fourth. The debenture-holders could not sell the railway.
The right of building the railway was given by Parliament to a
certain specific company. Neither that company, nor any law
court could sell it save by the assent of Parliament. "Once a
railway company, always a railway company.
' '
It was a sort of
a consecrated entity, which only Parliament could create, and
which only the same body could change.
Fifth. The mortgagees could not split their securities in spite
of the Act of 1863, the old form of debentures representing lump-
sums of money being still the most common form of securities
issued by railway companies. Thus the investors must take the
security as a whole and as a unit, and as they found it.
But the real state of affairs was not as objectional as these
difficulties would suggest. All but the last of these drawbacks
applied only to the poorer roads, which were in difficulty, and
did not have any reference to the debentures of strong, solvent
companies.
But the most objectionable drawback of the railway debentures
was the falling due of such securities at fixed and often unfor-
tunate seasons. This was fairly recognized in the early fifties,
but was made clear during the depression. Experience had
taught the hitherto credulous that short-period debentures were
dangerous and uncontrollable, "a lottery within themselves."
Some companies "highest in credit, most secure in revenue . . .
unassailable in repute found themselves ... as helpless as the
vilest excrescence which had been able to foist itself into the
family of railway interests. . ." Thus the Railway Times
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urged that short-period debentures be abolished and in place
debenture-stocks issued at such a rate of interest as would estab-
lish for them an immediate and permanent popularity. The
Economist also advocated that in the interest of the companies
as well as the investors, it was essential that a large portion of
the existing 110 millions sterling of debenture bonds which
would mature at fixed periods, very often without any or at
least with insufficient notice, should be changed into debenture
stocks, representable in consols at the option of the holder, by
certificate to bearer in coupon form. Some members of Parlia-
ment 4T also recognized the evil of the existing system of deben-
tures. Many solvent companies were often placed in consid-
erable embarrassment by the claims of the holders of such short-
period debentures. Indeed, to permit a large amount of capital
raised with short-period debentures to be sunk in a fixed under-
taking was regarded as a great error on the part of Parliament.48
The legislature was forced to recognize this evil, when borrowers
were compelled to come constantly or "almost hourly" before it
for renewals of their loans.49
Under such conviction, many people firmly believed that per-





as the railway debentures were called.
It was urged 50 that this reform would not only save the com-
panies the periodical recurrence of the danger inherent with the
falling due of short-period debentures, but would also mean an
immediate source of saving in money and trouble to the railways.
It would relieve the railways from the trouble of stamping, and
would save the commissions and fees to lawyers and brokers as
well as the wages of the staff of clerks employed for managing
the debenture business. Therefore, new debenture-stocks should
be issued to shareholders in place of dividends, and this pro-
cedure, it was thought, would prove acceptable to the share-
holders.
Another defect of the law which was brought to light by the




so London Times, March 23, 1867, p. 12.
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beneficial enactment, was the fact that the debenture holders
had no preferential claim on the rolling stock which formed the
implement of the trade. In the absence of any adequate pro-
tection for the rolling stock, even if the debenture-holders did
unanimously concur in the management of a railway to com-
pensate their losses in interest or principal, they would still be
in danger of having the carriages seized by the contractor, the
engine maker, or any other casual creditor of the company.
The debenture mortgage was on the "tolls or fares" of the rail-
way, and there was no specific pledge of the carriages. 51 There-
fore legislation was needed to keep the railway intact in order
to safeguard the security upon which the debenture-holders had
a claim, namely: the earnings of the company.
As might have been expected, the panic of 1865 and the re-
sultant discoveries regarding the validity and securities of rail-
way debentures created a widespread alarm among the owners
of these securities, which fact in turn involved many railway
companies in serious embarrassment. Interest to the amount
of one-half to one per cent higher than should have been paid
according to the natural state of the money market had to be
offered in order to induce investments.52 It became essential for
Parliament to take action in order to remove such alarm. More-
over, the fact that the class of people who invested in such
securities were those who needed the greatest protection made
immediate action necessary.53 Early in 1867 the Railway De-
benture Holders Bill was introduced to prevent any one class
of creditors from injuring the public and other losses of cred-
itors by seizing the rolling stock so as to stop the working of
the line.54 This measure, before being presented to Parlia-
ment, was submitted to and approved by "the highest authori-
ties" of the leading railways and was also approved by the At-
torney General.
55 What the bill asserted was that the whole un-
dertaking, engines, carriages and all, formed the security of the
debenture holder, and that other creditors should be forbidden
from seizing engines or any part of the plant, or in any way
6i Economist, February 2, 1867.
52 Hansard, 185: 787.
sa Hansard, 185: 781.
54 The bill was introduced on Feb. 12, 1867. Hansard, 185 : 297-299.
55 Hansard, 185 : 781.
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breaking up the "living whole" on which the conveyance and
convenience of the public as well as the money of the mort-
gagees depended.
This measure was regarded as both timely and helpful in es-
tablishing the desirability of debentures. "No one could
doubt,
' '
remarked the Economist ' ' that this enactment is bene-
ficial. It amounts to preserving the interest of the mortgages
from all danger, if the line yields money enough to pay it, be-
cause the whole earning machine is kept together and intact to
make what gains it can."
It was also felt in Parliament that, in the existing feverish
state of the public mind, any attempt to oppose such a measure
as the Railway Debenture Holders Bill might conduce to the
spread of panic and to create the impression that Parliament
was not anxious to strengthen the position of the debenture-
holders.57 Nevertheless, the bill was shelved for a while after
the second reading.
Being deeply impressed by the need of protection to the de-
benture-holders, some members evidently grew impatient with
the lack of action of Parliament. Consequently early in April,
1867,
58 a resolution was introduced into the House of Commons
to the effect that ' ' in case where adequate security can be given,
the state should assume the responsibility of the debenture debt
of railway companies unable to meet their engagements, upon
conditions providing for the eventual acquisition of such rail-
ways by the state upon terms of mutual advantage." In fact
the matter of government guarantee had been thought of for
some time. In the previous year it was announced that the
cabinet intended to adopt a plan for giving a government guar-
antee to railway debentures and for obtaining a sum of money
applicable to the payment of the national debt by that means.
The scheme was proposed in various forms, but in its essence it
was this: that the government should borrow the money need-
ful for railways at the cheapest rate it could in the market, and
lend it to the railways at what was called a "just" rate, namely,
a rate which railways had been paying. This process, it was
se Economist, February 23, 1867.
57 Hansard, 185 : 788.
58 The resolution was introduced by E. W. Crawford on April 2, 1867.
See Hansard, 186: 1025-1063.
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hoped, would on the one hand enable the railways to obtain
money upon fairer terms than they otherwise could, and on the
other hand, enable the government to gain the difference be-
tween the rate which it would have to pay and that which it
would charge.59
So far, so good. But serious objections were at once detected.
In the first place it was recognized that the chief reason why the
government was an easy borrower a borrower at low terms
was because it was a small borrower. Even then, there were
many dealers who declared that the public were withdrawing
from investment in "consols." If a large new loan were asked
for, it would likely tax the credit of the government to such an
extent as to necessitate a great depreciation. But it was argued,
not without reason, that the proposed loan to pay off railway de-
bentures would not constitute a loan for new, additional money.
The capital represented in these debentures had been sunk years
ago. All that was needed was a transfer from the books of the
railways to that of the government. To this it was replied that
such a transfer was precisely what would impair the credit of
the government. Its securities were then at a scarcity value.
The money to be attracted by a low rate of interest was limited
and could not be much augmented. Consols were once sold for
less than half of their face value,60 and it was not beyond possi-
bility that a disastrous event like a war might occur to necessi-
tate large loans. In such case, a government guarantee would
prove, it was feared, exceedingly embarrassing, if not disastrous.
Moreover, even if the borrowing could have been done prop-
erly, it was still almost impossible for the government to fix the
"just" rate at which to lend to the different railways. The nat-
ural test of a proper rate of interest was the test of the market.
The railways which the public trusted would get their money on
good terms; those which the public distrusted would get it on
bad terms. But it was asked, how could a government charge
one railway 5% and another railway 4%. There would at once
be a cry of favoritism. Such a process would not only give rise
to much complaint, but would also offer a strong temptation to
the different lines to corrupt the officials who had charge of de-
59 Economist, November 17, 1866.
o In 1797 consols were sold at 47. Cf. Economist, November 17, 1866.
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termining the rates of interest. Therefore it was urged that the
true function of a government in relation to railway credit was
to see that the law was complied with. The government should
use not its faculty of borrowing, but its function of verification.
Thus neither the resolution of Mr. Crawford nor the sentiment
of the cabinet in favor of government guarantee, resulted in any
action by Parliament.
But many members of Parliament clearly saw that something
must be done to prevent the spread of discredit over railway de-
bentures. Therefore, soon after the withdrawal of Mr. Craw-
ford's resolution just referred to, the Railway Companies Ar-
rangement Bill was introduced by the Secretary of State for
India. This bill, after being read a second time, was, in con-
junction with the Debenture Holders Bill, referred to a select
committee, and the two bills were "fused" into the Railway
Companies Bill.61 This measure was regarded as of great im-
portance. Lord Redesdale was even of the opinion that if it had
been introduced twenty years earlier it might have prevented
many of the difficulties in which the railway companies had be-
come involved.62
When the bill was discussed in the House of Lords, a proviso
was urged to the effect that whenever a company created any de-
benture stock having a higher rate of interest than 5%, it should
fall to that rate at the end of seven years.63 But the Duke of
Richmond pointed out that the question of limiting the rate of
interest had been thoroughly discussed by the committee which
examined the bill. This committee felt that the companies which
required such arrangements were in most cases probably in all
cases the best judges of what they needed, and that they ought
to be left to borrow money in the manner which they thought
best. If they could borrow at 5% they were not likely to pay
6% for it. Therefore, it was thought unjustifiable for Parlia-
ment to restrict the companies in fixing the rates of interest.64
But the most important and the most warmly opposed part of
the bill was that which prohibited creditors from seizing the
rolling stock of railways. This modification of the established
ei Hansard, 187: 1723-1724.
62/&uZ., 188: 491.
63 /bid., 189: 157.
6* Hansard, 189: 157-158.
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law by adding to the legal mortgages of the land estate, as it was
called, all the personal property that might happen to be upon
it was looked upon as too great a change. 85
It was, however, clearly recognized that it would be very in-
convenient to the public, who also had a right in railways, to
have the rolling stock of the company seized by individual cred-
itors, to say nothing of the undesirability of destroying the rea-
sonable security of the debenture-holders, who were the first
creditors. "When a law gave occasion for the stoppage of the na-
tion's commerce, it should be modified even if it were of old
standing.
66
An objection was raised against such a proposition on the
ground that it would deprive the trade creditor of his security.
It would give the debenture-holders an unwarrantable advantage
over all other creditors of a railway company, with the single
exception of the tax gatherers. It was feared that a case might
occur where a contractor engaged in constructing a line and de-
siring payment when the line was finished, would be unable to
put in an execution for payment in case the company had issued
debentures. The contractor for casual repairs, too, might be
brought into such a predicament under similar circumstances.
For these reasons, a member of the House of Commons seriously
opposed the measure,, and thought that it would be more appro-
priate to call such a measure railway companies creditors' de-
finance bill instead of railway debenture-holders' bill.67
Those in favor of the measure, however, denied that such
could be the case. However, even if it did so affect the security
of such trade creditors, that fact alone was not sufficient to make
the measure undesirable. Inasmuch as the bulk of the railway
revenue was received in cash, railway companies should pay cash
for their stores, labor, etc., and should not get into debt on their
account. Moreover, there was in fact a large amount of property
left untouched by the bill which could be seized by such trade
creditors, if such a course became really necessary. In addition,
the trade creditors had recourse to appointing receivers.68
es Hansard, 185 : 783-784.
wlbid., 185: 784.
67 Ibid., 185: 783.
185: 782.
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The opponents to the measure further contended that the
clause would encourage solvent companies to delay the payment
of their debts. Moreover, it was inexpedient to oblige the cred-
itors of solvent companies to resort to the "cumbrous and per-
haps tedious" plan of getting a receiver appointed. If a railway
were insolvent, it would itself apply for the appointment of such
receivers. In other words, in the case of solvent companies, it
would be impracticable and, in the case of the insolvent, it
would be unnecessary for the trade creditor to have recourse to
the appointment of receivers. Hence he would get no protec-
tion whatever from the clause providing for the appointment of
such receivers.69
To this it was answered that a creditor would have ample rem-
edy inasmuch as a solvent company would, under the provisions
of the bill, make immediate payments, while a receiver should be
appointed in the case of insolvent companies. No company that
was solvent would think for an instant of allowing a receiver to
be appointed. 70 It was also urged that if the trade creditors had
the power of selling the rolling stock, there would be a serious
effect upon the shareholders. Such powers might be pressed at
inconvenient moments with the intention of bringing down the
shares to a point far below their value, and then the very men
who had assisted in bringing about that unfortunate state of af-
fairs might step in and make a handsome fortune out of the mis-
fortune of others. 71 It was further pointed out that it was only
the small creditors who would ever be tempted to seize the roll-
ing stock. It would never be worth the while of large creditors
to do so. No railway which had the slightest regard for its own
reputation would permit its rolling stock to be seized for the
purpose of securing small debts.72 Furthermore, the measure
was not directed against existing creditors. As to future cred-
itors, they would be given their credit with the full knowledge
that they could not levy execution in case of default in payments.
Thus they would be duly aware of what their securities were.
To give such creditors the power to apply to the Court of Chan-
69 Hansard, 187 : 1725.
ro Ibid., 187: 1726.
"/few*., 187: 162.
72 Hansard, 189 : 162.
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eery for the appointment of a receiver to seize the tolls of the
railway was regarded, therefore, as ample protection.73
The opponents also endeavored to introduce an amendment to
the measure that should retain the power of seizing the rolling
stock in the hands of the creditors, unless the Court of Chancery
should appoint a receiver. But this amendment was defeated. 7 *
Another new and seriously contested section of the bill was
the so-called "arrangement" clause, providing for the creation
of "pre-preference" stocks. 75 This provision was opposed on the
ground that it would interfere seriously with the rights of the
holders of the some 150,000,000 in debentures.
76 Persons who
advanced money on debentures did so in the belief that they had
a first claim upon the company's receipts; but if Parliament
should confer the power of creating preference stocks, the public
would be unwilling to advance any more money upon this class
of securities in the future. It might be proper to permit the
creation of such pre-preference stocks by special act when the
particular circumstances warranted such a procedure; but it
would be impolitic to confer such powers by a general act. 77
There was also much opposition among the holders of railway
debentures as shown by the fact that a formal protest was lodged
against such a provision being inserted in private bills of the
session by a large number of bankers and lawyers, as well as by
many prominent railway men, in behalf of the holders of railway
debentures. 78 These petitioners claimed that the effect of such
187: 1725.
74 Hid., 187 : 1722.
75 Pre-preference stocks were securities issued in excess of a company 'a
borrowing powers in case that company became unable to meet its engage-
ments with its creditors. The first instance of the issue of such stocks was
that of the Caledonian Railway. In 1851 that company obtained powers
from the House of Commons to issue debentures in excess of its powers, for
the purpose of paying its debts. At the time the company was in a state
of great embarrassment, and the course adopted proved beneficial. It was
pointed out in Parliament that in that case the creation of the additional
debentures (pre-preference stock was not the name used) was equal to put-
ting a charge over the preference shareholders. Hansard, 187: 1246. For
further discussion of this provision in Parliament, cf. Hansard, vols. 186-
189, under Railway Companies Bill, 1867.
76 Hansard, 189: 159-160.
77 Ibid., 188: 590-492, and 189: 163.
i& Railway Times, July 22, 1897.
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a provision would be to depreciate or bring into disrepute the
security hitherto attached to acts of Parliament. It was claimed
that "a large proportion of these securities were held by trus-
tees for infants, married women and widows, or by persons of
fixed income, who invested their means in such securities upon
the faith of the acts of Parliament, and that such persons would
have never made any such investments had they supposed that
Parliament would permit their rights to be affected by a later
issue of securities of prior lien."
After being committed and recommitted and modified in many
respects, the bill was passed and became the Railway Companies
Act of 1867. The first important section of this act provided
that the creditors of a railway company might obtain the ap-
pointment of a receiver, and if necessary, of a manager, on ap-
plying to the Court of Chancery to manage the railway, but that
the ' ' rolling stock and plant used or provided by a company for
the purpose of the traffic on the railway or of the stations or
workshops, shall not, after the railway or any part thereof is
open for public traffic, be liable to be taken in execution at law
or in equity at any time after the passing of this Act, and before
the first day of September, 1868. . ."
It may be noticed that the provision for the protection of roll-
ing stock was adopted for only one year. This was due to the
fact that such a measure was still regarded as an innovation.
On account of the aforesaid opposition and uncertainty as to the
practicability of such a measure, Parliament decided to try it
for twelve months so as to carry the matter over the next ses-
sion; and then if it were found absolutely necessary that there
should be a sale of rolling stock by the creditors, it could be so
arranged by an Act of Parliament.79
This precaution proved beneficial. It afforded time to try out
the principle and it also gave a great stimulus to all concerned
to make close observation, with a view to altering the rule either
one way or the other.
The result of the application of the provisions governing the
protection of rolling stock proved so advantageous that Parlia^
ment in the following year, by a special general act,80 extended
79 Hansard, sec. 3, 189 : 162.
so The Eailway Companies Act, 1868, 31 & 32 V. c. 79. This act was
enacted for the sole purpose of extending the time-limit to 1870.
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the time limit of the provision to three years, that is, until Sep-
tember 1, 1870, and at the end of the three years, Parliament
found it expedient to pass another special act 81 for the purpose
of making the provision perpetual.
A large part of the act was devoted to defining relations be-
tween the company and its creditors. In this connection, ample
provisions were made for settling and defining the rights of
shareholders of the company as among themselves for raising
money by pre-preference stocks. Considerable protection was
afforded the holders of the different classes of securities which
might be affected by such schemes, through the requirement be-
fore a plan could be put into operation of the consent of the
holders of three-fourths of each class of such affected securities.
Moreover, the scheme must first of all be filed in the Court of
Chancery; and after hearing the directors, creditors, or other
parties whom the court might deem entitled to be heard and on
being satisfied with the nature of the scheme, the court might
confirm it. Notice concerning both the filing, as well as the con-
firmation, of the plan must be published in the gazette.
82
Besides the provision prohibiting the seizure of the rolling
stock, and that for the creation of pre-preference stocks, the
Railway Companies Act of 1867 contained a number of other im-
portant clauses governing the loan capital of railways. In the
first place it provided that, except the claim of the rent charges
and lease,
' '
all money borrowed or to be borrowed by a company
on mortgage or bond or debenture stock under the provisions of
any Act authorizing the borrowing thereof shall have priority
against the company and the property from time to time of the
company over all other claims on account of any debts incurred
or engagements entered into by them after the passing of this
Act." 83 Thus by this clause, the holders of debenture stocks
were clothed with an indisputable claim of priority against the
company over the holders of Lloyd's bonds and other irregular
securities. This measure was without doubt urgently needed for
improving the desirability of railway debentures.
Section 26 of this act provided that "money borrowed by a
si Railway Companies Act, 1875, 38 & 39 V. e. 31.
82 The Railway Companies Act, 1867, 30 & 31 V. c. 127, ss. 6-22.
ss 30 & 31 V. c. 127, p. 23.
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company for the purpose of paying off, and duly applied in pay-
ing off, bonds or mortgages of the company given or made under
the statutory powers of the company, shall ... be deemed
money borrowed within and not in excess of such statutory
powers.
' '
As we have seen, the railways had much trouble in meeting
their mortgages falling due. It has also been shown that there
was much difficulty over the fact that securities issued tem-
porarily in excess of the borrowing powers even in anticipation
of paying off debentures falling due were sometimes regarded as
illegal. By the above provision Parliament endeavored to re-
move this difficulty; and subsequent events have amply shown
that the effort of Parliament was not in vain. That such a pro-
vision had been urgently needed, few men who are familiar with
the financial affairs of English railways can deny.
To make the debenture stocks more acceptable and easier to
issue this act also removed all the restrictions prescribed in the
Companies Clauses Act of 1863 as to the rate of interest.84
Therefore, the companies and their investors were empowered to
make whatever arrangements they saw fit in regard to the rate
of interest.
Thus closed the legislation on the loan capital of railways in
England. Based upon the acts just referred to, the Lord Chan-
cellor in 1869 decided that railway companies should be held
liable for all loans irregularly contracted and even in excess of
its borrowing powers,85 thus removing much of the temptation of
railways to borrow illegally. Aside from the imposition,86 since
1868, of a stamp duty of 2 per cent on the nominal value of the
debenture stocks transferred, nothing new has been added to the
principles laid down up to 1870. In spite of the temporary dis-
content with these measures of Parliament, the regulations seem
to have proven on the whole satisfactory. With the additional
security and facility given to railway debenture stocks it soon
became common for railways to ask Parliament for powers to
issue stocks to be appropriated solely to the liquidation and can-
cellation of debentures and other periodical loans falling due.87
s* Sec. 25, 30 & 31 V. c. 127.
ss Economist, August 7, 1869.
86 Sec. 12, 31 & 32 V. c. 124.
87 Eailway Times, May 2, 1868.
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The desirability of such stocks was well shown by the fact that
by 1876 practically all the loans were converted into this class of
securities. 88
Our survey of this aspect of English railway finance leads to
certain conclusions, briefly expressed as follows:
1. Other things being equal, long period debts or better still,
perpetual and devisible debenture stocks redeemable at the op-
tion of the company are more desirable for railways than lump
sum loans or mortgages falling due after short periods.
2. The action taken by the English Parliament in 1867 pro-
hibiting the seizure of rolling stock, revealed the advanced ideas
of that body and proved to be an effective measure for the estab-
lishment of stability in railway finance.
3. The function of a government in regulating the capitaliza-
tion of railways by loans lies not so much in the adoption of
many complicated restrictions as in the enforcement of a few
essential rules, with a view of enabling the investor himself to
tell the true financial condition of the concern in which he in-
vests.
ss Board of Trade, General Eeport on Railway Shares, Loan Capital,
etc., 1876.
CHAPTER IV
CONTROL OF THE BORROWING POWERS OF RAILWAY
COMPANIES
In early years borrowing powers were granted to railway com-
panies for the purpose of relieving the pressure of calls upon
shareholders for new capital. There was no idea then that bor-
rowings should become a permanent charge upon capital. Par-
liament and the companies alike were of the opinion that the
vast profits to be derived from railways would speedily enable
the latter to pay off their debts and in addition to declare divi-
dends of a much higher rate than is now- expected. The general
belief was that railways were to be constructed with capital
raised from subscriptions, plus a small proportion of loans for
temporary purposes. It is hardly necessary to say that these
illusions as to railway profits were soon dispelled. The idea of
being able to pay off borrowed money, however, was retained for
many years, and was not abandoned until the constant and in-
creasing requirements for renewals, replacements, and improve-
ments had grown beyond all expected proportions. 1
With such a conception of railway borrowing in mind, Parlia-
ment endeavored, from the beginning, to limit the borrowing
powers of railway companies as well as to lay down strict rules
governing their exercise. Thus, in one of the standing orders,
2
which guided early railway legislation, it was provided that no
railway company should be authorized to raise, by loan or mort-
gage, a sum of money larger than one-third of its share capital,
and that until fifty per cent of the share capital should have been
1 Eailway Times, August 22, 1863.
2 Standing Order No. 84. Cf. Eemarks on Standing Orders by a Par-
liamentary Agent, London, 1837, p. 55, and Eailway Times, April 27, 1844.
Cf. also evidence before the select committee on railways, House of Com-
mons, 1844, p. 29.
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paid up, it should not be in the power of the company to raise
any money by loan or mortgage.
3
Thus from the beginning, two principles were laid down.
First, no railway company should borrow more than one-third of
its share capital ; and secondly, no company should borrow at all
until one-half of its share capital had been paid up.
The purpose of Parliament in so strictly limiting the powers
of railway companies to one-third of their share capital was due
first to the general belief, as already mentioned, that railways
should be built only with their subscribed share capital, and sec-
ond to the fact that strict limitation of loans was deemed neces-
sary to give the creditors of the companies adequate security.
The stipulation that 50 per cent of the share capital be paid up
before the exercising of borrowing powers, was adopted with the
hope that such a requirement would tend to place the shares in
the hands of substantial investors as well as to strengthen the
security of the debentures.
It was also held that no sellers of land or of material to a rail-
way company could be prejudiced by the railway company issu-
ing securities not authorized by the act of incorporation. The
company was not entitled to call any credit or to pledge any part
of their property for any other purpose, nor should the directors
make any contract or sanction any engagements to pay money
until they had clearly ascertained that from one or other of the
two sources authorized by Parliament they had the power of
fulfilling them.
4
So far so good. But in practice these rules were not always
observed. Much consideration was usually given to peculiar
circumstances. The
.standing order just referred to was often
"either dispensed with or modified so as to meet the circum-
stances of the case. " 5 In fact another standing order provided
for a select committee on standing orders, whose duty it was to
3 As has been referred to in Chapter I the early railway acts were
modelled after the Canal Acts, and the latter in the earliest years gave no
power for borrowing. The first acts in which borrowing powers appeared
were passed in 1770. By degrees this power of the Companies was re-
stricted to one-third of their share capital. Report of Royal Commission
of Railways, 1867. If iii.
* Letter to the London Times, August 23, 1866.
5 Eemarks on Standing Order, pp. 78-79.
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"determine whether the standing orders ought or ought not to
be dispensed with." 6 Moreover, it soon became clear that not
only were the borrowings of railways to remain a permanent
charge instead of a temporary obligation as was expected, but
that the limit of the borrowing powers was altogether too narrow.
The state of the money market and other circumstances fre-
quently made it advisable for a railway company to raise a larger
proportion of its capital by loans than the law permitted. In-
deed it was only by over-borrowings that some companies con-
tinued to pay a fairly good dividend. 7
Under such circumstances one may readily imagine what hap-
pened. When a railway company wished to increase its loans,
especially when it could declare bigger dividends by such a
process, it would find some way of so doing whether the law
permitted it or not. Moreover, the law itself was4 too imperfect
to be effective, for it only .stipulated against the borrowing on
mortgages and bonds, whereas there were other ways by which
money could be borrowed. As was currently remarked at the
time, one could always drive a coach and six through any law if
he tried hard enough. 8 This was exactly what happened. Money
was borrowed in many ways in excess of the legal limit, in spite
of the law. The best known expedient for evading the restric-
tions of Parliament was by the issue of loan notes!, for which the
directors issuing them were personally responsible. By the issue
of such loan notes the companies had "continually exceeded
their borrowing powers.
' ' 9 Thus the law prohibiting railways
from borrowing more than one-third of their share capital on
mortgages or bonds was evaded although not violated in letter.
The early restrictive measures upon railway borrowings
coupled with What was done to evade them had generally a
vicious effect upon the property of the original shareholders,
especially when the company was not prosperous. In such cases, '
the borrowing powers were usually exhausted and hence no
money could be obtained through that channel. Loan notes
might be issued, but they were obligatory upon the directors
6 Kemarks on Standing Orders, pp. 13-14.
7 Eailway Times, April 27, 1844.
8 Evidence before Select Committee on Eailway Borrowing Powers, 1864,
p. 22.
9 Eeport of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xxiii.
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personally instead of upon the company. The directors would
naturally become more desirous of relieving themselves of their
personal obligations according as the conditions of the company 's
finance became more desperate. Therefore, they would proceed
to Parliament and obtain authority to issue shares either at a
ruinous discount, or with an exorbitant rate of interest guaran-
teed upon them. The result would be an immediate depreciation
of the value of the old stocks. The property of the original
shareholders, who encountered the risk of forming the com-
pany, was often ruined, and the credit of the concern would also
sink with the value of the old stocks. Thus it was claimed that
the standing order limiting the borrowing powers of railway
companies had a tendency either to prevent railways from rais-
ing their capital in the most judicious manner or to compel them
to issue securities of an irregular character.
10
Efforts were made, during the forties, to urge Parliament to
abolish, or at least to broaden the limit.11 Nothing, however,
was done to remedy the situation. The law was neither modified
nor enforced. Like many other stringent laws, it was consistent-
ly disregarded. In some cases, sums of money larger than the
amount of the total authorized share capital were borrowed
through loan notes or other similarly illegal instruments.12
The worst effect was that the public did not understand clearly
that such loan notes were illegal, and were astonished when it
was declared by the select committee of the House of Commons,
1844,
13 that these loan notes were ' ' absolutely invalid,
' '
and that
the lenders had no means whatever of enforcing the repayment
of their money. The issue of such notes was not merely illegal
but actually a breach of the original contract under which the
act of incorporation was obtained. Thus this select committee
on railways felt it highly important to adopt some means to pre-
vent the recurrence of practices so "highly objectionable. . ."
14
10 Railway Times, April 27, 1844.
11 Ibid.
12 Beport of select committee of the House of Commons on Bailways,
May 24, 1844. Eailway Times, June 22, 1844.
is Fifth Report of Select Committee of the House of Commons, 1844.
Cf. also Eailway Times, June 22, 1844.
i* Ibid.
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At the same time it was noticed that although the existing
transactions were illegal and contrary to the public policy, they
were, nevertheless, of "a perfectly bona fide character" as be-
tween the borrowers and the lenders. The contracts were en-
tered into without a distinct knowledge of the illegality. More-
over, the money so raised was applied for the execution of the
work authorized by Parliament. Therefore, ignorance of the
illegality of these securities should be considered.
With these problems in view, the select committee on railways
after many sittings at which much evidence was taken, recom-
mended the suppression of the issue of such illegal securities in
the future. At the same time, it expressed the opinion that in
order to avoid undue hardship upon investors and the danger
of disturbing the existing bona fide engagements, certain pro-
visions ought to be made by Parliament for the purpose of con-
verting these loan notes into valid securities.
Following the recommendations of this committee, Parliament
passed an act
15 in 1844 to the effect that ' ' from and after the
passing of the Act any railway company issuing any loan notes
or other negotiable
16 or assignable instruments purporting to
bind the company as a legal security for money advanced . . .
other than under the powers of some Act or Acts of Parliament,
. . . shall for every such offense
' ' be liable to a fine equal to
the sum for which such loan notes purported to be a security.
The companies, however, were permitted to renew their loan
notes issued prior to the passing of the act for any period not
exceeding five years from the passing of the act.
It was also provided that companies should pay off all their
notes issued or contracted to be issued before July 12, 1844, as
the same might fall due, and that a register of all such loan
notes, etc., should be kept by the secretary of the company, which
should be open, without charge, at all reasonable times to the
inspection of persons interested.
In the Companies Clauses Act of 1845, considerable attention
was given to the question of railway borrowing powers. The
general rules governing the borrowing powers of railway corn-
is The Eegulation of Bailways Act, 1844, 7 & 8 V. c. 85.
is Italics are mine.
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panics, laid down in this first Clauses Consolidation Act, may
be briefly summed up as follows:
(1) Borrowing powers must first be obtained from Parlia-
ment.
(2) All borrowings must be executed according to the pro-
visions and regulations contained in the acts granting such
powers.
(3) All borrowings must be sanctioned by an order of a
general meeting of the company.
(4) In no case must such borrowings exceed in the whole the
sum prescribed in the special acts of Parliament, which sum was
generally limited to one-third of the share capital of the com-
pany.
(5) Fifty per cent of the aggregate sum of the share capital
must be paid up.
For the enforcement of these rules, it was provided that the
certificate of a justice of peace and a copy of the order of a gen-
eral meeting should constitute sufficient evidence of powers to
borrow. Rules governing the manner of transfers of such se-
curities as well as the registration of the same were prescribed in
detail.
To strengthen these rules, it was further provided that
"
at all
reasonable times the books and accounts of the company shall be
open to the inspection of the mortgagees and bondholders. . .
with liberty to take extracts therefrom, without fee or reward."
Thus within two years, the issue of loan notes, which was one
of the most effective instruments for evading the law, was placed
under severe penalty, and the general rules governing the bor-
rowing powers of railways as well as the methods for their en-
forcement were codified into a general act. But in both cases
loopholes were left, through which these rules were practically
nullified. In the case of the prohibition against loan notes the
phraseology of the law led some railways to construe, not with-
out reason, that the enactment applied only to negotiable securi-
ties, as specified in the enactment, and not to the mere borrow-
ing of money on instruments not negotiable. At any rate, some
railways made this their excuse to evade the restrictions against
over-borrowing. A new form of notes was soon devised by an
expert lawyer which proved to be of greater consequence than
87] BORROWING POWERS OF RAILWAY COMPANIES 87
the earlier form of loan notes. In the case of the general law
restricting over-borrowing, the regulations, per se, were strict
enough. But the enforcement of these regulations was left en-
tirely in the hands t>f the country justices. Under the act, these
justices, with their knowledge, or rather lack of knowledge, re-
garding the complicated system of railway finance and account-
ing, were depended upon to ascertain whether or not a railway
had fulfilled the requirements of the law governing its borrow-
ings; and their findings were final.
Moreover, in spite of the general law, considerable irregularity
appeared to have existed in practice. Thus in their third re-
port,
17 the select committee on railways appointed by the House
of Commons in 1848, three years after the first general act was
passed, pointed out that some bills of that session appeared "to
contain irregular or undefined powers of raising money. . ."
This committee also pointed, out that the most objectionable pro-
visions were the general powers for raising money to pay off
debts of the companies, when the bills contained no distinct re-
cital of the facts or specifications of the amount.
In spite of such irregularities, it may be said that the first
period of the legislation on railway borrowing powers was closed
by the act of 1845. With the exception of the provision con-
tained in the Abandonment of Railways Act, 1850,18 providing
for the reduction of borrowing powers in proportion to the
amount of work abandoned, nothing very important was done
during the following fifteen years to alter the established rules.
In 1856 agitation for the more strict regulation of railway bor-
rowing powers was revived. A prominent member of the House
of Lords 19 endeavored to insert clauses in the railway bills seek-
ing legislation during the session of that year to the effect that
no money should be borrowed by a company except on the au-
thority of a minute signed by a majority, at least, of the direc-
tors for the time being of the company, and such minutes should
be published in the London Gazette before any money be raised
under the same; and if any money should be borrowed beyond
IT General Report of the Board of Trade on Bills of the Session, 1863,
p. 19.
is 13 & 14 V. e. 83.
is Lord Eedesdale. See Bailway Times, April 26, 1856.
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the powers given by this proposed act, the directors signing the
minute authorizing such borrowing should be personally liable
jointly and severally for the amount so raised beyond the powers.
The purport of the provision was to prevent the companies
from exceeding their borrowing powers, by making the directors
personally liable for such offenses. This aroused much opposi-
tion. It was feared that it would alarm the public mind and
shake the confidence of directors in their colleagues. In speak-
ing of this provision, the Railway Times 20 editorially remarked
that it was "so fraught with evil, so redolent of injustice, and
so hostile to the whole moneyed world that deals or invests in
debenture securities, that it cannot be tolerated.
' '
The required advertisement in the London Gazette was re-
garded as worse than useless. Attention was called to the fact
that it was not always prudent for a purchaser, and frequently
less so for a borrower, to announce that he must obtain a certain
sum of money. These announcements in the London Gazette,
though they might be overlooked by the mass of the community,
would be keenly scrutinized by the "sensible" commission
agents, who had no money of their own but who played a great
part in keeping others' money in circulation. As soon as the ad-
vertisement appeared in the Gazette, it was feared that "the
highest existing rates of interest" would be "uniformly" ex-
acted from the borrowing company.
Moreover, if the directors were made personally liable, as pro-
vided by the clause, it would prevent good men from taking up
seats in railway directorates. Even without any such liabilities,
railway companies had already found it hard to find really
"good and upright men to undertake the onerous but thankless
duty of directors."
No open opposition was made in Parliament. But the Parlia-
mentary committee in charge of the matter unanimously rejected
the clause even without hearing the arguments of those who were
prepared to oppose it.
21
But the question of borrowing powers of railways was still a
live one. In the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act of 1860 pro-
20 Railway Times, April 26, 1856, from which the other quotations in
this connection are taken.
21 Railway Times, May 3, 1856.
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vision was made to the effect that, in case the proprietors of a
railway agreed for the purchase of any land in consideration of
the payment of a rent charge, annual feu duty or a ground
annual, the borrowing power of the railway should be reduced
by an amount equal to twenty years' purchase of any rent
charge, feu duty or ground annual, for the time being payable.
In the following year the question of the borrowing powers of
railways came up again. In petitioning for authority to increase
their share capital for the purpose of subscribing to the under-
taking of another company, some railway companies endeavored
to extend their borrowing powers in proportion to such additions
of share capital. On the surface, this extension of borrowing
powers seemed permissible, in that the borrowings would be still
within the limit of one-third of the share capital. But upon ex-
amination the Board of Trade concluded that any extension of
borrowing powers based upon the share capital created for the
purpose of subscribing to the undertaking of another company
was inconsistent in principle with the rule laid down by Parlia-
ment which provided that "in the case of a railway bill no com-
pany shall be authorized to raise by loan or mortgage a larger
sum than one-third of their capital." *2 In order to test the con-
sistency of such extension of borrowing powers, it was necessary
to go back to the original object of the rule just referred to.
This was that the mortgage creditors of a railway company
might have the security of a definite undertaking, on which a
subscribed capital was to be paid up to an amount not less than
three times as great as the sum to be borrowed. If a company
were empowered to borrow on the basis of an increase of its
share capital to be used for subscribing to the undertaking of
another company, the lender of money so borrowed would not
derive any additional security whatever from such creation of
new capital, for this additional share capital would not be laid
out in the subscribing company's undertaking, on which alone
the lender would have a charge, but elsewhere. Thus, the spirit
of the rule of Parliament would be destroyed. Moreover, if this
request of the railways were granted, the additional share capital
22 The 126th standing order of the House of Commons and the 189th
standing order of the House of Lords. See General Eeport of the Board
of Trade on Railway Bills, 1867, p. 25.
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would be made the basis by both the subscribing and the receiv-
ing companies for an extension of their powers. Accordingly
the Board of Trade recommended that such requests be not
granted.23
About 1855, as has been shown in a previous chapter, deben-
ture stocks came into vogue as a security in place of debenture
bonds, and Parliament took steps to reduce the borrowing powers
of the companies in proportion to the amounts represented by
the debenture stocks issued. In every railway bill seeking power
to issue such stocks, provisions were made to the effect that after
the issue of such debenture stocks or the conversion of any mort-
gages or bonds into such stocks, "it shall not be lawful for the
company to issue mortgages or bonds, or any other securities, or
again to borrow the sum so converted/' and the borrowing
powers of the company should be decreased by the amount so
borrowed, converted or raised by the issue of debenture stocks.24
The growing popularity of such debenture stock led the Board
of Trade to make repeated recommendations, beginning about
1858, for the adoption of some general regulations governing the
issue of debenture stocks. Among other things, it recommended
(1) that the powers to create such stocks should be defined; (2)
that money should not be raised by debenture stocks in lieu of
borrowing until such money might be raised by the exercise of
the borrowing powers of the company; and (3) that to the ex-
tent of the nominal amount of the debenture stocks disposed of,
the borrowing powers should be extinguished. 25 Following these
recommendations of the Board of Trade, Parliament inserted a
clause in the Companies Clauses Act of 1863 26 to the effect that
the ' ' power of borrowing and re-borrowing by the company shall,
to the extent of the money raised by the issue of debenture stock,
be extinguished.
" As is seen, this was not a new principle, but
an old one embodied in a new act.
Thus we see that prior to 1863 the question of the borrowing
powers of railways was not of any great popular interest, al-
though it had always been considered of considerable importance
in railway legislation. The custom of limiting the borrowing
24 15 & 14 V. c. 83.
25 General Beport of the Board of Trade on Railway Bills, 1861, p. 24.
26 26 & 27 V. c. 118, Sec. 34.
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powers to one-third of the share capital of railway companies
had been established. The public had seldom thought of chang-
ing the established rules. They also imagined that the restric-
tions laid down by Parliament were observed. With some slight
exceptions, the act of 1845 was considered as sufficient to safe-
guard the interest of the security-holders. In fact there was an
idea that the recording of securities by the secretaries of the
companies was a sufficient protection without an examination
into the details of the company. When the investor got his de-
benture, he never thought of searching the company's books.
It would be useless; ''it was never done; people trusted to its
being correct.
' ' 2T
But under this smooth surface, something unexpected was
taking place. The borrowing powers of many railway companies
were grossly abused or exceeded. In the first place a cry was
raised against the restrictions on borrowing powers to the effect
that they were too strict and that the limit was too small. Com-
panies were frequently in urgent need of larger sums of bor-
rowed money either to carry on works or to repay debentures
falling due. This difficulty was encountered in the common prac-
tice of companies issuing bonds to agents in several of the mon-
eyed circles in the country. By so doing the company would
often suddenly discover itself to have borrowed, through its
various brokers, a larger sum than was permitted to it. Then
whatever securities were issued over and above the limit were
illegal. Such illegal issues, however, were not practically very
objectionable, and Parliament often recognized such over-issues
in spite of their illegality.
28
But intentional breaches of the borrowing powers were also
made. Some of the companies which were the least entitled to
exercise such power were the most eager to exercise it. To get
around the restrictions, they resorted to fictitious subscriptions
and other improper methods. They filled their subscription
lists with the names of "men of straw," and they nominally ful-
filled the requirement of having one-half of their share capital
paid up not with payments, however, made by bona fide sub-
scribers, as contemplated by Parliament, but through the agency
27 Evidence before select committee on borrowing powers of railway com-
panies, 1864, pp. 6-10.
28 Railway Times, September 12, 1863.
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of contractors' contributions or advances made by financial
agents. As soon as the requirements of law were in some such
way complied with, they would immediately have recourse to
their borrowing powers. In many cases, the line was construct-
ed almost entirely with borrowed money, without any funds be-
ing left for the equipment or working of the road. Then the
promoters would go to Parliament to ask for powers to cancel
their ordinary shares which had been created but not disposed
of and to issue, instead, preference and other shares with claims
prior to those of the ordinary shareholders. 29
Fraudulent breaches of the law were also quite common. As
in the case of the West Hartlepool Harbor and Railway, it was
discovered after a protracted inquiry by a select committee that
vast frauds had been committed. The company under its three
separate acts of Parliament was authorized to raise 2,100,000
with power to borrow to the extent of one-third of the sum paid
up for shares. Thus, even if the whole share capital had been
paid up, which was not the case, the amount the company would
have been empowered to borrow was 525,000. But the com-
pany actually borrowed 2,700,000, without any authority from
Parliament.30
The discovery of this fraud discredited railway debentures
more widely than did even the panic of 1847. The mind of the
public was appalled when it was shown that all this fraud was
done in spite of the "duly authorized, properly circulated" half-
yearly accounts and in spite of the service of the '
' Committee of
Assistance" who helped to keep the company's affairs straight.
The debenture-holders felt that they possessed no security either
in the acts of Parliament or in the returns of the Board of
Trade, and much less in the half-yearly accounts of the com-
panies. In spite of all the restrictions and protection which
Parliament appeared to have given, he might be robbed of his
money at any time.31
It was, however, not the mere breaking of the law, but the
effect of such breaches upon the investors, that proved especially
obnoxious. When a company over-issued securities contrary to
29 Railway Times, May 2, 1868.
so Hansard, 171: 1302-1303.
a Economist, June 22, 1863, pp. 674-675.
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law, much hardship must necessarily fall upon somebody. The
securities issued over and above the borrowing powers were il-
legal, and hence the holders of such securities had no status be-
fore the law. If the principal and interest were paid to the
holders of such illegal securities, the money must come from
somewhere. If they were not paid, they would be losers. The
holders of the legal securities would justly oppose the reduction
of their interest to pay the holders of illegal debentures. They
advanced their money upon legal security and they would object
to anyone else receiving one farthing until their claims were
satisfied. These holders of legal securities, who had no share in
the management of the company, certainly should not be made
to suffer by the misconduct of persons over whom they had no
control. Nor should they in equity suffer simply because other
people had lost money upon purchasing illegal securities.
Then it was urged that the holders of the excessive debentures
who advanced their money without any legal security should
stand the loss. At first sight this appeared permissible. But
the true state of affairs showed that this was too harsh a measure.
It was true that these holders of excessive debentures had no
legal claim to depend upon; but it was also true that this was
not entirely their fault. Their money was advanced in a bona
fide manner. The company had received their money into its
hands and had either spent it on its authorized works, or still
retained it in its treasury. Moreover, it was likely that neither
the shareholders nor the holders of legal securities could have
derived their income were it not for the money advanced by the
holders of such illegal securities.
Finally it appeared that the shareholders, who in law had the
power to appoint directors and the managers of the business and
whose employees issued such illegal debentures, should be made
responsible. But there were also many practical objections to
this course of procedure. In the first place, it was pointed out
that these shareholders bought their stocks on the express as-
surance embodied in the acts of Parliament that there should be
only a certain amount of fixed charges against the company with
a prior claim over their dividends. Although theoretically they
had the power of appointing the managers and directors, many
of them, in reality, were no more responsible for the conduct of
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their so-called employees than the other classes of investors.
They had more enterprising spirit in investing their money in
the stocks of the railway, but they certainly should not be pun-
ished for that enterprising spirit which was much needed.
All these and many other difficulties as shown elsewhere in our
study were direct results of the evasion and overriding of the
borrowing powers which Parliament had taken special and con-
stant care to prescribe.
As mentioned previously, the issue of loan notes or other ne-
gotiable or assignable instruments purporting to bind the com-
pany as security for money advanced, was, since 1845, prohib-
ited. Owing to the narrowness of the limit of borrowing powers
and some less laudable reasons, some companies soon discovered
an ingenious way to get around this restriction. They devised
the well known device of Lloyd 's bonds to bridge over the barrier
against loan notes. These instruments were issued neither as
negotiable securities nor for "cash-advances," but as acknowl-
edgments of obligations for work done, materials supplied, or
for debts contracted in excess of their borrowing powers.
The original purpose for which these bonds were devised was,
however, not altogether bad, and the circumstances under which
they were supposed to be used also appeared to justify their ex-
istence. As often happened, a railway company suddenly dis-
covered that its expenditures were underestimated or its re-
sources overestimated. In either case the directors were in dif-
ficulty. They were compelled under severe penalty to complete
their work within a definite time.32 Their funds were exhaust-
ed. The contractor would refuse to continue the work without
pay, and the directors had no money to pay him. Moreover, if
the work was left to stand still, not only the capital already
spent would remain unproductive and the work itself deteriorate,
but the contractor would sue. Naturally a question would arise
s2 In each Railway Act there is always a clause stipulating the time
when the line must be completed and the penalty for failure. Clause 34
of the Model Bills of the House of Lords, 1909, says that ' ' if the railway
is not completed within five years from the passing of this Act, then on
the expiration of that period the powers by this act for making and com-
pleting the railway or otherwise in relation thereto shall cease except as
to so much thereof as is then completed," and clause 35 provides that de-
posit money shall not be repaid except so far as railway is opened.
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as to what should be done. As the law did not prohibit railway
companies from securing their debts contracted for the execu-
tion of the bona fide purpose of their undertaking, the directors
would, therefore, make some sort of an arrangement with the
contractor by which they would furnish him from time to time
with acknowledgments of indebtedness, under seal of the com-
pany, for the amount due to him on account of work done. On
these evidences of credit the contractor could secure money. In
this way Lloyd's bonds were issued to give time to the debtor
company instead of pressing it to issue shares and debentures
at great sacrifice.
This was the way in which Lloyd's bonds were originated and
in many instances used to the advantage of railways and the
public; and they appeared quite desirable. No tenable argu-
ment seemed to have been advanced to show that a railway com-
pany should not issue to its contractors acknowledgments of
indebtedness for the amounts actually due them on account of
work actually executed. Indeed, it was claimed that "if re-
stricted to their proper purpose, Lloyd's bonds would have been
a useful and certainly not inconvenient invention.
' ' 33 But these
bonds were soon issued for different purposes. Speculative un-
dertakings were gotten up with hardly any hope of securing
money through subscription ; and these bonds were issued at
' '
an
enormous sacrifice" in order to get the undertaking completed.
Ultimately debentures had to be issued. The result of such a
procedure was a great extra cost to the shareholders and the
owners of the property in general.
34
Swindling schemes were
also floated through the instrumentality of these bonds to coerce
some existing companies to purchase or lease at outrageous
prices.
35
Moreover the employment of the device tended to deceive the
investing public. With the current conception that the borrow-
ing powers of railways were strictly limited, investors were se-
duced into a belief that the work was so far completed with
money raised in accordance with the requirements of the acts of
33 Railway Times, December 15, 1866.
3* Evidence before Select Committee on Bailway Borrowing Powers, 1864,
p. 35.
35 Ibid., p. 19.
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Parliament; while in reality their later investments instead of
being applied to further prosecution of the work, had to be
diverted to the payment of debts of which the.se new subscribers
(the only subscribers, for that matter) were ignorant.36
On the other hand it was contended that the complaint against
Lloyd 's bonds that they represented a violation of the borrowing
powers of the company, was unfounded. These bonds could be
a violation of the borrowing powers only when they were issued
in excess of the borrowing powers of the company; but it was
only occasionally that they were issued in excess of such borrow-
ing powers.37 But this argument neglected the fact that railway
companies could violate the law without exceeding the limit of
their borrowing powers. The companies were authorized to raise
so much money on shares and so much on loans. The latter
privilege was not to be resorted to until the whole of the former
had been subscribed and one-half of its total amount paid up.
Some companies, however, whose undertakings were of such an
unpromising character that they could neither secure subscrip-
tions nor make calls, and whose borrowing powers consequently
did not materialize legally, would evade the law by resorting to
Lloyd's bonds.38 Although the amount raised was not in excess
of the borrowing powers, the issue of such bonds was illegal
nevertheless.
Moreover, as is usually the case with such convenient and yet
illusive schemes, these Lloyd bonds soon lost their original iden-
tity. In fact by 1864, the original purpose and the proper
function of these bonds were practically forgotten. Instead of
issuing them to contractors1 for work done in order to relieve
temporary pressure, companies used them in coupon form for
raising money 39 and also put them into circulation as negotiable
securities.40 Some directors incurred heavy obligations by the
issue of these bonds even without consulting the shareholders and
without the knowledge of the holders of statutory debentures. 41
se Railway Times, December 15, 1866.
37 Daily News, January 18, 1864, quoted by Railway Times, January 23,
1864.
38 Railway Times, January 23, 1864.
39 Evidence before Select Committee of 1864, p. 31.
40 Hansard, 182 : 183.
41 Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xxiii.
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Indeed, within a few years after their first use Lloyd bonds
became quite extensively circulated, and represented several
million pounds in nominal value. In some cases they were even
regarded as statutory securities.42 Thus their extensive appli-
cation, and the purposes to which they were applied, led the
Railway Times to say that "no other name than fraud can be
given to transactions of this description, and the eminent legal
ability which has been exercised in drawing up the instrument
so as to keep it out of the range of criminality must accept its
share of discredit. . . " 43 These instruments ' ' might or might
not be within the strict limit of legality," stated a member of
Parliament,44 "but they certainly had a tendency to be made a
most fruitful means of deception and concealment of the real
position of the company's affairs."
The effect of this expedient was the total evasion of the statu-
tory limitations of borrowing powers. While the legal borrow-
ings were limited to only one-third of the share capital, the il-
legal borrowings by Lloyd bonds were subjected to no limitation
whatever. Thus the precaution of the legislature for the protec-
tion of the holders of statutory securities was nullified. This
coupled with the numerous and varied excuses offered by the
companies for exceeding their borrowing powers in other ways
resulted in much confusion of the whole situation.45 The in-
vestor had no means of ascertaining whether or not the borrow-
ing powers of a company had been exceeded, and consequently
whether or not the securities offered by that company were
worthless. They had to trust the railway returns made by the
companies to the Board of Trade, but they had no means where-
by to verify the accuracy of these returns.46 If these returns
were made with strictness, they might in themselves form a good
prevention against over-issue of securities, or at least give
some valuable information. But these returns, besides not be-
ing always accurate, were not made until the end of each year
and were not published by the Board of Trade until August or
September of the year following. In the meantime the public
42 Evidence before Select Committee of 1864, p. 127.
43 Bailway Times, June 25, 1864.
44 Marquess of Clanricarde in the House of Lords, Hansard, 190: 1972.
4 5 Hansard, 181: 338.
46 Bailway Times, September 12, 1863.
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had to depend upon such "miserable and imperfect" extracts
therefrom as were given in the daily papers.47 Moreover, the
acts of Parliament were sometimes in such a state of confusion
that some of the railway companies themselves did not know
what their borrowing powers were.48 Thus the position of the
debenture-holders became exceedingly unsatisfactory. By the
kind of false shield which had been thrown over the debentures
through the limitation of borrowing powers, the public was led
to believe that the debenture-holders had a protection which they
really never had.
49
Being faced by such a serious situation, some people advocated
that borrowing powers should be abolished altogether. They
argued that "this Gordian knot, respecting which so much
trouble is taken to render it difficult to unloose, could be cut in
an instant. Abolish borrowing powers for the future, except in
so far as advances may be made on calls. Let no company . . .
raise capital by any other means than subscription for shares.
Let existing bonds be converted into debenture stock, and the
whole difficulty will be found to have 'vanished like a guilty
thing away.'
" 50
Certain members of Parliament seemed to be alive to the
serious nature of the situation. A resolution was introduced in
Parliament to the effect that the issue of securities should be
taken away from the directors appointed by the shareholders and
placed in the hands of persons representing the creditors. The
extreme character of this resolution reveals to a certain extent
the anxiety with which people searched for remedies. But it was
regarded as being of too novel a character and was withdrawn. 51
Parliament, however, felt obliged to take some steps. As most
legislative bodies would have done under such circumstances,
the House of Lords appointed a select committee in 1863 "to in-
quire into the whole situation and report as to what legislative
measures are desirable for the purpose of restraining the direc-
47 Railway Times, September 26, 1863. Evidence before Select Com-
mittee on Borrowing Powers of Railways, 1863.
48 Evidence before Lords' committee of 1863. Cf. Railway Times, Sep-
tember 26, 1863.
49 Evidence before Lords' Committee of 1864, p. 33.
so Railway Times, September 12, 1863.
si Railway Times, August 22, 1863.
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tors of railway companies from exceeding the limits of the bor-
rowing powers fixed by the Act of Parliament.
' ' 52 The com-
mittee made two reports, in which some methods for the enforce-
ment of the rules governing borrowing powers were recommend-
ed.53 In the same year when the Companies Clauses Bill was
considered in committee, a member in the House of Commons 64
moved the addition of a clause requiring companies possessing
borrowing powers to make an annual return to Parliament of
the capital which they had raised, with the object of preventing
the recurrence of cases like that of the West Hartlepool Com-
pany 55 or any similar violation of the provision forbidding com-
panies from raising money on debentures or mortgage until one-
half of their share capital was paid up. The clause, however,
was rejected for technical reasons.
But the alarm which resulted from the general lack of in-
formation regarding the condition of the borrowing powers of
railway companies continued. Therefore in 1864 the House of
Lords felt it expedient to appoint another select committee to
continue the inquiry commenced in the previous session. The
purpose of appointing this committee as well as that of appoint-
ing the previous one was to devise some means whereby directors
might be restrained from exceeding the limits of their fixed bor-
rowing powers. Parliament appeared to believe that there was
no question as to the merits of the established rules limiting the
borrowing powers of railway companies. The only thing needed
was to find some efficient way of enforcing these rules. There-
fore, Parliament reasserted its intention of restricting such bor-
rowing powers through the Railway Construction Facilities Act
of 1864 58 in which provisions were made whereby every com-
pany which wished to borrow money was subjected to the follow-
ing restrictions:
(1) "They shall not exercise the said powers of borrowing any money
until the whole of the share capital authorized by the certificate is sub-
scribed for or taken, and until one-half thereof is actually paid up, and
52 Hansard, 181 : 385-386.
63 For the recommendations of this committee, cf. infra, Chap. V.
5* M. D. Hassard. Cf. Hansard, 172 : .935-936.
55 See Appendix to Report of Select Committee on Eailway Borrowing
Powers, 1864, and Hansard, 171: 1302-1303. Cf. also supra, p. 92.
se 27 & 28 V. c. 121.
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until they prove to the justice who is to certify under section 40 of the
Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, . . . before he so certifies,
that shares for the whole of the capital are issued and accepted, and that
not less than one-fifth part of the amount of each separate share has been
paid up on account thereof before or at the time of the issue or acceptance
thereof, and that all such shares were taken in good faith, and are held
by the subscribers or their assigns who are legally liable for the same. ' '
(2) "They shall not borrow a larger sum in the whole than one-third
of the amount of the share capital authorized by the certificate."
The latter part of the first clause was especially important, in
that it required not only all shares should be taken in good faith
but not less than one-fifth of the amount of each separate share
had to be paid up before a company could resort to its borrow-
ing powers. This provision put a strong check against the prac-
tice of inducing "men of straw" to sign up subscriptions and
using borrowed money to meet the requirement of paying up
one-third of the share capital. It has proven so useful that pro-
visions similar to it have been invariably inserted in railway
acts since.57
This closed the legislative measures concerning the borrowing
powers of railway companies. As has been shown, Parliament
held from the beginning to the idea of limiting the borrowings
of railways to one-third of their share capital, and has consistent-
ly adhered to this principle throughout. Whenever the question
of borrowing powers came to its notice, all it endeavored to do
was to adopt measures to meet the changed circumstances with
the purpose of maintaining the borrowing limit. Parliament ap-
peared to believe that the merits and necessity of limiting rail-
way borrowings to one-third of the share capital had passed be-
yond the stage of argument. All that was needed was to see
that the limit was not exceeded. The idea of inquiring into the
adequacy of this limit itself did not seem to have been enter-
tained. Nor did Parliament appear especially desirous to find
out what were the causes which led railway directors to exceed
their borrowing powers. Even the fact that the established cus-
tom of borrowing on other good securities invariably warranted
a larger proportion of loans than one-third of the share capital
failed to induce Parliament to inquire into the advisability of
modifying such restrictions.
57 Cf. Clause 7 of the Model Bill of the House of Lords, 1909.
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The legal limit of the borrowing powers was thus quite defi-
nite. In practice, however, considerable latitude seems to have
been given to the companies as shown by the following table :
PROPORTION OF BORROWINGS TO TOTAL PAID-UP CAPITAL
Name of Company
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per cent, in 1880, 25 per cent, in 1890, 26 per cent, in 1900, 28
per cent, and in 1907, 27 per cent of the total paid up capital.
So far as the writer has been able to discover, the strenuous
adhesion of Parliament to the idea of limiting the borrowing
powers of railway companies to one-third of their share capital
arose simply out of the desire of giving security, by that means,
to the holders of legal debentures. Yet if railways had been
permitted to borrow to the extent of one-half or even two-thirds
of the bona fide share capital it seems hardly likely that thereby
the debenture holders would have been deprived of a reasonable
security. It hardly admits any doubt that it is desirable for a
government to limit the facilities for constructing railways with
other people's money; yet too stringent regulations are liable
to be as harmful as the lack of regulation.58 English experience
seems to justify the statement that broad but vigorously en-
forced restrictions may prove more beneficial than narrow but
loosely enforced limitations.
Another fact which calls for attention is that one of the chief
difficulties which English railways and the investing public had
in regard to the question of borrowing powers, was the lack of
true information concerning the real condition of such powers
and the actual state of affairs of the companies. Half the time,
neither the public nor the companies knew what actual powers
existed. These facts lead to the opinion that if more efforts
were made to clarify railway affairs in general and railway
borrowing powers in particular, much difficulty might have been
avoided and better results obtained.
Cf. Hadley, Eailroad Transportation, 1903, p. 54.
CHAPTER V
REGISTRATION OP RAILWAY SECURITIES
From the two preceding chapters it is clear that from the
beginning of railway enterprise, Parliament intended to give
ample protection to the holders of legal securities, and that for
the purpose of affording such protection it endeavored to re-
strict the borrowing powers of railway companies. It is the
purpose of this chapter to elucidate the principal methods by
which Parliament tried to restrict such borrowing powers.
In the early acts, by which railway companies were incor-
porated or enabled to raise money on mortgages or bonds, pro-
visions were made to the effect that an entry or memorial of all
mortgages or assignments should be made in the registers of the
companies within fourteen days from the time when the as-
signment or mortgage was made, and that such registers should
be open to the inspection of the proprietors or other interested
persons at all reasonable times without charge. 1 Provisions
were also made requiring the registration of the transfers of
such securities in the companies' registers within twenty-one days
of the execution of that transfer. It was only after such regis-
tration that the assignee might be entitled to the full benefits
and payments of the securities transferred. 2 Clauses to the
above effect were inserted in the private railway acts during
1 Section cxix of the London & Croydon Eailway Act, 1837, provided
that "An entry or memorial of such mortgage or assignment, containing
the numbers and dates thereof, and the names of the parties, with their
proper additions, to whom the same shall have been made, and of the sums
borrowed, together with the rate of interest to be paid thereof, be entered
in some book to be kept by the secretary or clerks of the said company;
which said book may be perused at all reasonable times by any of the pro-
prietors or mortgagees of the said undertaking or other persons interested
therein, without fee or reward."
2 For the registration of each transfer, the company should be paid the
sum of two shillings and sixpence. Ibid.
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many years, and were found quite beneficial, and so in the Com-
panies Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, we find general pro-
visions made for the registration of railway securities. In sub-
stance, these general clauses were similar to those of the earlier
private acts, with the exception (1) that the time limit within
which the transfers should be registered was extended from
twenty-one to thirty days, and (2) that until such entry (of the
transfer) was made the company shall not be in any manner
responsible for the transfer of such mortgage, thus making the
registration less rigid but of greater consequence to the secur-
ity-holders. The latter did not appear eager to avail them-
selves of the provision of the early acts requiring the registra-
tion of the purchase and transfer of railway securities. It was
felt that unless registration was made a condition of the validity
of such securities, the provision would remain a dead letter.
Hence, the new provision of 1845 was passed making it neces-
sary to register all transfers in order to render the company in
any wise responsible to the transferee.
Thus from the time Parliament began to prescribe the limit
of railway borrowing powers, it adopted this system of regis-
tration as a means of securing the observance of the same. It
thought that since all securities were registered in the companies'
registers and since such registers were open to public inspection,
there would be little chance for the companies to exceed the limit
of their borrowing powers without being at once detected. But
although the manner of registration was threshed out with much
precision, the execution of such registration was left entirely in
the hands of the companies. Prior to 1863, outside of occasional
agitations, practically no effort had been made to modify these
provisions. The general opinion was that the registration done
by the companies themselves was sufficient to prevent irregular-
ities. The public relied, and justly in ordinary cases, on the
integrity of the companies.
3
Unfortunately, however, in some
cases this reliance was ill-founded. Many companies made so
little use of registration that they were not aware of the exact
limits of their borrowing powers, as prescribed by Parliament ; *
s Economist, May 2, 1863.
* Letter in London Times, August 23, 1866.
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and many others purposely exceeded their limits in borrowing. 5
Indeed, the practice of overborrowing, as remarked the Earl of
Donong,
6
actually reached the stage not only of illegality but of
fraud. The public were told that Parliament had put a limit to
the borrowing powers of railway companies, but they soon found
out that under the semblance of this limit money was borrowed
every day beyond the authority which Parliament had given. 7
Consequently, doubt, suspicion and dissatisfaction prevailed,
which in turn depreciated the value of railway securities so much
that they were sometimes called insecurities?
This unsatisfactory state of affairs gave rise to agitation. A
number of chambers of commerce and other commercial bodies
petitioned Parliament in 1863 to modify the existing law, so that
railway debentures might be required to be registered and put
on the same footing as landed securities. Instead of the regis-
ters kept by the companies as required by the Companies Clauses
Act of 1845, which really formed no security to the public, it
was urged that there should be public registers kept in places of
easy access.
9 A scheme for such registration 10 was presented to
the select committee of 1863 to the effect that every railway com-
pany should be compelled to furnish the lender with a certificate
stating that the latter was the registered proprietor of the un-
dermentioned debenture bonds or other securities, duly sealed
with the corporate seal of the company.
According to this scheme, these certificates were to be register-
ed in the Bank of England by a public registrar and the regis-
tration was to be followed up with a series of acknowledgments
which would place it beyond doubt. Holders of registered se-
curities would alone be recognized as bondholders according to
acts of Parliament and alone would be entitled to exercise the
s The West Hartlepool, the Cork & Yanhol, the Carmarthan and Cardi-
gan, and the London, Chatham and Dover were in this class. Cf. Economist,
June 20, 1863, Hansard, 182 : 1580-1583, and Economist, December 22, 1866.
e Hansard, 177: 1297.
7 Ibid., 183: 869.
8 Economist, August 12, 1865.
9 Evidence before select committee of 1864 on Kailway Borrowing Pow-
ers, 1864, p. 12.
^Eailway Times, October 3, 1863.
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rights of interference which the law accorded to mortgagees. On
the other hand, if the holder of such securities failed to register
he would not be deprived of his money or of his common law
right, but simply of those extraordinary privileges which be-
longed to the rightful and recognized mortgagees.
To form a complete check, it was also urged that the Board of
Trade should be furnished with returns showing the extent of
the borrowing powers of each company. Then the proposed
public registrar, being in an independent office, should furnish
the Board of Trade with a return compiled from the registration
of the securities of each company, showing the amount which each
company had borrowed. By comparing these two independent
returns, the Board of Trade could easily ascertain whether or not
a company had exceeded its borrowing powers.
Another plan was proposed by the Deputy Keeper of the Sig-
net of Scotland 11 to the effect that (1) public registers should
be kept in London, Edinburgh and Dublin; (2) that all existing
companies having debenture debts or stocks should be required
to give to the respective registrars a return duly certified as on a
certain date, specifying the acts of Parliament under which they
were authorized to borrow money, the amount so authorized, the
amount which the shareholders had authorized to be borrowed by
resolution of general meetings, and the dates of such meetings,
together with the amount of debenture bonds and stocks which
had been issued and was then due and outstanding against each
company; and (3) that all existing and future companies should
be required to make returns from time to time of all acts there-
after passed authorizing the borrowing of money or effecting any
changes of their borrowing powers.
He also proposed that each return should be registered in a
separate book or a part of a book for each company. It should
be incumbent on all companies, after the designated date, to
transmit to the respective registrars for registration, before they
were issued, all debentures and certificates of debenture stocks.
The registrar should register these, entering the number, date,
amount, etc., in a special form prepared for the purpose. A
registration fee was also recommended. Then after such regis-
n See evidence before Lords' Committee of 1864, pp. 4-15.
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tration the registrar should certify on each instrument the fact
and date of such registration.
To form a complete check, he also proposed that it should be
incumbent on the companies to send in for registration all de-
bentures or other vouchers of debenture loans or stock which were
discharged. These should be registered under a separate head-
ing in the book or part of the book applicable to each company.
This system, it must be observed, was intended for the regis-
tration of all debentures or debenture-stock certificates to be is-
sued thereafter. It was suggested that existing debentures should
also be registered. The Deputy Keeper of the Signet, however,
was of the opinion that it would be rather cumbersome to re-
quire the registration of all existing securities. Moreover, such
a process would not afford any additional security than that
afforded by simply requiring all companies to give the total
amounts of securities which they had issued.
Others were of the opinion that it was necessary to have a
public register of all transfers and renewals in addition to the
'registration done by the companies as provided by the Compa-
nies Clauses Act of 1845. Although such transfers or renewals
did not affect the borrowing powers, their consummation should,
nevertheless, be made more definite through a system of public
registration. Accordingly, another elaborate form Was recom-
mended for the purpose.
A representative of the Board of Trade also suggested a form
for registration purposes very similar to this.
Under such a system of registration, it was thought that am-
ple protection would be afforded the public. By these tables
the public could see the amount authorized by Parliament, the
amount sanctioned by the shareholders to be borrowed, and the
number of securities discharged. A comparison of the figures
given in the proposed tables would indicate at once how much
legal debt was out-standing against the company and the con-
dition of the company's borrowing power. It was also recog-
nized that there would not be much trouble to start such a sys-
tem of registration, since a similar system of registration had
already been used in the case of landed securities.
12
12 There were already registration offices under the Companies Act, 1862.
Cf. Evidence before Lords' Committee of 1864, p. 4.
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It was further urged that if the registrars were appointed
with definite instructions to register nothing beyond what the
companies were authorized to issue, the people would be able
to tell at once whether any security was legal or not. It could
be safely expected that no man would think of lending money
upon debentures which were not registered.13
The agitation for a simple and effective system of registration
appears to have been most keen; the matter was of wide in-
terest. The general opinion of stock brokers, money-lenders,
and the like was unanimously in favor of .some sort of govern-
mental registration. The railways as a whole, according to the
representatives of some of the leading lines hi the kingdom, en-
tertained no objection against the compulsory registration of
their securities.14 Some of them would even welcome such a
procedure. The solicitor of the Bank of England, which estab-
lishment was then a large investor in the securities of railway
companies, was also strongly in favor of such a system of regis-
tration. 15 Indeed, the concensus of opinion as expressed before
the Lords' Committee of 1864 was that the investors had too
much trust in the honor of railway officials in connection with
their borrowing powers and that a public registration of railway
debentures, if constructed upon some simple principle, was
needed to restore and maintain confidence. Such a system of
registration would ultimately prove to be an advantage not only
to the investing public but to the railway companies as well.
Furthermore, since neither investors nor borrowers were able
to ascertain the legality of some of the existing securities, it
was asked : 16 Why was it not feasible for the government to
investigate and establish the legality of such securities for them?
It was suggested that the Board of Trade might effectually do
for every person what he could not do for himself, and which,
even if it were possible for each individual, would have to be
done over and over again by every successive holder of each
railway debenture. Thus it was urged that the railway corn-
is Evidence before Lords' Committee, 1864, p. 12.
i* More than eight of the influential chambers of commerce openly ex-
pressed their desire for such a course of public registration. Ibid., pp.
14-15.
IB Hansard, 181 : 338-9.
IB Economist, May 2, 1863.
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panies should be required to certify to the Board of Trade
every new issue of debenture. Only after due examination and
being satisfied that the company had not exceeded its borrowing
powers, the Board of Trade should give the company stamped
debentures for that specific amount. According to the opinion
of the managing director of the Lands Improvement Company, 17
securities, unless so stamped, should not receive any legal recog-
nition. By this process every debenture holder whose deben-
ture had the mark of the Board of Trade impressed upon it
would be sure that he held a good security. The credit of the
companies would also be benefited by the removal of the ex-
isting suspicion.
The consideration of the matter was taken up by Parliament.
As mentioned in a previous chapter,18 when the special report
and evidence upon the West Hartlepool Harbor and Railway
bill were presented to the House of Lords, great alarm was felt
over railway borrowings by that and other companies. Action
by Parliament was obviously necessary if the alarm were not
to spread. Accordingly in 1863 the House of Lords appointed
a committee on railway borrowing powers to inquire and report
as to what legislative measures were desirable to prevent the
railway companies from exceeding their borrowing powers.
This committee, therefore, recommended 19 that semi-annual
declaration of the state of the borrowing powers signed by the
chairman, the secretary, and a director of the company should
be published in the London Gazette by every railway company
exercising, or claiming to exercise, borrowing powers under any
act of Parliament. In this declaration, the amount paid up and
the amount which the company was legally authorized to borrow
by the creation of debt, should be clearly set forth. These officers
of the company should also declare that the total amount now
raised by the company upon bonds or other securities did not
exceed the above mentioned amount, upon which the company
could legally borrow.
The committee also recommended that thereafter no mortgage
IT Evidence before Lords' committee of 1864, pp. 22-33.
is Cf. supra, p. 118.
is This part of the committee 'a report and evidence are published in
Eailway Times for August 22, 1863. See also Report of Lords' committee,
1864, p. 27.
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bond or any security for money should be issued by any rail-
way company without having endorsed upon that security a
certificate in the following form, to be signed by the chairman
and secretary of the company:
"A. B. Railway Company. Date.
Bond for No
, being part of the total amount
which this company can now legally borrow."
A plan for the registration of all securities by an independent
public office was suggested to the committee, but while the com-
mittee conceded that such a regulation "might operate for the
security of the public," it felt that it did not have sufficient
time to give full consideration to the subject.
Parliament did not take any immediate action to give effect
to those recommendations. But when the Companies Clauses
Bill of 1863 was considered in committee in the House of Com-
mons, M. D. Hassard moved the insertion of a clause requiring
companies possessing borrowing powers to make an annual re-
turn to Parliament of the capital which they had raised. This
motion was rejected on the ground that it was not proper to in-
sert a provision of such importance into a bill which was only
intended to consolidate the clauses commonly inserted in com-
panies bills.
20 In the same year, however, in connection with
the regulation of the issue of debenture stocks, Parliament
adopted a provision for the registration of such stocks. This
provision
21 did not contain any new principle. It simply made
the rule regarding the registration, by the companies of mort-
gages, deeds, etc., applicable to the registration of debenture
stocks. In the same act, Parliament also adopted a clause 22
requiring all companies to keep a separate account of debenture
stocks, showing how much money had been received for or on
account of debenture stocks. Also how much money was borrowed
20 Hansard, 172 : 936.
21 Sec. 28 of the Companies Clauses Act, 1863, provided that the com-
pany should from time to time enter the debenture stock created in a
register to be kept for that purpose. In the register it was to enter the
names and addresses of the persons and corporations who are holders of
such stock, with the respective amounts of each; and the register was to be
accessible for inspection and perusal at all reasonable times to every mort-
gagee, etc., without charge.
22 Sec. 33.
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or owing on mortgage or bond, or which they had power to
borrow, had been paid off by debenture stock instead of being
borrowed on mortgage or bond.
At the same time some members of Parliament also considered
the advisability of bringing in a bill for the purpose of carrying
out the recommendations of the committee on railway borrowing
powers of 1863.
23 But it was feared that those recommenda-
tions would be of little value unless provisions were made for
general registration of debenture transactions. Moreover, it
was still felt that further information was needed on the sub-
ject of registration before any efficient system could be adopted
to cope with the situation. Therefore, another select committee
was appointed in 1864, to continue the inquiry commenced by
the select committee of the previous year.24 In its report, this
committee first of all recommended that requirement of a com-
pulsory public registration of railway debentures and deben-
ture stocks as an efficient means whereby to restrain the direc-
tors from exceeding the limit of their statutory borrowing pow-
ers.
25 The committee was also of the opinion that holders of
statutory debentures duly registered should have a right to re-
cover and secure the payment of all principal and interest due
to them in priority to the holders of Lloyd's bonds, or of any
other obligations or acknowledgments of indebtedness not is-
sued under the authority of Parliament. 26
Following the recommendation of this committee, the Regis-
tration of Railway Debentures, etc., Bill was introduced into the
House of Lords in 1865. 27 This bill was in a great measure
founded on the report of foregoing committee.28 It passed the
upper house without much discussion, but it wjent to the lower
house late in the session. 29 The promoters of the bill thought
it would meet with severe opposition from the powerful railway
interests in that house.30 Therefore, they did not push the
23 Hansard, 173 : 1317.
24
Ibid., 175: 697.
25 Report of Lords' Committee, 1864, p. 111.
26 Ibid.
27 Hansard, 180 : 848.
28 Hansard, 184: 1704.
29
Ibid., 180 : 848.
so In 1864 there were no less than 153 railway directors (not to speak
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measure vigorously. After being read a second time, it was
"put off" for a fortnight, and nothing was done with it that
year.
31
At this time it must be remembered that there was much con-
fusion over the legality of railway securities. Many companies
were forced to declare their inability to observe accurately the
limits of borrowing powers prescribed by the numerous acts of
Parliament. The public also became aware that under the sem-
blance of compliance with the limit prescribed by Parliament,
money was borrowed every day beyond the authority given.
Parliament itself was forced to recognize the unfortunate state
of affairs. 32 It appeared timely to legislate on the matter, but
it was thought impolitic to start too stringent rules so as to
"make it safe for people to jump in the dark." As a compro-
mise between the extreme views, the Marquess of Clanricarde re-
vived the agitation of the previous year by proposing that every
company should be compelled to make periodical returns and
that Parliament should adopt some system of public registra-
tion so as to enable the people to judge for themselves. 33 In
the meantime a bill 3* for the registration of railway debentures,
which was substantially the same as that of the previous ses-
sion, was introduced into the House of Commons. 35 This bill
contained thirteen clauses and dealt in detail with the yearly
returns to the registrar of joint stock companies, the appoint-
ment of assistant registrars by the Board of Trade, and the
question of fees, and other questions. It also contained three
schedules, of which the first was concerned with the reports on
borrowing powers, the second with the registration of the issue
of bonds and debentures and of certificates of debenture stock,
of engineers, bankers, or contractors) in the House of Commons, nearly one-
fourth of the chief branch of the legislature being thoroughly identified
with the railway interest in the country. Some of the railway directors,
however, were not returned to Parliament for the purpose of representing
the railway interest, others were solicited to become members of railway
boards in consequence of their being members of Parliament. Railway
Times, January 16, 1864.
si Hansard, 180 : 848.
32
Ibid., 183 : 869.
ss Hansard, 183 : 869.
34 Bill No. 109, 1866.
ss Hansard, 182:1577; 181, pp. 336-338.
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and the last with the registration of discharges of debentures
and debenture stock.
In spite of the general need of some system of registration,
however, the railway interests raised considerable objection to
the provisions proposed by this bill. 36 In the first place, they
claimed that such a system of compulsory registration would
give to the registered securities an apparent validity which they
did not have intrinsically, and that it was impossible for the pro-
posed registrar in charge of the annual returns, etc., to ascertain
whether bonds submitted to him were or were not issued within
the borrowing powers of that company. But the railway inter-
ests, as remarked the Earl of Belmore, failed to notice that all
the bill proposed to do was exactly what had been done for the
preceding 150 years with regard to the registration of deeds in
Ireland. All land deeds had to be registered in the Rolls Office
in Dublin. This was exactly the proposition as regards the
registration of railway securities, and it did not seem probable
that the registration in the case of railway securities would give
the debentures any more validity than it would convert a false
deed in Ireland into a good one. The only object of the require-
ment was to show the numbers and amounts of the securities
issued by each company so that the investors might be able to as-
certain for themselves which securities stood in relative priority.
Another objection against this compulsory registration of rail-
way securities was that this requirement would take away from
the directors the feeling of responsibility, which they were then
supposed to have. If the directors were divested of their duty
of looking into the limits of their borrowing powers and were re-
quired by law to rely upon the findings of some government
office in regard to the exercise of their borrowing powers, they
might be induced to shirk the responsibility of keeping their
loans within the limit. But this argument could not hold in the
face of the fact that many railway directors themselves often did
not know either the extent of their responsibility or the exact
limit of their borrowing powers.
A general objection was also made on the ground that such
registration would interfere with the proper conduct of the com-
panies' business. Extra forces of men would have to be em-
se
Ibid., 181 : 336-338.
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ployed in order to prepare the required returns, and the regular
business would be interfered with. But the supporters of the
bill retorted that no one would deny that the required compul-
sory registration would mean some extra work for the railways,
but that it must also be conceded that the increased value of their
securities due to such registration would more than compensate
them for any minor inconveniences which they would have to
incur.
While this bill was progressing, the Government was also plan-
ning to bring in a bill to give effect to some of the recommenda-
tions of both of the select committees on railway borrowing
powers.
37
Thus, in May 1866, a measure called the Railway
Companies Securities Bill was introduced by the president of
the Board of Trade into the House of Commons.38 This bill dif-
fered from the Registration of Railway Debentures, etc., Bill in
that while the former was based largely on the report of the
Lords' Committee on railway borrowing powers of 1863, the lat-
ter embodied the recommendations of the committee of 1864.
Soon after the introduction of this measure, the Registration
of Railway Debentures, etc., Bill was withdrawn 39 without any
discussion. The government measure, after being examined and
considered in committees and amended considerably, was adopted
and has since been known as the Railway Companies Securities
Act of 1866.40 Its primary purpose was to amend the law re-
lating to securities issued or to be issued by railway companies.
The principal provisions may be summed up as follows: (1)
Every railway company, on or before January 15, 1867, should
register and keep registered at the office of the Joint Stock Com-
panies the names of their secretary, accountant, treasurer, or
chief cashier for the time being authorized to sign instruments
under the act. (2) Within fourteen days after the end of each
half year every railway company should make an account of
their loan capital authorized to be raised and actually raised up
to the end of that half year, specifying the particulars described
in the schedules of the act. (3) The Board of Trade was au-
thorized to prescribe, by notice in the London Gazette, the forms
37 Hansard, 181 : 338-339.
ss IUd., 183 : 1197.
39 It was withdrawn on July 23, 1866. Ibid., 184: 1279.
40 29 & 30 V. c. 108.
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in which, the half-yearly accounts were to be kept. Such ac-
counts were to be open to the inspection of shareholders, etc., at
all reasonable times, without charge. (4) Within twenty-one
days of the end of each half year every railway company should
deposit with the Registrar of Joint-Stock Companies a copy,
certified and signed by the company 's registered officers as a true
copy, of their loan capital half-yearly account, and it should be
unlawful for any railway company to borrow any money unless
and until it had first deposited the aforesaid accounts. Failure
to deposit such accounts or to register its proper officer should
render the company liable to a fine not exceeding 20 for the
initial offense and a penalty not exceeding 5 per day during
the time which the offense continued. (5) Any person might
inspect the documents kept by any registrar on the payment of
one shilling for each inspection, and might have certified extracts
furnished him on the payment of additional fees. It was fur-
ther provided that thereafter two of the directors and the regis-





as stated in the act, that, so far as he
knew the debenture was issued duly and was within the pre-
scribed limits to the borrowing powers. In case any mortgage
deed or bond was delivered without such a declaration, the com-
pany should be liable to a penalty not exceeding 20 for every
offense, and if any officer or director knowingly permitted the
delivery of such mortgage, deed, etc., he should be personally
liable to the same penalty as that of the company. Moreover, if
any director or registered officer of a company signed any dec-
laration, account, or statement required by the act, knowing the
same to be false in any particular, he should be deemed guilty
of an offense against the act and should be liable to a fine or
imprisonment.
It may be noticed that all the provisions contained in the act
had been, more or less, generally conceded as being necessary.
Parliament did not adopt any of the more stringent measures,
such as the compulsory stamping of each security by the govern-
ment, etc., for fear that in trying to require too much at a time
the whole program might be either defeated or made difficult of
application. Most of the provisions, therefore, were passed with-
out much opposition in either house of Parliament.
But of even greater importance were the provisions governing
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the make-up of these returns as required by the act. No matter
what efficient rules were adopted to enforce the making of re-
turns, the system would be of little value if the returns them-
selves were inadequate. It may be remarked that two distinct
things were required, namely: (1) half-yearly account of the
loan capital of the company, and (2) a statement of the borrow-
ing powers. The half-yearly accounts were required to show
the acts of Parliament under the power of which the company
had borrowed money, the amounts of loans authorized and the
amounts raised by loans, besides other important accounting de-
tails
;
41 while the statement of the borrowing powers should con-
tain information concerning (1) the acts of Parliament con-
ferring the borrowing powers and the conditions under which
the powers may be exercised, (2) the amount of mortgage or
bonded debt or debenture stock authorized, and (3) the date at
which such conditions have been fulfilled.
This act proved disappointing to some, in that it failed to
embody many of the more stringent measures demanded. Thus
the Economist said : 42
"English legislation abounds in abortive expedients. It
shrinks from difficulties. There is very commonly an admitted
evil, and very obviously only one real remedy. But very often
that real remedy is painful, and if public attention is but half
aroused to the subject, we are apt to put up with some half-
measure which gives little or no trouble, which looks as if it
might mend matters a little, and which has no disadvantage save
that it is not a searching cure of the evil to be remedied, and
that in a little while it will be forgotten on account of the slight-
ness of its effect, while the malady itself will rage as much as
ever."
"One of these half-way laws is the Act of last session as to
railway securities."
This important financial paper contended that the precautions
provided by this act failed exactly at the weak point. What was
wanted was an independent audit, a warranty by a competent
and impartial authority that such and such debentures were
*i Cf. first schedule of the Railway Companies Securities Act, 1866. Cf.
also infra, Chap. 7.
42 Economist, October 27, 1866.
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good. "The confusion, not to say worse, of the affairs of some
railways has been so great that those connected with all of them
are inevitably subject to a doubt Half of the directors in dis-
organized railways do not know what is being done, and others
wish to do what is illegal. Against such dangers, the act gives
no security; it requires certain statements to be made which all
the good companies, and 99 out of 100 . . . will make hon-
estly, but which an exceptional company, or rather some few
people about such a company, may make dishonestly. As long
as you rely on the bona fides of the issuer of the debenture you
are not, and cannot be, safe from his mala fides." **
The act seemed to have failed to check the confusion over de-
bentures at least during the three or four years after its passage.
Nor did it prevent some of the companies from exceeding their
borrowing powers, as shown by the fact that a good number of
railways continued their former practice and that neither the
shareholders nor the public were at all aware of the liabilities
to which the companies were subject. 4* Moreover, during 1867,
the year after the act was passed, many railway properties be-
came greatly depreciated and a feeling sprang up throughout the
country that further reform was needed. 45 Thus Lord Redesdale
felt it "extremely necessary" to adopt some provisions to the
effect that railway securities, unless properly registered, should
be regarded as invalid.46
In this connection it may be remarked that the apparent fail-
ure of the Railway Companies Securities Act during several
years after its passage was perhaps due more largely to the spec-
ial momentum of the established habit of the railway companies
to over-borrow rather than the weakness of the act itself. When
the state of railway borrowing had reached such a chaotic condi-
tion and the companies had become so used to exceeding the
limit of their borrowing powers, as they were during the early
sixties, it would take some time to make any signal improvement,
no matter what measures were adopted. Therefore, the contem-
porary dissatisfaction and the apparent lack of good results from
ibid.
44 Hansard, 190 : 1962.
45 /bid., 190 : 1955.
id., 190: 1962.
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the act during the years immediately following its enactment do
not necessarily prove that the act was ineffective. On the con-
trary, time seemed to have proven the act of great value in spite
of its defects, in helping to restore order out of the financial
chaos which existed during the fifties and sixties. An English
writer,
47
after criticising the English system of regulation, gave
much credit to this act as having done "a great deal towards
placing railway finance on a sounder footing. . ."
After the enactment of the Railway Companies Securities Act,
Parliament commenced to give its special attention to the adop-
tion of some effective system of accounting as a possible method
of regulating railway loan capital as well as other branches of
railway finance. Accordingly special legislation for the purpose
of regulating the borrowings of railways may be said to have
closed with the passage of this act.
Now it may be asked, why did the railway companies exceed
the limit of their borrowing powers? What was the reason that
directors even risked their personal liability to issue illegal se-
curities ? It is true that some directors violated the law for inde-
fensible reasons; but it is equally true that in some instances
they were practically compelled to borrow beyond the legal lim-
its. By reason of the restriction of loans to one-third of the
share capital the companies were naturally always at the limit
of their borrowing powers. Thus the directors were placed
under an obligation at a certain time to meet a large amount of
debts falling due, whatever might then be the state of the money
market. Therefore, they often felt it necessary to raise money
beforehand wrhen the state of the money market was easy. More-
over, it often became necessary for a company to create new
debts in anticipation of the falling due of the old debts so that
its creditors or financial agents might not be able to take advan-
tage of the occasion to embarrass the company. With its loans
up to the limit, in issuing fresh debentures, the company in
either case would exceed the statutory limit of its borrowing
48
powers.
In answer to the question as to why railway directors, especial-
ly of small lines, were willing to evade the law and assume the
47 J. S. Jeans, Eaihvay Problems, p. 23.
48 Cf. Economist, May 2, 1863, and Hansard, 181 : 338.
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risk of personal liability, the Economist said, 49 "But human na-
ture is vain and weak, and the directors are puffed up by the
little local importance, and flattered by secretaries who live by
the line, and engineers and attorneys who make a large profit
out of it, and so they yield and ruin themselves.
' '
Some people felt that the limit of the borrowing powers, which
was only one-third of the share capital, was "utterly inade-
quate,
' ' 50 that the limit was too small compared with the gen-
eral practice of borrowing on other mortgages,51 and that too
strict rules would invite their evasion. Indeed, it was contended
that this inadequacy of borrowing powers was responsible for
the gross violation of the limit.
Others felt 52 that it was not within the power of the legisla-
ture to put any effective restrictions upon the borrowing powers
of railway companies, even if it were proper to do so. If a com-
pany wanted to borrow, it would find some way of doing it in
spite of the law. Therefore, it was urged that the limit upon
borrowing powers should be removed 53 and railways should be
allowed to borrow what they liked, provided that they made
known all their proceedings. If the public had the necessary
information, they might be safely given absolute freedom in ad-
vancing their money.54 If the limit was not entirely done away
with, it should at least be extended.
Further it was urged that the borrowing powers of railway
companies should be made more definite and the law governing
the same should be more strictly enforced. If the railway direc-
tors realized that there were absolute limits to their borrowing
which it was not possible to evade, they would make better ar-
rangements beforehand, and would not be so speculative. In-
deed much of the difficulty was attributed to the facility with
49 Economist, December 14, 1867.
so Evidence before Lords' Committee, 1864, p. 34.
si The ordinary margin of borrowing with reference to good mortgage
securities was two-thirds of the share capital. See evidence before Lords'
Committee, 1864, pp. 34-35.
52 Evidence before Lords' Committee on Bailway Borrowing Powers,
1864, p. 24.
ss Evidence before Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, pp. 803-836.
5* Evidence before Lords ' Committee on Railway Borrowing Powers,
1864, pp. 33-35.
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which, railway directors in general were able to get their wrongs
set right by the assistance of Parliament in patching up their
former acts. Although they did not always succeed in getting
what they asked for, the hope of being able to do it operated
strongly upon them. 55 Parliament in its desire to protect deben-
ture holders by limiting the borrowing powers had led the public
to believe in the thoroughness of the protection ; while in reality
their protection was by no means satisfactory so long as the law
was indefinite and loosely enforced. 56 Therefore, it was urged
that the limit of the borrowing powers of railway companies
should be made more definite and strictly enforced, or that there
should be none at all.
Another defect in the law prior to 1866 was that there was not
any effectual means to ascertain whether or not the law had been
complied with. The law said that railways should not issue any
debentures unless and until a certain proportion of their capital
had been paid up, but it left the enforcement of this provision
to a justice of the peace. It limited the amount that the railway
could borrow but in practice could not enforce the limitation.
The whole trouble seemed to be briefly this : The legislature had
given a privilege of borrowing and had defined the extent of the
privilege as well as the conditions under which the privilege
might be exercised; but under the circumstances which existed
during the sixties no one had any adequate means of ascertain-
ing whether or not the limit had been exceeded or the requisite
conditions had been fulfilled.57 Therefore, it was recognized
that the difficulty was a legal one and not an economic one, in
that the earning powers of the railways, on the whole, were such
as to make a mortgage on railway undertakings "one of the very
best securities. ' ' 58 Toward removing this difficulty, the agita-
tion as well as the laws adopted during the sixties for the regis-
tration of railway securities seem to have done much.
55 Evidence lefore Lords' Committee on Eailway Borrowing Powers, 1864,
p. 27.
58 Evidence before Lords' Committee, 1864, p. 33.
57 Economist, May 2, 1863. Cf. also Hansard, 171 : 1303.
as Economist, October 20, 1866.
CHAPTER VI
REGULATION OF RAILWAY STOCK WATERING
Stock watering by railways may be- defined as the nominal in-
crease of railway capital without any commensurate investment
of real capital in the concern. It amounts to the fictitious in-
creasing of the capital liabilities by mere book entries and the
issuing of unpaid certificates. Stock watering has several forms,
chief among which may be mentioned (1) stocks issued partially
to represent money, which, instead of being used for improving
the property is paid out as dividend; (2) stocks issued to repre-
sent an actual increase in the earning capacity and market value
of the property; and (3) stocks issued to give certain parties
control of the line without actually risking anything like the
amount nominally represented by their stocks. 1 Stock watering
may be done in many ways, the most important, as it is practiced
in England, are those of mere duplication or triplication of ex-
isting stocks or the creation of new but unpaid stocks.
Stock watering under the first form came up before Parlia-
ment in 1868, in connection with the Regulation of Railways
Bill of that year. The Duke of Richmond proposed the insertion
of a clause in that Bill to enable railway companies to issue
preference shares which had been authorized and remained un-
issued at the time, in lieu of dividends, in cases where by a vote
of no less than three-fourths of the holders of ordinary shares
any portion of the amount declared by the auditors to be ap-
plicable to the payment of dividends on the ordinary shares is
applied to the redemption of debentures or to the execution of
authorized works. This proposition was objected to on the
ground that it would enable a company to apply its earnings to
the construction of new works or the redemption of debenture
without paying anything to the preference shareholders. 2
1 Hadley, Railroad Transportation, 1903, pp. 54-55.
2 Railway Times, May 23, 1868, p. 548.
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This objection, per se, did not appear valid, for the dividend
on the ordinary stock was distributable only after the claims of
the preference shareholders had been satisfied. Since the divi-
dend on the ordinary shares of a company was duly earned, as it
was required to be in this case, there was no reason why that
company, with the consent of the holders of its ordinary shares,
should not be permitted to issue its existing preference shares in
lieu of such dividends. Indeed, as the Railway Times 3 main-
tained, it appeared strange that the shareholders could not, on
their own accord obtain the privilege of paying themselves "in
paper instead of in cash." The difficulty appeared to be that
Parliament feared the proposal would prove "extremely unjust
and that it would probably lead to gross mismanagement, though
it would not be open to so much objection if the payment were
made in ordinary instead of in preference stock.
' ' Some prom-
inent members in the House of Lords 4 contended that ' ' if Par-
liament could have foreseen the evil which had resulted from the
issue of preference stock," it would have never given its sanc-
tion to these preference shares. The difference of opinion with
regard to this proposition of issuing preference shares in lieu
of dividends appeared to be so strong that the bill was with-
drawn.6
Thus direct stock watering in England has been practiced
only under the various shades of the second form. The first
form, as has just been shown, failed to receive the sanction of
law; and the last form, which is by far the most objectionable,
has proved impracticable under the English system of regulation
and the conservative business sentiment of the people.
But stock watering has been practiced indirectly, although on
a small scale, ever since the thirties. One of these early methods
of indirect stock watering was to pay interest on calls before a
line was opened, and then charge such unearned interest to cap-
ital. This practice became quite common during the forties. 6
From its appearance it was quite harmless, but in reality it was
nothing but a pure case of stock watering, in that such charges
of unearned interest would swell the capital account to the extent
zEailway Times, May 23, 1868.
* Lord Redesdale et al.. Hansard, 192 : 420-422.
s Hansard, 192 : 422.
e Railway Times, April 27, 1844.
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of the interest so charged, without any corresponding addition
to capital. Although the magnitude of these nominal additions
was small, the effect became rather objectionable. So in 1847,
after the panic which followed the great railway extension, the
House of Lords adopted a standing order 7 prohibiting the pay-
ment of interest out of capital. This was done, however, not
primarily for the purpose of preventing stock watering, but to
discourage speculation.
8
Nevertheless, this standing order had
considerable effect upon stock watering, and remained in force
for many years.
This restriction was again emphasized in 1864 in connection
with the loans made by the railway companies. In the Railways
Construction Facilities Act of that year a provision was made to
the effect that railway companies should not, out of money
raised under the certificate of the Board of Trade by calls or
borrowing, pay interest or dividend to a shareholder on the
amount of calls made on his shares. 9
For twenty years these restrictions remained in force. Prac-
tically nothing was done during that period to change them.
But in 1882 on behalf of the small undertakings, which were in
demand at that time, an effort was made to obtain from Parlia-
ment a modification of these restrictions. The reason advanced
was that the payment of interest out of capital would offer a
great inducement to local investors and small capitalists, who
could not afford to put their money into these undertakings with-
out obtaining at once some returns upon it. While the effort
was unsuccessful, it brought about considerable agitation, as a
result of which the House of Lords in 1886 modified its standing
order so as to make the payment of interest out of capital per-
missible under certain conditions.10 This relaxation of the law,
however, was not accompanied with such good results as was
expected. It soon proved that it was the bright prospects of the
undertaking and not the power of the company to pay interest
out of capital that could induce investors to come forward. So
this relaxation of the indirect check against stock watering
7 Standing Order No. 167.
s Report of Select Committee, May 19, 1882, p. iii.
9 27 & 28 V. c. 121, sub-see. 3 of section 29.
10 According to Earl Beauchamp in House of Lords, Eailway Times,
March 16, 1889.
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proved to be ill-advised. Since then, however, special provisions
have been made to restrict the payment of interest out of cap-
ital. Thus the Coventry Railway Act of 1910 provided that no
interest should be paid on any share until at least two-thirds of
the authorized share capital had been accepted by bona fide
shareholders, nor should interest accrue in favor of any share-
holder when calls on any of his shares were in arrears. The ag-
gregate amount to be paid for interest was also limited to a
definite sum, and the company was required to give notice of its
power to pay such interest in every one of its prospectuses, ad-
vertisements, or other documents inviting subscriptions, so that
investors might know what might take place. Moreover, the
borrowing powers of the company should be reduced to the ex-
tent of one-third of the amount paid for interest, and the half-
yearly accounts were required to show the amount of capital on
which, and the rate at which, interest had been paid. 11
Another indirect method of stock watering was to declare un-
earned dividends. This practice was quite as extensive as the pay-
ment of interest out of capital. A member of Parliament 12 was
reported to have said that many railways paid dividends out of
their capital stock as if they were in a most flourishing condition ;
and that they sometimes carried the practice so far that their
capital no longer existed. This practice once became quite alarm-
ing ; and the House of Commons felt itself compelled to insert a
clause in the Companies Clauses Act of 1845 13 to the effect that
companies should not declare any dividend whereby their capital
stock would be in any degree reduced. By the Companies Act
of 1862, it was also provided in Table A that no dividends should
be paid except out of profits earned. But this regulation was
not compulsory on the companies registered under that act, for
they were empowered by sec. 14 to make rules of association ex-
cluding the regulation in Table A. Much conflict consequently
resulted between the application of this act and the enforcement
of Standing Order No. 167. 1 *
But some railways soon found another method of adding water
to their capital by the issuing of stocks at a discount. They is-
11 Sec. 41 of the Coventry Railway Bill, 1910.
12 Lord G. Somerset. Hansard, 78 : 48-49.
is 8 V. c. 16, sec. 121.
i* Report of Select Committee, 1882, p. iii.
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sued stock certificates for sums larger than were paid into the
treasury of the company. This practice also became obnoxious,
as a result of which a clause was inserted in the Companies'
Clauses Act of 1863, 15 prohibiting the issue of any shares for less
than the full amount.
This law lasted three years. Owing to the agitation of the
railway interests as well as the changeableness of the attitude of
Parliament in railway matters during the period, the law was
amended by the Railway Companies Act of 1867,16 and the pro-
vision prohibiting the issue of shares at a discount was elim-
inated.
There was no debate upon the amendment in the public bill.
But the question regarding railways was debated in connection
with the proposal made in the Brighton Railway Bill. 17 This
company (the Brighton Railway Company) being very much in
want of funds proposed to raise money by the issue of prefer-
ence stocks; but being unable to raise the amount required by
such means, they sought to issue ordinary stocks at a discount.
The proposal was regarded by the lords as "perfectly new" and
of great importance. Lord Redesdale, who recommended the
passage of the bill, confessed that it was an objectionable course,
but he thought that "it was less objectionable than the creation
of preference stocks, and he therefore felt disposed, under the
circumstances, to allow the company to issue stocks at a dis-
count." None of the lords who spoke on the question were cer-
tain as to the advisability of such a measure; but with the feel-
ing that "when a railway company was in difficulty it was the
interest of all parties that money to carry it through should be
raised in some way," they did not oppose the measure openly.
Following the example of the Brighton, four other companies
also obtained similar powers, and 4,043,000 in "water" was
added in that year to the railway capital by the issue of stocks
at a discount,18
By the amendment of 1867 and the interpretations given to
that amendment in the cases just cited, it was generally consid-
is 26 & 27 V. c. 118, sec. 21.
is 30 & 31 V. c. 127, sec. 27.
"Hansard, 188:1423-1424 (July, 1867).
is The Chatham & Dover, the Great Eastern, the Sheffield, and the Met-
ropolitan. Fraser, British Eailways, p. 54.
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ered that the issue of shares at a discount was permitted. This
freedom was made more unmistakable in 1869 by the Companies
Clauses Act of that year,
19 in which it was provided that the re-
peal of the proviso against the issuing of stocks at a discount
was made applicable generally to all companies coming under
that act. Thus all restrictions were removed. The railways at
once made use of this relaxation of the law; and the issuing of
stocks at a discount soon became quite general. 20
Although these discounts were ipso facto nominal additions,
they were comparatively negligible in amount and were done
only indirectly. Open stock watering was still under the ban of
law. There appeared, however, to be much latitude in enforcing
the law governing such nominal additions. Since 1867 many
railway companies have obtained powers to "convert" their
stocks, by which process considerable nominal additions were
made. But in most of these cases the "infusion," as it was
then called, was still small compared with the capital of the
companies, and was made more or less incidental to other ar-
rangements. Out and out stock watering by duplication did not
take place until 1888,
21 when a new departure took place under
the scheme known as stock splitting. In that year the North
British Railway was authorized to make an "absolute duplica-
tion" of its existing stock of 5,181,000. By this so-called
process of duplication, every holder of the company's ordinary
stock on which, say, 100 had been paid, was given a certificate
for 200 in the converted stock. In the same year the Great
Northern made a nominal addition of 1,803,000, and in the fol-
lowing year the Taff Vale obtained powers to increase its ordi-
nary capital of 1,300,000 two and a half times by the same
process. The latter case led Parliament to make its first inquiry
into stock watering. We shall, therefore, examine it briefly.
When the bill of the Taff Vale for triplicating the amount of
is 32 & 33 V. c. 48, sec. 5.
20 Evidence before the Select Committee of 1890 on the Conversion of
Railway Stocks, p. 39.
21 Prior to 1890 complete information regarding the amount of nominal
addition was not obtained by the Board of Trade, but the Board of Trade's
returns of 1890 show a total of 57,800,000. Deducting from this the sum
of about 21,000,000 added in 1888, 1889 and 1890, the amount of nominal
capital existing prior to 1888 would be about 37,000,000.
127] REGULATION OF RAILWAY STOCK-WATERING 127
its ordinary shares was lodged in Parliament, it aroused consid-
erable anxiety. Therefore, in spite of the fact that it was not
the duty of the Board of Trade to examine questions dealing
with capital in railway bills, the matter was brought informally
to the notice of that board for consideration. The view which
that board took on the question was that the proposed nom-
inal increase was so extensive that it ought to be dealt with
in a public manner, and should not be allowed to pass as a mat-
ter of course, notwithstanding their general opinion that the
"greatest freedom should be permitted to companies to arrange
their capital as they pleased." Eventually the bill was passed
and ample powers of duplication were granted to the company,
subject to the provision that surplus profits above 15 per cent
on the ordinary capital, or 6 per cent on the new enlarged cap-
ital, should be given to the public in the form of reduced rates or
improved accommodations. It was also provided that the nature
of the nominal increase as well as the old capital should be
shown in the accounts of the company, so that every one should
be able to understand what had happened.22
Leaving the advisability or inadvisability of granting powers
for stock watering, for future consideration, we may here men-
tion the erroneous idea which Parliament had in regard to rail-
way finance as evidenced by the proviso under which the ex-
tensive powers of duplication were granted to the Taff Vale.
Although the high level of the maximum rate of dividend fixed
to "balance" the favors granted might have been warrantable
at the time by the special circumstances of that company, the
method of limiting the maximum was altogether misleading and
ineffective. According to that method any surplus above 15 per
cent etc. was to be given to the public in the form of reduced
rates. It was fairly well recognized then, as it has been gener-
ally recognized since, that a railway company under restriction
as to the maximum rate of dividend would be constantly tempted
to increase its expenditures, whenever its profit promised to ex-
ceed that limit. 23 There are always many ways in which a rail-
way company can spend money before it will give it to the
22 Evidence before the Select Committee of 1890.
23 " To forbid a corporation to increase its profits is to encourage waste
and discourage enterprise." Hadley, Eailroad Transportation, 1903, p. 102.
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public. This was especially true during that period when the
system of accounts was ineffective to check up the expense
charges of the company.
Then again, the proviso was based on a false premise. The
maximum was fixed at 15 per cent only because the company
had been declaring an average dividend at that rate during the
previous seven years. From this it would follow that a company
which might have gone on the principle of charging high or dis-
criminating rates and had thus been enabled to pay high divi-
dends would have its maximum fixed at a high point, whereas a
company that had been content with moderate rates would be
punished for its moderation by having its maximum fixed at a
low level.24 It is needless to say that such a practice would
mean gross injustice.
To the public such a principle would also be unfair. One dis-
trict would be given a right to receive all profits above say 5
per cent of dividend of the railways serving it, while another
district would not be entitled to enjoy such a right until the divi-
dends of its railways had reached say 10 or 15 per cent. But the
question of rates is not within the scope of our study* Suffice it
to say that strange as it appeared to others,25 Parliament at the
time thought it had gained a great concession from the railway
by the provision mentioned and referred to it in subsequent
years as a principle to be followed instead of regarding it as a
bad practice to be avoided.
The case of the Taff Vale, significant as it appeared to be,
was nevertheless only the prelude to what took place immediate-
ly afterwards. It was in 1890 that stock watering reached an
extravagant scope, and it was in that year when the most im-
portant parliamentary inquiry regarding stock watering was
made. In 1890 four companies 26 lodged bills for powers to add
2* "The market value (of railway stocks) depends upon the rate which
has been charged. . ." Interstate Commerce Commission Report, Feb.
22, 1911, p. 259.
25 Economist, March 22, 1890, pp. 364-365.
26 The Isle of Wight, the London & South-Western, the Caledonian, and
the Great Northern. The London & South-Western may be taken as a
simple and typical example of stock duplication. In the second clause of
this company's bill it was provided that the company would create ordinary
stock of two classes (1) preferred 4 per cent ordinary stock and (2) de-
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some 36,000,000 nominally to their capital, and those bills were
not opposed.
27 The vast interest involved in these proposals at
once attracted much attention. The Board of Trade in spite of
its policy to favor non-intervention in such matters, thought the
question of such an extensive increase of nominal capital to be
of "novel impression" and a "new departure so important that
it ought not to be passed sub silentio . . .," so it urged
that the question should be fully debated and the whole matter
thrashed out. The chairman of the Ways and Means Commit-
tee, under whose hands such unopposed bills were usually dis-
posed of without much discussion, also considered that the vast
interests involved in them required special investigation. He
disregarded, therefore, the usual rule of procedure, and handled
those bills as if they were opposed. Accordingly they were re-
ferred to a select committee of nine members, five being nom-
inated by the House of Commons and four by the Committee of
Selection. 28 This select committee was empowered to send for
persons, papers, and records, etc., concerning both sides of the
question, and to consider what provisions should be made for the
benefit of the public, if the applications were allowed.
29
Two distinct questions at once presented themselves for solu-
tion, namely:
(1) Whether or not the proposed duplication of stocks ought
to receive sanction.
(2) How far it was necessary or expedient for Parliament to
interfere with the methods by which the duplication was done,
and if Parliament should so interfere, whether the terms and
ferred duplicated ordinary stock, both classes of which to be in substitu-
tion of a corresponding amount of the paid up ordinary deferred. That is
to say, 100 of the preferred and 100 of the existing ordinary stock should
be substituted for every 100 of the existing ordinary stock. It was also
provided that the maximum dividend on the preferred stock should be at the
rate of 4 per cent non-cumulative, and that the remainder of the net profits
would go to the deferred ordinary stock. The voting powers were to re-
main as before, as if the splitting or duplicating had not taken place. Cf.
Eailway Times, May 17, 1890, and testimony of the representative of the
L. & S. W. before the Select Committee of that year.
27 Eailway Times, March 22, 1890, and June 21, 1890, p. 784.
28 Select Committee of the House of Commons on Stock Conversion, 1890,
hereafter called Select Committee of 1890.
w Report of Select Committee, 1890, p. ii.
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conditions under which duplication might be done should be
prescribed in a general enabling bill.
With these questions before it, the committee, besides taking
testimony from the representatives of the railways and other
interested parties, called for much independent evidence, among
which was that of the representatives of the Board of Trade,
the Stock Exchange Committee, and of prominent members of
the London and Scottish banking fraternity. A remarkable
phalanx of opinion was obtained.
One very striking feature of the evidence on the question of
stock watering was that not one of the witnesses thought the
practice good in itself. Even those who appeared in behalf of
the railways did not attempt to justify it on its own merits. On
the other hand, all the witnesses agreed that in principle stock
watering should be avoided. But the railway representatives
claimed that if the practice were an evil, it was a necessary one,
since if they did not do it themselves, the conversion companies 30
were going to do it for them.
The second question upon which much discussion took place
was how to ameliorate this necessary evil. What was elicited
upon this question was enlightening. The Board of Trade 31
was of the opinion that if the freedom of stock watering were to
be generally conceded, it was most important that they should
retain a record of the actually paid-up capital as distinguished
from the nominal addition. The position of the board was to
leave railway shareholders to duplicate, triplicate, or to give any
name or units to their capital, for the purpose of buying and sell-
ing, that suited them best, "but/' they said, "let us take care of
the public interest so far as the record is concerned." The
so The first stock conversion company was floated in February, 1889.
The object of the company, which was new at the time, was to effect the
duplication or triplication of the stocks of railway companies independent
of the railways themselves. The conversion company, or trust, used its own
capital for the purchase of railway stocks, and also gave its own shares and
debentures in exchange for any railway stocks that might be deposited with
it. Thus, it obtained a considerable amount of railway stock, which in turn
was made the basis of a very much larger issue of the trust's own shares
and bonds. For details of the working of the conversion company see
Economist, 1889, p. 596.
si For details of the position of the Board of Trade see Evidence before
the Lords' Committee on the Conversion of Stock, 1890, pp. 37-44.
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Board of Trade was also of the opinion that there should be uni-
formity in recording these nominal additions. If no special act
like that of 1868 were enacted, a uniform clause requiring such
records should be inserted "as far as possible" in all private
bills asking for powers to make nominal additions. It also pro-
posed under the powers of obtaining statistical information con-
ferred by the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1888 32 to obtain
and record the same information in the annual returns under the
Regulation of Railways Act of 1871.
33 Attention must be called
to the fact that the purpose of the Board of Trade in insisting
upon the keeping of a clear record of the original paid-up and
the nominal capital was "mainly in the interest of the govern-
ment and the public with reference to the powers with which the
companies have been entrusted, and not for the purpose of bene-
fiting or shielding the investing classes in any way.
' f 34
Whatever the purposes were, all the evidence agreed on the
necessity of keeping a clear record of all nominal additions. A
practical banker 35 in testifying, believed that to keep a separate
record of such nominal additions was very important not only to
the railway companies themselves but to the general investors as
well. The chairman of the stock exchange 36 considered it very
important that the government should insist upon having the
original capital placed on the face of the accounts, so that there
should be no doubt as to what was the real paid-up capital. By
this means,
' '
every person who buys or sells these shares will al-
ways have before him every six months what his position is."
In short, the consensus of opinion both in Parliament as well as
outside of it was that a clear, separate record of the conversion
and the converted stocks was necessary for the general interest
of the railways and the public. It is interesting to notice that
no objection whatever against this requirement was raised by the
railways.
The select committee, after examining those witnesses repre-
senting different interests, made a special report three months
32 52 & 53 V. c. 66, sec. 32.
ss 34 & 35 V. c. 78.
s* Evidence before the Lords' Committee on the Conversion of Stock,
1890, p. 43.
35 Ibid., pp. 53-56.
se
Ibid., p. 47.
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after its appointment. As above stated, the committee had to
decide two distinct questions: (1) whether the proposed nominal
additions ought to receive the sanction of Parliament, and (2)
how far it was expedient for Parliament to interfere with the
process by which the nominal additions were to be effected. In
answer to the first question, the committee said that there was
"nothing unreasonable or objectionable from a public point of
view in the conversion of ordinary stocks into a preferred and a
deferred class," and, therefore, it recommended "that the neces-
sary power for that purpose should not be refused when a rail-
way company desires it." "With regard to the second question,
which was of general interest, the committee instead of trying to
solve it as it was expected, dodged it by throwing the responsi-
bility upon the Royal Commission of 1867 which stated "that
Parliament should relieve itself from all interference with the
financial affairs of railway companies, leaving such matters to be
dealt with under the Joint Stock Companies Act . . ." and
the committee urged "that Parliament should continue to act
upon the principle of non-intervention . . . believing that
while the public are naturally concerned in the solidity and sta-
bility of corporations to which Parliament has given large ex-
clusive powers, these objects are, in most cases, best secured by
trusting to the self-interest of the shareholders.
" 37 In order to
avoid the confusion inherent in these nominal additions, the
committee believed "it right to insist (1) that the dividend
should in all cases continue to be declared on the original stock,
and (2) that the original stock or paid-up capital shall be re-
corded and shown in the accounts as though no alteration had
been made, . . ." and (3) that the new stock should bear a
different and uniform nomenclature.
This report proved, as might have been expected, disap-
pointing to many parties, 38 but not to the railway companies.
Throughout its length it showed that the committee took for
granted the very matters into which it had been expected to in-
quire. Most of its conclusions were drawn from the fact that
some commission said so and so; and much of the evidence
37 Report, pp. IV-V.
38 Both the Economist and the Railway Times published editorials strong-
ly criticising the report.
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seemed to have been disregarded. In the first place, the con-
elusion of the committee that "there was nothing unreasonable
or objectionable from a public point of view in the conversion of
ordinary stocks . . ." did not seem to be well founded. In
the face of the numerous objectionable features of stock water-
ing brought out by the evidence, no one could have expected such
a conclusion.
Then the statement made by the committee that the estab-
lished principle was that Parliament should not concern itself
any more with the financial affairs of railways than with those
of other stock companies was open to serious question. Parlia-
ment had never assented to this principle. On the contrary it
had never permitted railway companies to deal with their cap-
ital accounts with the same degree of freedom as the ordinary
joint stock companies. Numerous facts 39 could be cited to show
that Parliament had drawn a clear and broad line of demarca-
tion between the principles governing the finances of railway
companies which enjoyed a state conferred monopoly and that
of ordinary industrial undertakings. "To assume, therefore,
that Parliament had acted on the principle of non-intervention
in the financial affairs of railway companies seemed to be direct-
ly opposed to facts.
' ' 40 Whether the principle involved in
stock watering was right or wrong, it was certainly not to be
summarily disposed by quoting a twenty-year old opinion which
Parliament did not endorse at the time and which in its subse-
quent actions it had often deliberately set aside.
It must not be inferred from these disappointing features that
the inquiry of the committee was entirely fruitless. At least two
of the recommendations of the committee have since proved to be
sound. The first was that regarding the keeping of a clear rec-
ord of all nominal additions and the other was that of requiring
a uniform and distinct nomenclature to be put on the face of the
"watered" stocks. It is to be regretted, however, that sound as
these recommendations were, they were shorn of much of their
39 Parliament has put railway finance upon a different footing from that
of other companies by specially authorizing trustees to invest in certain
classes of railway stocks. It has reserved to itself the power to deal with
the affairs of an insolvent railway; and it has intervened to limit railway
dividends, etc.
<o Economist, June 21, 1890.
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force and value by the lack of emphasis placed upon their en-
forcement.
This report was received by Parliament on June 13, 1890.
No general or special legislation resulted from the inquiry. But
clauses embodying the recommendations of the committee to re-
quire the recording of all nominal additions were introduced
into the bills then under consideration. 41 Moreover, a precedent
was established, according to which similar clauses have con-
tinued to be inserted in all subsequent bills for powers to make
nominal additions to railway stock. Parliament also occasion-
ally required that dividends be paid on the original ordinary
shares, exclusive of the nominal additions, as in the case of the
Midland, where it was provided that the "company shall, not-
withstanding the conversion, . . continue to ascertain and
declare their dividends on the amount of ordinary stock which
would have been entitled to dividend if no such conversion had
taken place. . .
" *2
Parliament, however, failed to make use of the committee's
recommendation of adopting some distinct nomenclature for the
converted stocks. Neither was any uniform method of procedure
adopted to compel all railway companies to report their nominal
additions to stock. An indirect but more effective check against
stock watering, however, was adopted in the following year, by
the enactment of the Stamp Act in which it was provided that in
case of any nominal increases of the share capital, an ad valorem
duty of 2 shillings per 100 should be charged, with a cumula-
tive penalty for neglect to render due statement of such in-
creases. This measure has been rigorously enforced. Thus the
railway companies have been compelled under penalty to pay
duty on, as well as to render due statements of, all nominal in-
creases to a government office. It may be added that a further
check against unnecessary stock watering was effected by a sub-
sequent enactment in which the stamp duty was increased from
2 to 5 per cent.
In this way, the question of stock watering was disposed of,
and the policy for its regulation settled once for all. No new
41 Eailway Times, June 14, 1890.
42 Sec. 67 of the Midland Act of 1897, quoted in Fraser, British Rail-
ways, p. 68.
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departure from the policy has since been made by Parliament.
The status thus established may be summed up as follows :
(1) Railway companies shall have freedom to determine their
policies and practice in making nominal additions to their
capital.
(2) Before such nominal additions are made, the company
must come to Parliament for power.
(3) Bills for such powers are dealt with in the same way as
any other kind of private bill.
(4) Clauses requiring the keeping of a clear record of all
nominal additions as distinguished from the paid-up capital are
uniformly inserted in such bills before their passage.
(5) An ad valorem, duty of 5 per cent is to be paid on the
nominal increases and a due statement of all nominal additions
is to be furnished to the Stamp Duty Commissioners' office.
By this system of regulation, complete liberty has been given
to the companies on the one hand, and publicity has been insured
to the public on the other. Although England had to suffer from
her leniency toward stock watering, she has never known those
vicious schemes of stock watering practiced in the United States.
Thus, disappointing as the 1890 investigation and imperfect as
the action of Parliament appeared to be, much good was brought
about, which was, perhaps, due both to the efficacy of the Eng-
lish system of regulation as well as the readiness of the English
railways to mitigate as far as possible the evils inherent in stock
watering.
Following the suggestion of the Select Committee of 1890, the
Board of Trade in preparing its railway returns for 1890 also
endeavored to find some way to give practical effect to the rec-
ommendations in regard to the records to be kept. On account
of the lack of definite power, the Board of Trade, however, had
to request the companies to show in their semi-annual returns
the amount by which the various descriptions of their stocks and
shares had been nominally increased or decreased.43 But the
"request" of the Board of Trade, though not as effective as a
command might have been, proved quite useful, and considerable
information regarding nominal additions was obtained from the
companies which had added "water" to their capital. These
43 General Beport to Board of Trade on shares, etc., 1890, p. 4.
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figures of nominal capital have since been published by the
Board of Trade from year to year,44 to the advantage of the
public as well as to the railways themselves. By turning to
these returns one may at once see for himself what part of the
company's capital represents nominal increases, which informa-
tion is an advantage in itself as well as a means to clarify con-
fusion and, in a measure, to prevent speculation in stocks.
But, as remarked before, the policy of freedom in stock water-
ing in England was established; and the aforesaid indirect
checks against this practice were not felt seriously in some cases.
The significance of this policy may be seen from the following
table which exhibits the development of stock watering in Eng-
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From this table, it may be seen that at the time when the par-
liamentary inquiry was made, 57,800,000 46 or about six per
cent of the total paid-up railway capital in the United Kingdom
represented nominal additions. This equaled about 3,000 per
mile of line opened. The effect of the attitude of Parliament
and the Select Committee of 1890 may be seen from what hap-
pened during the subsequent eight years, when an average of
16,000,000 in
"
water" was added annually. In 1895 the nom-
inal addition made was as large as the real increase in capital;
in 1896 it was about twice as much and in 1897 it reached the
enormous proportion of 46,200,000 which was more than three
times as much as the increase of real capital made during that
year. This shows how extensively stock watering was practiced
during that period. On account of the encouragement given by
the findings of the Select Committee of 1890 the railways ap-
peared to have thought that there was a "gold mine" in stock
watering, and plunged into its depth. Thus by a stroke of the
pen, so to speak, the amount of the stocks of a number of com-
panies was doubled or trebled, without adding anything materi-
ally to their properties. The significance of such extensive and
violent manipulations can hardly be overestimated. When over
16 per cent of the paid-up capital represents "water," and
which the capital of each railway company has been nominally increased by
the conversion, consolidation, and division of their stocks, are shown with
figures in italics under the figures of the total capital of each company.
There is also a separate table showing, in abstract, the nominal increases of
each individual company as well as the whole system. The returns, how-
ever, contain no information as to the difference between the nominal
amount and the amount actually received of the stocks which have been
issued at a premium or at a discount.
of the Board of Trade and the percentages are calculated with a slide-rule.
They represent the United Kingdom, but the amount for England and
Wales is about 75-80 per cent in almost every case.
The nominal increases due to discount on issue, payment of dividends




46 Of this amount, 6,000,000 was due to the conversions made by the
Midland which has been by far the most important company in stock water-
ing. This company has about 41,000,000 of its nominal capital represent-
ing water.
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when nominal additions made in a year become three times as
big as the increase of real capital, we have something that is at
once important. It becomes hard to agree with the Select Com-
mittee of 1890 that such stock manipulations as these made no
difference whatever to the public.
Another peculiar feature of the English practice of stock
watering is that "water" is added not only to the shares and
stocks but to the debenture debts as well,47 and that the nominal
additions to these debts, as shown in the preceding table, repre-
sent a considerable proportion of the total amount of "water."
But stock watering reached its zenith in 1897, and its decline
has been more striking than its growth. In 1898 the annual in-
crease declined to 31,000,000, and in the following year, it
dwindled to the insignificant figure of a little over a million
pounds. Ever since that time the annual increase has never
been more than 2,300,000, and the practice has continued to de-
cline until it reached the negligible proportion of only about
half a million in 1907.
The course of these annual increases may be seen more clearly
by the help of the following diagram. In the first place, it may
be noticed that the annual increases of nominal capital from
1890 to 1895 were about equal. The curve suddenly commenced
to rise in 1896, it reached the highest point in 1897, it com-
menced to fall in 1898, and it reached a very low point in 1899.
This course is especially interesting when studied with the
curve showing the increases of real capital during the same
period. Before 1895 the "real increase" curve always stays
above the "nominal increase" curve. During the following
four years the latter rises above the former by an enormous
margin; and since 1899 the "nominal" curve remains consider-
ably below the "real" curve. Then the curve showing the real
increases does not have any such violent and abrupt changes as
that showing the nominal increases.
These facts also reveal that there is some truth in the principle
which had a great influence upon the English legislators that
47 The watering of the debenture debts has been done usually by giving a
new certificate for a debt of say 200 at 2 per cent for a former and actual
debt of 100 at or above 4 per cent per annum for either the purpose of
making the security more attractive or that of reducing the rate of interest.
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railway shareholders would generally find out for themselves
what is good or bad, though sometimes after much loss, and to a
certain extent explain why Parliament has been so lenient in the
regulation of stock watering. But even this self-conviction of
the railways could not right what was wrong. While the indi-
vidual roads had to suffer enormous financial losses in the pay-
ment of stamp duties and litigation penalties, the whole system
also could not escape from the disastrous confusion created in
the minds of the public. In spite of the far-sightedness and
moderation of most of the English railways in stock watering,
today about 200,000,000, or about $44,000 per mile of line 48
still encumbers the English railway capital, to say nothing of
the unrecorded nominal additions, all of which serves to add
more confusion and uncertainty to the complicated questions of
railway finance.
This leads us to ask why stock watering came into vogue and
48 The mileage of the United Kingdom given in the 'Board of Trade re-
turns for 1908 was 12,845, including double track, and 10,263 miles not in-
cluding second and third tracks.
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what were the underlying notions regarding it. First of all, it
must be remembered that stock watering has practically never
been defended on its own merits. Nothing was elicited from
the inquiry of 1890, which was by far the most important of its
kind, to justify the practice. Bankers and large merchants re-
gretted the necessity of stock watering, and many railway of-
ficials were opposed to the practice. In short, all seemed to
agree that stock watering was an evil, because it was nothing but
a pure case of misrepresenting actual facts. It was advocated
not as anything good in itself, but as a measure of self-defense
against the operations of the stock conversion and investment
companies. As the.se conversion companies had achieved some
apparent success in securing and . duplicating large blocks of
railway stocks, the railway directors made their plea for powers
to follow the example of the conversion companies. Their reason
was that there might be danger to the properties if large blocks
of their stocks were merged in successive trusts. If such dupli-
cations were a necessary evil, it was better that they should be
effected by the railways themselves rather than by certain irre-
sponsible conversion companies, which were making it a business
to effect such duplications for speculative purposes. Besides
other objectionable features, the special danger apprehended
from the operation of the conversion companies was that as hold-
ers of large blocks of stock they would possess a voting power
which might be used to thwart the policy of the directors con-
ceived in the best interest of the company.
There appeared to be considerable justification for this appre-
hension. But it must be noticed that the argument of the rail-
way companies postulated that the operations of the conversion
company had already proved such a financial success that share-
holders had a strong inducement to avail themselves of them.
This, however, was not exactly the case. Take the London &
South-Western as an example, we find the price of the com-
pany's ordinary stock in May, 1889, when the scheme of the con-
version company was first put into operation, was 180. At this
price, 3,000 would have bought 1,666 of stock. The latter
amount of stock sold at the price of 179, which prevailed at the
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time 49 when the company lodged its bill for duplication, would
have realized 2,970. On the other hand, if an investment of a
similar amount were made in the stocks of the conversion com-
pany which operated on the London & South-Western stocks,
the result would have been as follows : 50
Amount
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and interfere with the voting power of the railway companies.
Stock watering, however, did not appear to be the real remedy,
for the railway companies, as was then recognized,
51 could never
have hoped to keep pace with the conversion companies in the
matter of stock manipulations. Furthermore, even if the railways
could have manipulated their stocks as rapidly as the conversion
companies, it was no reason why they should be induced to join
the gambling ranks of the conversion companies. Both the Rail-
way Times and the Economist 52 strongly criticised the partici-
pation in it by the railway companies.
The foregoing was the principal reason given by the railway
representatives before the Select Committee of 1890 in advocat-
ing stock watering. But, the reasons emphasized within the
walls of the committee rooms are often different from those
emphasized without. The case in 1890 seemed to be no excep-
tion. For in the report of the Isle of Wight Railway 53 we find
the only reason given by the directors of that company to their
shareholders in advocating the duplication of stocks was that the
process would
"
(1) increase the capital value of the debenture
stocks. . . (2) It will benefit the ordinary stock-holders, be-
cause experience has abundantly shown that preferred and de-
ferred stocks . . . are together more valuable than one or-
dinary stock. (3) It will benefit the preference stockholders"
by making their securities more negotiable, and so forth. These
might not have been the only reasons in every case but they
seemed to be the most important ones why the railway compan-
ies wanted to ''water" their stocks. Thus it was not the fear
of the conversion companies, as emphasized by the railway rep-
resentatives before the Select Committee that led to the watering
of stocks, but the hope of pecuniary gains.
There was no doubt that the railway directors had some rea-
son for believing that stock watering would make the securities
more valuable. It must also be admitted that some companies
had made some apparent gains from the operation. But, as we
have shown, such gains were by no means always the rule. On
51 Railway Times, April 26, 1890, p. 541.
52 Economist, May 7, 1890, p. 619.
ss Eailway Times, March 1, 1890, p. 304.
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the contrary actual losses have been suffered from such manip-
ulations in some cases. Moreover, even if by stock watering the
prices of railway securities were inflated, as was expected, such
temporary gains of the existing investors would only mean a
corresponding loss to the investors who came afterwards. In-
deed, as the Railway Times maintained,54 those who looked to
the future must have entertained grave misgivings as to the
wisdom and even the honesty of the financial legerdemain in-
volved in stock-watering. It is hardly conceivable that the
change of the names of securities could create any lasting and
real advantage to the general investor without a corresponding
loss to some others.
The reason given by the Board of Trade 55 for permitting
stock watering is especially worth noticing. That department
shared "the common feeling rather against a watering of cap-
ital,
' '
but, as said one of its officers, if the railway shareholders
desired it, I would "incline to think . . . it is rather cov-
ered by the general idea that they should be allowed to do what
they please. . ."
One may see plainly that the opinion of the Board of Trade
was a negative one. It was one of suspense. They advocated
that Parliament should permit stock watering not at all because
they thought stock watering was good, but because they thought
non-intervention was their policy, and hence, they must follow it.
The immediate effect of stock watering in England has been
unmistakably bad. In the first place, this process has unneces-
sarily added treacherous elements of speculation in railway fi-
nance, in turn the cause of much disastrous fluctuations in rail-
way stocks, especially the "adulterated" classes. Genuine in-
vestors have been victimized. Many people have sustained dis-
astrous and irretrievable loss from the practice.56
Moreover, the process of stock watering, as was prophesied at
the time,
57 has conclusively proved to be not only unproductive
of any real advantage, but delusive, as shown by the fact that
5* Eailway Times, April 24, 1890, p. 541.
55 Evidence before Select Committee of 1890, pp. 42-43.
ss Fraser, British Eailways, p. 109.
57 Eailway Times, April 26, 1890, p. 41.
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"The subsequent balance-sheets can hardly show the true posi-
tion of the undertaking with so much water added. " 58 In spite
of the efforts of the Board of Trade to set forth clearly the
nominal additions of each company, stock watering is largely
responsible for the subsequent misconception of many people
regarding the true nature and extent of railway capital in Eng-
land. It is hard to tell exactly how much harm these nominal
additions have done, but it is certain that they have contributed
their part to delude future generations into the belief that the
English railway system has cost a great deal more than it really
has. And this delusion has undoubtedly done more harm than
good. Fictitious capital has long been recognized as a real evil
in railway finance,59 and stock watering has, perhaps, created
more fictitious capital than any other known process.
The effect of stock watering upon the general investing public
is of even greater consequence. The creation of so many nomen-
clatures for the "watered" stocks at once caused much incon-
venience to the holders of existing stocks. As was expected, the
misrepresentation of actual facts by this process brought about
much confusion. The numerous descriptions of stocks which had
been already complicated enough were made altogether beyond
the comprehension of any ordinary investor.60 The public was
puzzled as to the value of such securities. The stockholder could
not know exactly what was the real position or status of his in-
vestment
;
the new investor was unable to tell the value of what
he was buying. As the readiness of an average man to invest
varies directly with his knowledge of the steadiness and true
value of the securities, these new elements of uncertainty have
unquestionably frightened away many investors who would have
come forward otherwise.
Abstractly considered, stock watering is also objectionable.
It cannot but work to the disadvantage of the general public. A
company with an inflated capital account is usually under pres-
ss McDermott, Railways, p. 164.
59 London Times, May 15, 1866.
60 The best known varieties of ordinary stock are those known as ordi-
nary, as preferred and deferred ordinary, as preferred and deferred con-
verted ordinary, besides consolidated "A" and "B" ordinary stock and
"consols." See J. Fraser, British Railways, p. 65.
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sure to "wring" big profits out of its customers so as to pay
dividends on its fictitious as well as real capital.
Again, stock watering, as President Hadley said, has been re-
sorted to in order to furnish an excuse for paying higher divi-
dends than the law or public sentiment would otherwise permit,61
Indeed an English writer claimed that one reason for the adop-
tion of stock watering in England was that the nominal reduc-
tion of dividends would render the companies concerned less
liable to attack on the ground of excessive profits.62
Moreover, it is generally recognized that the "watered" stocks
of a railway company usually have some baleful effects upon the
wages which it pays and the rates which it charges. The com-
pany with a large capital and consequently a low rate of divi-
dend certainly has a more plausible reason for opposing the pay-
ment of higher wages to its employees as well as for objecting to
any reduction of its charges than it would have otherwise. Al-
though the actual relation between capital and railway rates is
unsettled there is hardly any question that, other things being
equal, a company with a low rate of dividend is less liable to
have its charges reduced by the government than it would be if
its rate of dividends were high.
Furthermore, stock watering seems to have been one of the
worst causes in giving rise to speculation, and sometimes, to
fraudulent manipulations, both of which results have been re-
sponsible in making railway securities a much less reliable form
of investment than they might have been.63 The best managed
companies have either been cautious or have never attempted to
indulge in stock watering. It is the promoter and the speculator
who find opportunities in this practice. It is to the advantage
of the general investing public and the responsible railway direc-
tor to avoid this practice. Indeed, the phrase of stock watering
is still altogether indefinable, and the evil effects of stock water-
ing have been recognized in the United States as well as in
England.64
61 Hadley, Railroad Transportation, 1903, p. 55.
62 E. B. McDermott, Eailways, p. 164.
63 E. R. Johnson, Am. Railway Transportation, 1907, p. 94.
64 Of the nine witnesses who testified before the U. S. Industrial Com-
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The principle, or rather the lack of principle, involved in
stock watering "is to be deprecated." 65 It is "opposed to con-
servative railroad financiering;"
66 it gives rise to objectionable
speculation and gambling,67 it leads to pursuing a short sighted
policy ;
68 it should be ' ' emphatically condemned ;
" 69 it "is a
practice against which Parliament should have resolutely set its
face." 70
Thus, from all the evidences, statistics, and authorities consult-
ed and after examining the principal reasons given by various
parties, we are led to conclude that stock watering in railway
finance is objectionable.
Now what shall be the remedies ? No general rule can be laid
down for all countries, nor, perhaps, could any be laid down for
the same country for all times. Any empirical formula or dog-
matic doctrine is liable to be useless, or even harmful. But tak-
ing England as an example, it seems that more strict rules were
warranted and could have been adopted for the regulation of
railway stock watering. Even at the time when the practice was
most vigorously advocated, there did not appear to be much ob-
jection against more stringent measures than those adopted by
Parliament. The only excuse we find for the attitude of the
select committee of 1890 and the legislature in giving much free-
dom to stock watering was that the established principle seemed
to be non-intervention. It is hardly necessary to emphasize that
to fall back always on old principles in order to solve new prob-
lems is a dangerous policy. Even the English people are op-
posed to all kinds of government interference, it seems that Par-
liament could have done more to safeguard the public interest.
If nothing else, it certainly could have required the appearance
mission of 1900 in regard to stock watering, every one was of the opinion
that the practice was harmful. Chief among these witnesses were Profes-
sors Seligman, Johnson and Newcomb. U. S. Industrial Commission Eeport,
1900 V, IV, pp. 25 et seq.
65 E. E. McDermott, Eailways, p. 164.
66 E. E. Johnson, Am. Railway Transportation, 1907, p. 90.
67 Railway Times, April 26, 1890, p. 541.
es Hadley, p. 22.
69 The Economist, Feb. 9, 1889, p. 172.
TO Ibid., July 13, 1889, p. 891.
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of uniform nomenclature on the face of the converted stocks as
recommended by the select committee. It could have enacted
some law to enable the Board of Trade to compel instead of to re-
quest the companies to furnish returns showing the nominal ad-
ditions as distinguished from the actual capital; and it could
have enacted a general law so as to insure uniformity in the
whole matter, instead of leaving it to be dealt with piecemeal.
On the other hand, we must not criticise the English Parlia-
ment according to our understanding of what stock watering
means in the United States. In the first place, the "worst forms
of stock watering, unhappily so common in America ... is
practically unknown in England.
" n If at all, stock watering
must be done openly. It must be sanctioned by Parliament.
Such publicity removes much of the temptation to effect stock
watering for dishonest purposes. Moreover, the indirect checks
imposed by the Stamp Acts have made stock watering quite diffi-
cult. Let stock watering be done openly and be investigated first
by some dignified government office, it will disappear on its own
merits. Therefore, stock watering in England, extensive as it is,
has never been nearly as objectionable as in some other countries.
Moreover, the English railways seem to have seldom if ever,
"watered" their stocks for dishonest purposes. They also ap-
pear to have been eager to help the government to prevent the
difficulties inherent in stock watering. Hence a request of the
Board of Trade has been sufficient to secure full information re-
garding their nominal additions made each year. Thus by turn-
ing to the annual railway returns of the Board of Trade, one
may see at a glance what proportion of the capitalization of each
company represents water. This difference partially explains
why Parliament has taken such lenient measures in regulating it.
Thus, it appears that publicity is one of the most effective and
practicable checks against objectionable stock watering in rail-
way finance. To insure this, railway companies should be com-
pelled to show in their accounts and balance-sheets all their
nominal additions. They also should be required to furnish
periodic and due statements exhibiting clearly such nominal ad-
ditions as distinguished from the actual capital, with remarks as
71 Hadley, Railroad Transportation, 1903, p. 156.
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to the time when, and circumstances under which, the additions
were made. A uniform nomenclature should be marked on the
certificates of all adulterated stocks so as to avoid confusion. It
further appears that stock watering in railway finance should
be discouraged and placed under government supervision in all
cases, and prohibited whenever circumstances permit.
CHAPTER VII
THE REGULATION OF RAILWAY ACCOUNTS
The English legislature took pains to regulate railway ac-
counting as early as it endeavored to regulate other branches of
railway finance; but it did not prescribe any precise system of
accounting before 1868. The keeping of accounts had been
obligatory upon the railway companies in common with other
joint stock companies. For this purpose separate provisions
were made in the special acts of incorporation. Thus a clause
in the Croydon Act of 1837 * provided :
' ' That the said directors shall cause a book or books to be kept
by a book-keeper who shall be expressly appointed by the said
directors for that purpose, and who shall enter or cause to be
entered in the said book or books true and regular accounts of all
sums of money received and expended for or on account of the
undertaking . . . ; and such book or books shall at all rea-
sonable times be open to the inspection of the respective loan
creditors . . . without fee or reward, and the said loan
creditors or any of them may take copies of or extracts from the
said book or books without paying anything for the same ; and in
case the said book-keeper shall refuse to permit such loan cred-
itors or any of them to inspect such book or books, or to take
such copies or extracts as aforesaid, such book-keeper shall for-
feit and pay over for every such offence any sum of money not
exceeding 20."
In 1841 a member of Parliament inquired of the president of
the Board of Trade as to whether it had not become necessary
to take evidence to show that all railway companies should peri-
odically furnish to the Board of Trade a debtor and creditor ac-
count, drawn out on a simple but uniform plan, of their half-
yearly receipts and expenditures, etc. To this inquiry, however,
1 1 V. c. cxir, s. CLXXXVIII.
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the president of the Board of Trade answered that he did not
think that it had become desirable to make any such regula-
tions. 2 This last statement shows how little value was attached
to uniform accounting during the forties.
In 1842 in connection with the collection of stamp duty on
passenger fares, a clause was inserted in an act of that year
3 to
the effect that all companies should keep accounts of their pas-
senger receipts in such form as should be prescribed by the com-
missioners of stamps and taxes, and should, within five days
after the first Monday in each calendar month, deliver to the
said commissioners or other duly appointed officers a true copy
or copies of the accounts so kept. Another section 4 of this act
provided that all books containing passenger receipts should be
open to the inspection of officers of stamp duties, under penalty
of 50 for each offense against the law.
For the purpose of government purchase of railways, a clause
was introduced in the Railway Regulation Act, 1844,5 to the
effect that, during the period of three years previous to the time
when option of revision of rates or state purchase of a railway
should become available, true accounts should be kept of all
sums of money received and paid, that a half-yearly account in
abstract should be prepared, showing the total receipt and ex-
penditure, and that these accounts should be open to public
inspection.
This general provision as well as those contained in the act of
1842 just referred to, were, however,, not made primarily for the
purpose of regulating accounts. It was not until 1845 that gen-
eral provisions were made to regulate railway accounts. In the
Companies Clauses Act of that year, 6 no less than eight clauses
were devoted to the regulation of this branch of railway finance.
By this act, railway directors were required to cause "full and
true accounts to be kept of all sums of money received or ex-
pended on account of the company . . . and of the matters
and things for which such sums of money shall have been re-
2 Hansard, 73: 1070-1071.
s 5 & 6 V. e. 79, s. Iv.
4 Section V.
s 7 & 8 V. c. 85, s. 5.
s 8 V. e. 16.
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ceived or disbursed. . . " The act further provided 7 that the
books of a company should be balanced at the prescribed periods, 8
and an exact balance sheet should be made up, exhibiting a true
statement of the capital stock, credits, and property of every de-
scription belonging to the company, as well as the debts due by
the company at the date of making the balance sheet. A distinct
view of the profit or loss which might have arisen in the course
of the preceding half year should also be presented. Such bal-
ance sheet was also required to be examined by at least three of
the directors, and was to be signed by the chairman or deputy
chairman of the company. Moreover, both the shareholders and
mortgagees were authorized to have access to these accounts at
the prescribed or other reasonable times, with the liberty of tak-
ing extracts therefrom without charge. 9 In the Railways Clauses
Act of the same year,
10 a further provision was made to require,
under penalty, 11 railway companies to prepare and transfer to
the clerks of the peace and the over-seers of the poor of the coun-
ties and parishes traversed by the railway, abstracts of their an-
nual accounts.
The financial depression caused by the railway mania of 1847
led to some investigation of the accounts of railway companies.
A committee of the House of Lords was appointed in 1849 to
consider "whether the railway Acts do not require amendment,
with a view of providing for a more effectual audit of accounts
to guard against the application of the funds of such companies
to purposes for which they were not subscribed, under the au-
thority of the Legislature." 12 This committee pointed out that
a serious omission in the existing law was the want of any pre-
scribed and uniform system of accounts, and recommended the
enforcement of some statutory forms to be binding, within cer-
7 Section 116.
s If no period is prescribed, then the balance should be made fourteen
days at least before each ordinary meeting.
8 V cap. 16, ss. 55 and 117-119.
10 8 V. cap. 20, s. 107.
11 In case any railway company should fail to prepare or transmit such
accounts as required by law, it should forfeit for each failure the sum of
twenty pounds.
12 Eeport of Eoyal Commission on Eailways, 1867, p. xviii.
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tain limits, upon all railway companies. 13 It further proposed
that the statutory forms should embrace the following partic-
ulars : "
1st. A full .statement of all the parliamentary powers granted
for raising money, showing the undertakings to which they were
applicable ; the manner in which the money had been raised ; the
nature of securities issued under each act, with the condi-
tions and rate of interest applicable to each, and the amount of
money obtained and in arrears; and the balance of parliamen-
tary powers unexhausted.
2nd. A capital account explaining how the money shown as
having been raised under the parliamentary account had been
dibursed, and
3rd. An account of the ordinary income and expenditure of
the railway company.
It also recommended that separate accounts should be kept for
separate branches of the enterprise of every company.
Moreover, it was further urged that the right of inspection by
shareholders of the companies' accounts should be unrestrained;
that all accounts without exception touching or relating to the
receipts or payments of each company should be required to be
produced, and that in case of refusal the statutory penalty
should be extended from the book-keeper to the governing body.
About the same time, the Railway Commissioners 15 also voiced
the opinion, apparently with the general approval of the rail-
ways, that the companies should specify in their accounts every
loan contract, the period for which it was contracted, with the
rate of interest and the liquidation of such loans or portion
thereof as might be made from time to time. 16
These recommendations, practical as they were, failed to ma-
ture into legislation. They were too much out of line with the
laissez faire ideas of the time.
During 1859 to 1862, the Board of Trade persistently recom-
mended that separate accounts should be kept of the amounts of
is Report of 1909 Departmental Committee on Accounts, etc., p. 4.
i* Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xciii.
is These early railway commissioners had the duty of examining railway
bills and differed materially from those appointed since 1873.
is C. L. Webb, Letter to the President of tJie Board of Trade, 1848, pp.
59-60.
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debenture stocks created and disposed of, and of the application
of the money raised by such issues.17 It was, however, not until
1866 that Parliament began to give effect to some of these recom-
mendations. In the Companies Securities Act, 1866, provisions
were made to require all railway companies, within fourteen
days after the end of each half year, to make an account of their
loan capital authorized to be raised and actually raised up to the
end of that half year. In the account, the railway companies
were required to specify the following particulars, in addition
to what was required by former acts.
(1). The amount or prospective amount of loans authorized
or confirmed by Parliament;
(2). Whether or not the obtaining of the certificate of a
justice for any purpose, or the obtaining of the assent of a meet-
ing of the company, was made a condition precedent to the ex-
ercise of the borrowing powers ;
(3). The date at which such condition was fulfilled;
(4). The aggregate amount of the company's existing debts
contracted on mortgage, bond, or debenture stock, up to the end
of the half year ; and
(5). The aggregate amount remaining to be borrowed.
Then the second and every subsequent half-yearly accounts
were required to show the items described in paragraphs (1) and
(4) for two consecutive years, and the increase or decrease
of any of those items in the second of those half years as com-
pared with the first. The Board of Trade was authorized to
prescribe, by public notice in the London Gazette, the forms of
the half-yearly accounts of the loan capital of railways from
time to time.18
The act further provides that within twenty-one days after
the end of each half year, every railway company should deposit
with the registrar of joint stock companies, a copy, certified and
signed by the company 's registered officer as a true copy, of their
loan capital half-yearly account. Moreover, these accounts were
to be open to the inspection of shareholders, stockholders, etc., at
all reasonable times without charge.
Furthermore, the act made it unlawful for any railway com-
17 General report of the Board of Trade on Railway bills, 1861, p. 23.
is 29 & 30 V. cap. 108, s. 6.
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pany to borrow any money on mortgage or bond, or to issue any
debenture stock,
' '
unless and until they have first deposited with
the registrar of joint stock companies ... a statement cer-
tified and signed by the company's officer" in the prescribed
manner.19
By this series of enactments, Parliament "endeavored to se-
cure a faithful record and account of all the financial transac-
tions of the companies to be kept under the authority of the di-
rectors; a power for any shareholder within limited bounds to
examine the company's accounts; the periodical exhibition of a
balance sheet showing all the capital, stock, credits, and prop-
erty of and debts due by the company, and giving a distinct
view of the profit and loss ; and the payment of a dividend out
of profits, coupled with a prohibition against reduction of cap-
ital by means of dividends. . .
" 20
It may be observed, however, that all except the last one of
the statutes referred to were enacted for the purpose of requir-
ing the companies to keep accounts according to their own way,
without any governmental interference. Even the act of 1866
just referred to went no further than to authorize the Board of
Trade to prescribe and alter some forms of loan accounts. In-
deed, it was not until the report of the Royal Commission on
Railways of 1867 had been made that steps were taken by means
of the Regulation of Railways Act, 1868, to give effect to the far-
sighted recommendations of the select committee of 1849 regard-
ing the adoption of a uniform system of accounts. We shall,
therefore, examine (1) how the results of the old system of reg-
ulation of railway accounts led to the adoption of the new sys-
tem of 1868, (2) the nature of the principles set forth in the
new system, (3) the defects of the new system, and (4) what
Parliament has done since.
The early system of regulation required railway companies
themselves to keep true and clear accounts of all their incomes
and disbursements for the purpose of preventing irregularities
in the application of the companies' capital. This was based
on the assumption that the ordinary maxims of prudence and
good faith, combined with the usual practice of persons engaged
in commercial affairs would be sufficient to secure the observance
19 29 & 30 V. e. 108, s. 10.
20 Eeport of Eoyal Commission on Eailways, 1867, p. xxiii.
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of these regulations.
21
"Unhappily/' as it was remarked in the
House of Commons in 1867, 22 "the fact was far otherwise." It
was true that railway companies always kept accounts and uni-
formly prepared a sort of balance sheet every half year; "but
it was frequently such as no merchants or bankers would be sat-
isfied with." It was claimed that a great number of companies
considered a balance sheet a means of mystifying and mislead-
ing their proprietors and the public, and that balance sheets
were often used to conceal the real state of a company. It has
even been said that the balance sheet of a railway company has
no more effect than a sheet of waste paper.23
Moreover, there was no uniformity whatever in the matter of
railway accounts during those years. 24 One company had one
form of accounts
;
a second one, another ; and a third one a form
still different. It was not only impossible to compare the ac-
counts of the different companies, but also impossible even to
compare the accounts of the same company for different years.
Regarding the prohibition against the wrong application of
the companies' capital, Sir William Hunt in introducing the
railway and joint stocks companies' account bill, 1868, said,25
that no one could read the act of 1854 for the consolidation of
railway and joint stock companies, or the Companies' Act of
1862, without being struck by the grave and imperative language
in which the acts directed that no dividend should be paid un-
less their accounts showed that the dividend has really been
earned, and could be paid out of the net profits of the company.
But in this case also the law has proved ineffectual. Directors
were often tempted to disregard all the moral and legal obliga-
tions in order to make things look "pleasant" to their propri-
etors. Dividends were frequently declared out of capital, until
it became impossible to tell whether or not it was really earned. 26
The effect of this practice was that railway shareholders were
so "bewildered and mystified by cooked accounts, manipulated
figures, partial statements, and delusive representations of rail-
way property" that they actually regarded the payment of divi-
21 Hansard, 187: 1588.
22 Ibid.
23
Fraser, British Railways, 1903, p. 140.
2* See Railway Times, May 23, 1868.
25 Hansard, 187: 1588.
26 London Times, August 27, 1866.
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dend out of capital as a legitimate practice and looked at the
chaos of railway accounting as hopeless. Apparently they im-
agined that they could "eat their cake and have it too." 27 As
a natural consequence of this state of affairs, suspicion arose,
which proved harmful not only to the public but to the railways
as well. As said the London Times in 1866, 28 "nothing has dam-
aged railway property so much as the suspicion, notoriously rea-
sonable, that the truth was not put before the public in the re-
ports of railway directors.
' '
The magnitude of the evil due to the lack of confidence could
not be fully comprehended at the time. The problem facing the
railway companies was not merely to satisfy the shareholders of
that time. It was necessary that they should give assurance to
the investing public in order to get additional money to keep the
railways "alive." Explanations at meetings, statements of fig-
ures capable of favorable inference, sometimes sufficed to satisfy
those who had already put their money in; but they could not
attract new investment.
Following the suspicion of the investing public, the share-
holders also became discontented. They saw their property de-
preciating; they found that their shares could be disposed of
only at great sacrifices. No longer were they to be satisfied with
"information" alone. 29
The difficulty, however, was not exactly an economic one.
There was plenty of money for investment. It was generally
recognized at the time by clearer observers that if there was a
single company where shares were considered by its directors to
have fallen too low in the market, they could set the matter right
easily. There were plenty of shrewd people at the time waiting
with money to find investments. "Give them a statement such
as they require, and such as any city accountant . . . would
prepare, in a form that the simplest tradesman might under-
stand it, and forthwith they will bid within a fraction of the true
value of the shares." 30 Thus the problem before Parliament
was to stop suspicion and to restore confidence. 31
27 London Times, November 8, 1867, p. 6.
28 Ibid., August 27, 1866.
29 Economist, December 28, 1867.
so Fraser, British Railways, 1903, p. 140.
si Economist, December 23, 1867.
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It was recognized that besides retreating from the costly
litigations, in which the railways were fond of indulging, there




32 They must make a clear statement of their
affairs. However unpromising it might be, the whole truth must
be told so that no disguise or reserve could be suspected. It was
urged that 33 there was no cure for the mischief of delusion nor
any hope for railway property except by the introduction of a
principle of accounting in which nothing should be admitted as
profit but surplus of actual receipts over actual expenditures.
The Royal Commission on Railways in its report of 1867 also
recognized
3 * that greater facilities should be afforded for the de-
tection and repression of acts by which the public were misled
or deceived. It further said, "The concealment or imperfect
representation of important facts, which no one is charged with
the duty of faithfully disclosing to the shareholders or the pub-
lic, will be found to underlie most of the delinquencies . . .
and there can be little doubt that many objectionable transac-
tions would not be embarked in if they were to be immediately
followed by publicity. . .
" A member of Parliament 35 urged
before the commission that Parliament should take care to see
that the periodical railway accounts should "comprise not only
every item of expenditure but every liability, and every contract
that they have entered into . . . and leave the public to
judge for themselves. Many other members of Parliament were
also of the opinion that shareholders should only ask the legis-
lature to require that accounts be kept in an intelligent way so
that they may have a chance to "sift them to the bottom." 36
But it was the report of the commission that gave uniform ac-
counting its proper place of importance. 37 It emphasized that
the provisions of the law regarding the financial affairs of rail-
way companies would always remain defective, until a uniform
system of accounts was secured. Until that was done, each com-
32 London Times, February 9, 1863, p. 9.
ss Ibid., November 8, 1867, p. 6.
3* Report of Eoyal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xliv.
ss G. P. Bidder, M. P., before Eoyal Commission on Eailways, 1867.
Evidence before Royal Commission, p. 803.
se Hansard, 191 : 1541-1542.
37 Report of Royal Commission, 1867, p. XXIII.
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pany was at liberty to adopt its own form of accounts and to
vary that form from time to time. The result would always be
that no adequate comparison of the financial affairs of different
railways, or even of the same railway, could be made. This lack
of uniformity in accounting not only deprived the public of the
power to ascertain the relative conditions of different companies,
but also deprived one company of the means of profiting by the
experience of another.
Thus it soon became generally recognized that until clear, com-
plete and truthful accounts, on a common system, could be ob-
tained, there would be continued suspicion. The urgent need of
such a uniform system of accounts was recognized, alike, by the
railways and Parliament. This was well shown by the fact that
while both Houses of Parliament were giving the matter atten-
tion, the railway men themselves were holding meetings, in 1868,
to discuss the same subject.38
To give effect to some of these recommendations, Sir "William
Hunt introduced the Railway Audit of Accounts Bill early in
the session of 1867. 39 In the following year, another bill, called
the Joint Stock Companies Accounts Bill, was introduced, the
aim of which, similar to that of the bill of the previous year, was
to secure to shareholders and the public, periodically, a true bal-
ance sheet of the financial affairs of railway companies and a
true statement of the assets and liabilities. 40
Neither of these bills, however, was enacted into law. In the
meantime, the government prepared the Regulation of Railways
Bill, which embodied many of the principles contained in the
two bills just referred to. This bill was first introduced into the
House of Lords.41 A considerable proportion of the bill was
based on the recommendations of the Royal Commission. 42 More-
over, the Board of Trade had also received frequent deputations
and much correspondence on the subject from railway experts.43
In fact some of the very fundamental matters, such as the forms
ss Railway Times, May 23, 1868.
39 For purpose of this bill, see Eailway Times, June 15, 1867.
40 Hansard, 187: 1588.
4i/&td., 192: 1294.
42 Hansard, 192: 115-116.
43 IUd., 192 : 1294.
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of accounts, etc., were adopted only after extended consultation
with some of the most prominent railway accountants.
44
When the Regulation of Railways Bill was introduced, the
legislators recognized the great change which had taken place in
the English railway system since the forties. Thus attention was
called to the fact that all legislation connected with railways
must be cautious, practical, and well considered, and that in
dealing with the subject it was as necessary to look at the inter-
est of the public, on whose behalf the railways were constructed,
as it was necessary to take care of the interest of the sharehold-
ers who expended their money in those great undertakings.45
Parliament was also reminded that it was by no means desirable
to adopt a policy by which it would lay down stringent rules
with respect to all the details of accounts and the management
of the companies.
46 It was believed that sufficient time had
elapsed since the panic of 1866-1867 to afford Parliament the
means of legislating upon the subject without acting in the hasty
and ill considered manner which might have been inevitable if
they had dealt with it during the previous session.47 The com-
plete collapse also led the public and the railways to appreciate
more fully whatever action might be taken. It was under the
influence of such prevailing opinion that the first important act
to regulate railway accounts was prepared.
The first part of the bill related to accounts and audit; the
second to the liabilities of railway companies in certain cases as
general carriers ; the third provided for the safety of passengers ;
the fourth dealt with the matter of compensation for accidents;
the fifth had to do with light railways ; the sixth referred to arbi-
trations by the Board of Trade ; and the last part was given to
miscellaneous matters. "None of these," said the Economist,48
1 '
are unimportant ; and all are designed to bring railway law into
accordance with recent experience.
' ' But the ' ' novel part of the
bill is the first section, making new rules for the auditing and
inspection of railway accounts." On account of its importance
44 Hansard, 190 : 1957.
45
Ibid., 190: 1955.
46 Ibid., 190 : 1956.
47
Ibid., 190: 1956.
48 Economist, March 21, 1868.
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and novel nature, that part of the bill, therefore, received much
discussion both in and out of Parliament.
During the course of the passage of the bill, Parliament laid
great emphasis upon the importance of the forms of accounts
which were attached to the bill. It had in mind that the ac-
counts should neither on the one hand be limited to the ordinary
payments and receipts, nor on the other hand be so extensive as
to make it hard for the eye to follow or the mind to compre-
hend.49 They should be sufficiently elastic to meet the varying
circumstances of the different railways, and at the same time
precise enough to enable shareholders of ordinary intelligence to
compare one year's accounts with those of any other year and
the accounts of one company with those of another. The guid-
ing purpose was that every person looking at these forms should
be able to see at a glance the exact financial position of each
company.50
The importance of uniformity in railway accounts was greatly
emphasized. The advocates of such a uniform system had in
mind two important objects: First, to prevent the "dressing"
of accounts, and secondly to insure that every item of expendi-
ture should pass through the books of the company. Incidental-
ly, it was also hoped that when all companies adopted the same
form of accounts, the public and the investors would be enabled
to form some estimate of the values of the shares and securities
of railways.
51
But it was recognized that according to the provisions of the
bill, the usefulness of the prescribed uniform system of accounts
would largely depend upon the voluntary efforts of the com-
panies themselves. If the companies made use of these pre-
scribed forms, as they should for their own interest, the uniform
system would be of great value. The auditors and inspectors
would have a convenient guide in the "labyrinth of accounts." 52
The common form would become familiar, and people would
know what to verify. One more important and general use of
such a common system was that so long as there was no down-
right falsification, it would be possible to compare one railway
49 Hansard, 190 : 1972.
so Hansard, 190: 1957.
si Ibid., 191: 1538.
52 Economist, August 29, 1868, p. 993.
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with another, and that, where circumstances were nearly similar,
the comparison would be invaluable.53 As a prominent railway
accountant said, in the Manchester Railway Conference in 1868,
"The importance of the adoption by all railway companies of a
clear, complete and uniform system of accounts, properly audit-
ed and vouched, can scarcely be over-estimated. . .
" 5 * It was
generally recognized that it was exceedingly desirable to have
one form of accounts. 55 In fact all those members of Parliament,
who spoke in connection with the bill during its passage, advo-
cated the adoption of a uniform system.
Some contended, however, that it was impossible to have a uni-
form scheme of accounts for all companies, because the circum-
stances of the different companies were so dissimilar. A uniform
scheme would not furnish any accurate comparison, it was
urged, unless people knew what were the gradients of each line
and the prices of fuel and labor in each instance as well as other
details which varied in different places.56 This objection, how-
ever, failed to gain much weight and experience has since proven
that a uniform system is desirable in spite of its drawbacks.
The greatest defect of the bill, however, was said to be the lack
of any regulations governing the "filling up" of the uniform
forms. It was urged that the usefulness of these forms might be
much lessened, if not nullified, by irregularities in the entering
of the different expenses into the accounts. Thus the Economist
said,
57
"We question very much . . . whether the dictation
of a certain form in the accounts will do much good. . .
There will be room for endless disputes as to whether certain
expenses are for renewals or new works, or as to whether capital
or revenue should be changed. . .
"
It also believed 58 that
the distrust of the people had been related to the substance of
the accounts, and that changing the form would not mend mat-
ters much.
The London Times also pointed out that "a uniform system
of accounts would prevent one line from showing better than an-
ss Economist, August 29, 1868, p. 995.
s* Railway Times, May 23, 1868.
ss Hansard, 190 : 1961-62.
ss Ibid., 187: 1590-91.
57 Economist, March 21, 1868.
ss
Ibid., August 29, 1868, p. 992.
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other, but it would not prevent them all from showing un-
truly.
' ' 69 This paper believed that the people clamored mostly
over the evil itself, instead of the source of the evil.





lies not so much in the system of accounts,
of which every body complains, as in the principle of account-
ing. . ."
60
These anticipations, especially that of the Economist, have be-
come true since, as shown by the report of the departmental
committee on railway accounting and statistical returns of 1909
to be referred to hereafter.
It was also urged that there should have been inserted in the
act provisions for a "wear and tear" account. It was believed
that the proper way of providing for renewals was to lay aside
certain sums annually in proportion to the value of the material
and the depreciation it would suffer. This was regarded as be-
ing especially important, since the pressure of heavy renewals
had been one of the chief factors in tempting railway boards to
charge capital with what did not belong to it. In spite of the
requirement of the engineers' certificates concerning rolling
stock and permanent ways as provided by the bill, some railway
men thought that it would be impossible to ascertain the real
surplus profit to be divided as dividends without a depreciation
account.61
Furthermore, there were also other persons who were entirely
opposed to any such regulation of accounting. They based their
opposition chiefly on the ground that England '
' had grown great
by having private parties to manage their own affairs in their
own way by individual care of individual interest which could
not be superseded by the action of any government department
whatever." 62 The Railway Times,03 which was strongly opposed
to the measure, said,
' ' The entire railway history of the kingdom
is redolent of the idea as well as of the practice of shareholders
being at all times and under all circumstances fully cognizant of
any matter or detail in which their property may be involved."
After citing the satisfactory results of several of the companies
59 London Times, November 8, 1867, p. 6.
eo
Ibid., November 6, 1867, p. 6.
61 See Economist, August 29, 1868, p. 993.
62 See Hansard, 167 : 1569.
63 Railway Times, June 8, 1867.
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who had been left to manage their accounts in their own way,
the paper concluded that "all these private parties have been
conducting their own affairs in their own way ; and is not to be
endured that they should be interfered with. . ."
Furthermore, in the debate in Parliament, it was also agreed
that it was quite impossible to control railway directors by acts
of Parliament. If they were determined to "cook" the accounts,
they would do so, in spite of all the acts in the statute book.
64
Another important provision of the bill was that regarding the
penalty for falsifying accounts. This question did not receive
so wide discussion as that concerning the accounts themselves but
it excited more animated debate in Parliament than any other
part of the bill. The original bill provided that "if any state-
ment of accounts, balance sheet, estimate or report, which is re-
quired by this act is false in any particular, the auditor or officer
of the company who signed the same shall, unless he satisfies the
court that tries the case that he was ignorant of such falseness,
be liable, on conviction thereof on indictment, to fine or impris-
onment, or on summary conviction thereof to a penalty not ex-
ceeding fifty pounds.
' ' 65
The most striking feature of this provision was that the onus
of proof was placed on the defendant. This at once aroused in-
tense opposition. The beneficial effect of punishing the wilful
falsification of railway accounts was generally admitted ; but the
manner of inflicting such punishments as provided by the clause
proved extremely distasteful to many. The provision was
strongly opposed because it was entirely contrary to ordinary
principles of law. According to usage, a man was assumed to be
innocent until he was proven guilty, while according to the pro-
vision in the bill, the railway officers were to be held guilty until
they could establish their innocence. According to this prin-
ciple, it was feared that if there was any falsehood in any of the
accounts, statements, balance sheets, etc., so voluminously re-
quired by the bill, and which the chairman and secretary were
required to sign, they would be held guilty and might be sent to
jail unless they could prove their ignorance of the falsity. Nor
were railway officers to be allowed the ordinary privilege of trial
e* See
"Hansard, 191, p. 1540.
es Railway Times, March 21, 1868.
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by jury like other Englishmen, but they must prove their ig-
norance to the satisfaction of the court trying the case. It was
urged that this system would be liable to be attended with great
oppression, to say nothing of the violation of all established cus-
toms. The judges, in spite of their ability and the respect of the
people for them, were not immune from errors. In occasional
instances, they might also have a grudge against railway officials.
Therefore it would be necessary, it was contended, to appoint
railway officers who know nothing of the accounts so that they
might be able to prove their ignorance and could sign the re-
quired documents without danger of being imprisoned or fined. 66
If these disgraceful penalties were to be attached to the ordinary
performance of the duties of a railway officer, it would become
impossible to find any respectable people to perform such duties.
The Economist also questioned the practicability of the pro-
vision, not only because the provision was contrary to the ordi-
nary practice of law but because it was illusory. It called atten-
tion to the fact that particular falsities were as likely to creep
into accounts by neglect as by wilful perversion. Therefore it
believed that the clause, as it stood, instead of doing any good to
insure true accounts would offer a premium on being neglectful
and ignorant.67
Ultimately, the heated discussion resulted in the amendment
of the penalty clause so as to read :
68
"If any statement, balance sheet, estimate, or report which is required
by thia act be false in any particular to the knowledge of the auditor or
officer of the company who signs the same for the company, such officer or
auditor sh'all be liable upon conviction thereof on indictment, to fine or im-
prisonment.
' '
Thus the onus of proof was removed from the defendant ; and
railway officers were to be punished for signing statements and
accounts which they knew to be false.
The bill when first introduced was quite a voluminous docu-
ment but it was found, on close examination, that many of the
provisions, though admirable in theory, were impracticable. Ac-
cordingly, it was greatly reduced in size before it reached the
second reading in the House of Lords, so as to make it a smaller
66 Hansard, 192 : 6-7 and 190 : 1962.
67 Economist, March 21, 1868.
68 Hansard, 192: 7-8.
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and more practicable measure. After various modifications and
improvements, the bill received the royal assent on July 31,
1868, and became the Regulation of Railways Act of that year.69
Fifteen schedules or forms were prescribed, a great part of
which relate to accounts, while the others deal with statistics of
traffic, mileage, etc. They include, in the first place, a set of
capital accounts. No. 1 is a statement of capital authorized and
created by the company, requiring the enumeration in detail of
the acts or certificates of the Board of Trade, authorizing the
creation of capital, and a statement in each case of the amount
actually created and the balance left. No. 2 is a statement of
stock and share capital created showing the proportion received,
and requires the exhibition in parallel columns of the amount of
capital created under each act or certificate, the amount received,
calls in arrear, amount uncalled and amount unissued. No. 3
shows the capital raised by loans and debenture stock, and the
amount of each at the beginning and end of the half year com-
pared. These are, however, subsidiary to Nos. 4 and 5, the ob-
ject of which is to show at a glance how the capital account
stands and what has been done upon it during the half year,
especially how the money has been spent. The statements are
quite detailed, and "shareholders and all concerned should be
able to tell," it was expected, "at a glance whether there is any
item here properly belonging to revenue.
' ' 70 No. 6 is a return
of the working stock, which was regarded as of great importance
in connection with the engineers' certificate which must be af-
fixed to the accounts. 71 The object of Nos. 7 and 8 is to show
in detail the proposed further expenditures on capital account
in the following half year and subsequent years. A comparison
of the proposed expenditures compared with the available assets
of the company was expected to be of great value. The need of
such an account had been insisted upon for some years and its
usefulness was well recognized. It was, however, pointed out
at the time as a defect that the directors were in no way bound
69 31 and 32 V. e. 119.
TO
Economist, August 29, 1868.
"i The
"engineer and the locomotive superintendent were required to cer-
tify, respectively, that the company's permanent way, stations, etc., and
the company's plant, engines, etc., were maintained in good working condi-
tion and repair during the half year.
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by their estimates even as to the half year concerned ; but it was
hoped that this would be safeguarded by the fact that the ensu-
ing account would show whether or not the estimates were cor-
rect, although the remedy would be only ex post facto.
Nos. 9, 10 and 11 are revenue accounts. The first deals with
the gross revenue, the second the net revenue, and the last, the
appropriation of the balance, if any, available for dividends.
Supplementary to No. 9 is No. 12, which consists of abstracts A.
B. C. etc., referred to in No. 9. Those abstracts were expected
to prove especially useful in enabling the shareholder to study
his own company's affairs and compare its expenditures with
that of others. Form No. 13 is the general balance sheet, which
exhibits the whole system. Statistical forms to show mileage
statements and those to be used by the company's engineers and
locomotive superintendents were also prescribed.
These prescribed accounts may be conveniently classified into
two groups: those relating to capital and those relating to rev-
enue. According to this system, the receipts and expenditures
on capital account are shown separately from the general balance
sheet, which differs materially from the American system where
the balance sheet exhibits in condensed form all the assets and
liabilities of the company, and the income statement shows the
gross earnings and expenses as well as the net revenue and its
application. This distinctive feature of British railway accounts
is sometimes known as the "double account system," according
to which the details of capital expenditures and capital receipts
are separated from the other assets and liabilities. Only the bal-
ance, either positive or negative, enters into the general balance
sheet. This system is based on the theory that inasmuch as the
capital is created by Parliament for a specific purpose, that pur-
pose is best fulfilled by crediting to one special account all
amounts received from the issue of capital securities and debit-
ing the account with all the assets acquired with the funds so
received.72
According to the provisions of the act every incorporated com-
pany, seven days at least before each ordinary half-yearly meet-
72 Cf. an able article by A. M. Sakolski on the
' ' Control of Railroad
Accounts in leading European countries," in the Quarterly Journal of
Economics, May, 1910.
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ing, should prepare and print, according to the statutory forms,
a statement of accounts and balance sheet for the preceding half
year and an estimate of the proposed capital expenditure for the
ensuing half year, which should be the same as those submitted to
its auditors. In case of default, the company should be liable to a
fine of five pounds per day. The Board of Trade, with the con-
sent of a company, was authorized to alter the statutory forms
to suit special circumstances.
The act further required that every statement of accounts,
balance sheets, etc., required by the act, should be signed by the
chairman or deputy chairman of the company's directors and
should be preserved at the company's principal office. A printed
copy was required to be forwarded to the Board of Trade.
Shareholders and holders of debentures, etc., were also entitled
to receive copies of such accounts on application. However, all
persons interested in the company's affairs were permitted to
peruse the original copy without charge. When a company
should act in contravention of these provisions, it would be liable
to a penalty not exceeding fifty pounds for each offense.
Upon the enactment of the act, the Railway Times expressed
much dissatisfaction over the whole measure,73 and several mem-
bers of Parliament also regarded the act as being too weak to be
of much value. 74 More than anything else, the means for secur-
ing the object of the act was severely criticised. Dissatisfaction
was especially expressed at the purely permissive character of
the requirements. The only compulsory clause was that requir-
ing the publication of the accounts in a certain form. Even
this compulsory provision was regarded as weak. A maximum
penalty of 35 per week was regarded as being ineffective to give
any great stimulus to exertion, at least in the case of important
companies where a body of directors at any time had much to
gain by a stealthy evasion of the act. Much mischief might be
done long before it could become worth while to prevent the
accumulating penalties. 75
On the other hand, the Economist at once recognized the pre-
scribed accounts as being very "skillfully framed." After ex-
73 Railway Times, August 1, 1868.
T* Hansard, 190, p. 1968.
75 Economist, March 21, 1868.
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amining and criticising every feature, it concluded that "the
accounts are very perfect and likely to be useful, in spite of all
defects." 76
It was further recognized that the silent influence of the pro-
visions would have a great amount of influence in preventing
companies from violating these regulations. The fact that a de-
parture from the prescribed forms would at once expose a de-
faulting company to the penalty of discredit, which would be
much severer than a fine, would insure at least a nominal com-
pliance with the provisions. 77
The Regulations of Railways Act, 1868, closed the legislation
on railway accounting. The regulations governing, and the
forms of accounts adopted in that year were generally recognized
as being very good in themselves. They emphasize the advanced
ideas which English legislators entertained long before others
realized the importance of this branch of railway regulation.
But they went no further. Instead of following up its good
start and taking advantage of its subsequent experience to im-
prove these regulations and principles as courageously as it had
adopted them, England settled down for many years to the idea
that nothing further was needed. Thus many defects in these
regulations have been suffered to exist during the last forty
years.
Among these defects, first of all, may be mentioned the fact
that there seemed to be much variation in the date of closing the
financial year of some of the companies. This defect, though
apparently of little consequence, had the undesirable effect, as
pointed out by the departmental committee on railway accounts
and statistics of 1909, 78 of rendering comparisons less valuable
than they would have been if the same date were common to all
companies.
Then the established regulations required that railway com-
panies should prepare their accounts in accordance with the
forms prescribed in the act of 1868 half-yearly is not in accord-
76
Ibid., Aug. 29, 1868.
77 Economist, March 21, 1868.
78 Report of the Committee of tlie Board of Trade on EaUtvay Accounts
and Statistical Returns, 1909 (hereafter called report of departmental com-
mittee on accounts and statistics, 1909), p. 4.
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anee with the usual practice of other companies and does not
seem necessary according to expert opinion. 79
But another defect, which is of much greater consequence, lies
in the lack of uniformity in practice. "It is obviously of the
first importance," said the departmental committee on railway
accounts and statistics, 1909, 80 "from the point of view of com-
parison between the different companies, that there should be
uniformity of practice among all the companies with regard to
the keeping of accounts and statistics ; that is to say, that every
heading both in accounts and in the statistics, should bear pre-
cisely the same meaning in the case of all railways should, in
fact, be standardized." In this connection it may be recalled
that one of the leading purposes for enacting the act of 1868 was
to afford the means of a comprehensive comparison between the
different companies, and that it was emphasized at the time that
uniformity in practice was even more important than uniformity
in the system of accounts.
In practice, however, the emphasis seems to have been placed
in the wrong place. The forms of accounts themselves are uni-
form, but the manner in which these accounts are filled up dif-
fers among the different companies. Thus after reviewing the
diverse nature of the capital accounts of some sixteen leading
railways, the Economist 81 in 1882 stated that "it would appear
to be wholly impossible to construct a statement, setting forth
the actual money expenditure upon those systems in many
cases it would be difficult even for the companies themselves to
construct such a statement. ' ' This financial paper further stated
that the capital accounts of railway companies "were wholly
unreliable for purposes of contrast with revenue, almost every
company constructing its capital account upon a different prin-
ciple.
' ' An English writer 82 also stated that ' ' the first item of
every railway balance sheet, which has yet been published to the
world under state authority during the past seventy years, is the
deliberate expression of an unmitigated falsehood. . . In ar-
79 Bepart of departmental committee on railway accounts and statistics,
1909, p. 4.
so Ibid., p. -5.
si Economist, March 4, 1882, .pp 248-249.
82 Fraser, British Railways, 1903, pp. 138-139.
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riving at each of these balances, every conceivable irregularity
. . . has been introduced, and has thereby received, not only
the sanction but the approval of the state.
' ' This writer further
said that ' ' the account is not a balance sheet at all, nor is it even
a very defective shadow or skeleton of one. It is . . . only
the declaration of an untruth, in every instance, coupled with a
list of a few of the most insignificant balances, which appear in
a company's set of subsidiary book of accounts."
We are not prepared to agree with these strong terms. But
the lack of uniformity in practice has recently attracted consid-
erable attention. The departmental committee on railway ac-
counts and statistics, 1909, gave much time to this difficulty, and
the evidence taken by that committee goes to show that much
needs to be done in making the uniform accounts really as useful
as they should be. Indeed, this committee was convinced that
unless some permanent machinery is established to define the
scope of the various headings and to decide authoritatively from
time to time the questions of detail which must arise in this con-
nection, much of the value of the uniform system of accounts
would be lost
;
and they accordingly recommended the formation
of a standing committee, to be appointed by the Board of Trade,
which should include representatives of the railway companies,
to decide on points arising in connection with the preparation of
the accounts and statistical returns.83
This departmental committee also recommended that "in the
interest both of the railway companies themselves and of the gen-
eral public" a system of yearly accounts and statistical returns
should be substituted for the present system of half-yearly ac-
counts. It further recommended that a uniform date should be
adopted to close the financial year of all the companies, instead
of permitting each company to adopt its individual date.
Furthermore, this committee took great pains in preparing a
set of forms for financial accounts and returns,84 with the aim
of meeting the changed circumstances. Special effort was made
ss For this and other recommendations of this departmental committee,
see its report, pp. 1-6.
s* Those interested in railway accounting will find their time well spent
in examining the forms which are to be found in appendix I of the com-
mittee's report.
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to exclude from the financial statements all matters of a purely
statistical nature, thus making a strict division between the
financial and statistical parts of the returns which did not exist
in the statutory forms then in force.
A bill was introduced into the House of Commons in 1910, to
give effect to most of the recommendations made in the report of
this departmental committee, but was withdrawn in consequence
of the dissolution of Parliament.
From the foregoing, we have seen that England endeavored to
regulate the accounts of railways, to some extent, from the be-
ginning, but prior to 1868, the companies were practically free
to keep their accounts in their own way. The panic of 1867 and
other events led Parliament to adopt a definite and uniform sys-
tem of accounts twenty years before the United States attempted
to regulate railway accounting in any definite way. England,
however, made no further progress after her early start. Be-
tween 1868 and 1909 nothing was done to improve the old sys-
tem, whose defects are many and obvious. During this time the
United States made some remarkable advancements in railway
accounting and its regulation. The measures adopted by the
Interstate Commerce Commission toward the unification of rail-
way accounting and statistical returns, which met with consider-
able opposition at first, are gradually becoming more popular
and have unquestionably done much good. In fact the report
and recommendations of the departmental committee of 1909
have been greatly influenced by the system of accounts adopted
by the Interstate Commerce Commission. It is hoped that Par-
liament may soon see fit to give more serious consideration to
these recommendations.
Since writing the foregoing, the Railway Companies (Ac-
counts and Returns) Act of 1911 has been enacted. This act is
based largely upon the recommendations of the departmental
committee of 1909.
At a glance, one can see that the act and its forms of accounts
are a decided improvement over that of 1888. The half-yearly
accounts are changed into annual accounts, which experience has
unquestionably proven to be the right thing. The forms are
much more detailed and precise than the former ones. This is
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especially true with regard to the revenue accounts. The intro-
duction of the appropriation account is a decided improvement.
The separation of the various expenses of operation and main-
tenance according to their nature are incomparably more dis-
tinct and detailed than those of 1886.
Another notable improvement is the equalization of the re-
ceipts and expenses of the different auxiliary operations. These
auxiliary operations are of an entirely different nature from
that of the general railway business. Chief among this may be
mentioned form No. 11 which shows the receipts and expenses in
respect of omnibuses and other passenger vehicles not running
on the railway, No. 12, receipts and expenses in respect of steam-
boats, No. 15, receipts and expenses in respect of hotels, and of
refreshment rooms and cars where catering is carried on by the
companies. Each of these forms a distinct auxiliary service of
its own kind and each service has its own head and staff. To
separating the receipts and expenses of each service from those
of the rest, not only the general manager of the whole undertak-
ing may be better enabled to watch the whole situation and meas-
ure the efficiency of his men, but the individual heads of the dif-
ferent services will also be impressed more effectively with their
responsibility. By separating the accounts of the different ser-
vices and allocating the items of revenues and expenses to the
respective officers responsible for the items, the company will do
much to encourage economy and efficiency. "With the same idea
in view, wages are separated from costs of materials and office
expenses. With the multiplication of the activities of a modern
railway, such a system of segregation is imperative to successful
management.
We must observe, however, that improved as it was, the act
still has many defects which, in our opinion, could be advan-
tageously avoided. First of all it may be mentioned that the
leave given to end the financial year other than on the same date
is not going to prove advantageous. To close the accounts on
the same date is of fundamental importance to realize fully the
advantages of a uniform system of accounts^ which was one of
the chief reasons for passing the bill. In any act, loopholes or
exceptions to the general rule can hardly be expected to do more
good than evil.
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Another defect, which we feel is a serious one, is the lack of
any definite and detailed classification of the different items of
accounts. It may be recalled that one of the chief aims of the
departmental committee of 1909 was to secure uniformity. But
we may be permitted to say that uniformity in accounting can
not be easily achieved. The uniformity in the headings of ac-
counts cannot be expected to insure the uniformity in what may
be put under each heading by the different railways. While the
accountants may be reasonably expected to put the most obvious
items under the proper heads of accounts, they may quite as
reasonably be expected to interpret the less obvious items of
which there are numerous in the enterprises of a railway in
different ways. To sustain this statement, it may be recalled
that the Regulation of Railway Act, 1868, prescribed a form of
accounts for all railways, yet at the time of the revision in 1913,
following the act of 1911, there were innumerable differences be-
tween the accounts of one company and those of another. Al-
though the present forms of accounts are far more detailed and
specific than those of former years, there is nevertheless ample
room for differences in the allocations. It is understood that the
Standing Committee of Accountants, under the Railway Clear-
ing House regulations, has prepared an annotated form of ac-
counts, but it is not generally accessible to the shareholder or
the general public. This, in the opinion of the writer, is a de-
fect. The said annotated classifications or something similar to
it should be prepared and promulgated by government authority
which should be strictly followed by the railways and accessible
to all interested parties, instead of keeping it under the veil of
secrecy. Publicity and openness is the foundation of public con-
fidence. Therefore it is publicity that government regulation
should emphasize. In the long run, the railways and all other
parties concerned. will have everything to gain and little to lose
by adopting such a policy of publicity. There seems to be con-
siderable apprehension against such an open policy, but we feel
the anticipated dangers are visionary rather than real. Given a
fair trial, publicity wrill surely find its own favorable position in
railway finance and regulation.
The above is only an inadequate observation. To give full
consideration to the act would require at least a separate chap-
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ter. As the act was passed after this monograph was written,
the writer prefers to limit himself to this short analysis. It is
recommended that every student interested in accounting will
find it of great advantage to make a thorough examination and
detailed comparison of the different forms of accounts as set
forth in the accounts of 1886 and 1911.
CHAPTER VIII
STATE AUDITING AND INSPECTION
Parliament has required from the beginning an authentic audit
of railway accounts by the railway companies themselves. It has
also adopted elaborate, although ineffective, regulations govern-
ing such auditing by the companies. Thus in the Companies
Clauses Act, 1845, numerous provisions were made governing the
appointment and duties of auditors, etc. 1 The substance of these
rules may be briefly summed up as follows :
Unless otherwise provided by the company's special act, the
shareholders at the first meeting after the incorporation of the
company should elect, either in person or by proxy, the pre-
scribed number of auditors, 2 in like manner as in the case of the
election of the directors. One of the auditors, to be determined
in the first instance by ballot between themselves or in any other
way suitable to themselves and afterwards by seniority, should
retire at the end of the first ordinary meeting in each year ; 3 and
this annual vacancy should be filled by election at the same meet-
ing. If no other qualifications were required by the special act,
every auditor should have at least one share in the undertaking,
and should not hold any other office in the company nor should
he "be in any other manner interested in its concerns, except as
a shareholder."
In regard to the duties and powers, the act stipulated that the
auditors should receiye and examine all the half-yearly or other
periodical accounts and balance sheets of the company, which
should be delivered to them by the directors at least fourteen
days before the ensuing ordinary meeting at which these ac-
counts, etc., were to be produced to the shareholders. They were
also required either to make a special report or simply to con-
1 8 V. c. 16, SB. 101-108.
2 If no number is prescribed, then two would be the number.
3 Each auditor should be immediately eligible to reelection.
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firm the accounts, etc., submitted. Furthermore, these reports
or confirmations together with the reports of the directors should
be read at the meeting. In performing their duties, the auditors
were empowered to employ at the company's expense such ac-
countants and other persons as they might deem proper.
After the financial disaster of 1847, general proposals con-
cerning the auditing of railway accounts were made, but no re-
sult was obtained from these attempts. In 1848 a bill was sent
down from the upper house of Parliament, in which it was pro-
posed that on the requisition of a certain number of sharehold-
ers who were ready to deposit 200 to meet the expense, the gov-
ernment should appoint impartial persons as auditors. The
principal object of the bill was to protect the minority. It was
urged that as the directors were elected by majority, if the aud-
itors were also elected by the same majority, the check would
be imperfect.
4 This measure was opposed however, on the ground
that there was no demand for it by railway shareholders, that it
is very questionable whether Parliament had any right to inter-
fere with private business, and that one might just as well have
an audit of the accounts of the Bank of England.5 After con-
siderable discussion in the House of Commons, it was finally
rejected.
But the financial difficulties of the railways were too apparent
to escape the attention of Parliament. A select committee was
appointed by the House of Lords in 1849 to consider
' ' Whether
the railway Acts do not require amendment, with a view of pro-
viding for a more effectual system audit accounts, to guard
against the application of funds as such companies to purposes
for which they were not subscribed, under the authority of the
legislature.
' ' 6 This committee recommended that the right of
inspection by shareholders of the accounts should be unrestrain-
ed: that all account, without exception, touching or relating to
the receipts or payment of the company should be required to be
produced; and that in case of refusal the statutory penalty
should be extended from the bookkeeper to the governing body.
The committee further recommended that the restriction upon
* Hansard, 98 : 1143-1147.
s Hansard, 187 : 1589-1590.
e Report of Eoyal Commission on Eailways, 1867, p. xviii.
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selecting auditors from among the shareholders should be re-
pealed, and that the auditors should be empowered to call for all
books and documents of the company necessary to elucidate not
only the balance sheet, but the entire whole financial condition
of the company. Moreover, the committee also urged that the
government should name one auditor to act in conjunction with
two auditors to be named by the company ; and that if the gov-
ernment auditor differed in opinion from the company's audi-
tors, his opinion should be recorded and published with the
accounts for the information of the shareholders.
Bills embodying some of these provisions were introduced in-
to Parliament in subsequent sessions, but none of them became
law until 1868.
In 1851 the railway companies themselves brought in an audit
bill, proposing to appoint a board of auditors elected by share-
holders. The president of the Board of Trade objected to the
proposal, on the ground that it would make the people judges in
their own case and that such a tribunal lack independence and
continuity. The last proposal made to the House of Commons
up to 1867 was that the railway companies should elect a body
of 300 persons, out of which five auditors should be chosen to
hold their places during good behavior. It was proposed that
the debenture holders should also take part in the election. No
legislation, however, sprang from these bills. 7
Thus up to 1857 the main objects aimed to be secured by Par-
liamentary action may be summed up as follows : 8
(1) A clear and faithful record and account of all the finan-
cial transaction of the company.
(2) Authority for shareholders to inspect within certain fixed
periods the company's accounts and to take copies or extracts.
(3) The appointment of auditors from among the sharehold-
ers to audit the balance sheets and accounts.
(4) The preparations of a scheme for the declaration of a
dividend to be paid out of the profits of the company.
For the purpose of securing these objects, Parliament adopted
the following rules.
Each company at its annual meeting should appoint two audi-
7 Hansard, 187: 1589-1590.
s Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xliv.
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tors, one of whom should retire annually but should be re-eligi-
ble.
The directors should deliver to the auditor half-yearly or other
periodical accounts and balance sheets fourteen days before the
meeting at which they were to be produced.
The auditors should receive and examine the same, and might
employ at the expense of the company such accountants and oth-
er persons as they might think fit to assist them. They should
either make a special report on the accounts or simply confirm
them.
The directors should keep the accounts of the company. The
books should be balanced at the principal periods, and there-
upon the exact balance sheet be made up, which should exhibit
a true statement of the capital stock, credits, and property of
every description belonging to the company, the debts due by
the company, as well as a distinct view of the profit or loss
which had arisen in the course of the half year.9
The application of these provisions, however, was by no means
free from difficulty. In practice, it was found that only a very
short summary was usually laid before the auditors, who made
an examination of it within a very limited time.10 The daily
transactions of railway companies were so numerous and in-
tricate that the company was compelled to employ a staff of
clerks and accountants proportionate to the magnitude of its
business in order to examine and check every transaction as
it took place. Since the manner in which every transaction
was debited or credited depended upon the orders issued at the
time when the transaction was made, the accounts could be
cheeked efficiently only by a contemporaneous audit by an estab-
lishment employed in the same office, or by a complete transfer
or transcript of the accounts, vouchers, correspondence, minute
books, etc., to be examined elsewhere. 11 It was quite competent
for the shareholders of any company to direct their auditors to
investigate the accounts of the company to any extent they
thought necessary after the accounts were rendered each half-
* Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xliv.
10 Economist, May 16, 1857.
11 Hid.
179] STATE AUDITING AND INSPECTION 179
year, but it did not seem to be within their power to direct any
continuous, daily audit.
The Royal Commission on Railways, 1865-67, however, dis-
covered that in many cases, especially as in that of the London
and North-Western,12 much could be done by the companies
themselves for the purpose of ensuring a supervision and effec-
tive audit in the interest of the shareholders. At the same time,
the commission pointed out that the powers conferred by the
Companies' Clauses Acts were manifestly insufficient for this
purpose, in case the directors were otherwise disposed.
13
It has been shown in a previous chapter that under the sys-
tem of independent auditing much abuse arose, especially in the
declaration of dividends otherwise than out of net profits. It
was a
"striking fact," said the London Times,1 * "that . . .
the auditors have never discovered or, at any rate, disclosed any
one of the numerous cases of ... false returns to the
Board of Trade, payments of unearned dividends, charging of
revenue expenses to capital, or any other of the various forms
of
'cooking' accounts by which shareholders have been lured to
ruin. . ."
Therefore it was again urged that no legislation to repress the
existing abuses would be of any avail without a system of gov-
ernment audit of the companies' accounts. 15 On the other hand
the Royal Commission apprehended that it would not be desir-
able to impose upon the Crown the duty of auditing the accounts
of joint stock companies and to certify to the shareholders the
correctness of their own balance sheets, for in practice this would
require a very large staff of officers as well as involve very
serious responsibility, merely to relieve the shareholders of a
duty which they could well perform for themselves by the elec-
tion of competent auditors with adequate powers and sufficient
remuneration. But this commission agreed with the select com-
mittee of 1849 that the restriction upon selecting auditors from
among the shareholders should be repealed, and was also of the
opinion that the auditors should be empowered to carry on a
12 Royal Commission on Railways, 1865-74, Appendixes E-F.
is Ibid., 1867, p. xlv.
i* London Times, November 3, 1867, p. 4.
is Report of Royal Commission on Railways, 1867, p. xliv.
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continuous audit and to call for all books and documents neces-
sary to elucidate not only the balance sheet, but the whole finan-
cial position of the company. 16
In commenting on the report of the Royal Commission regard-
ing government audit of railway accounts, the Economist stat-
ed,
17
"These remarks seem to us full of wisdom. The attempt
to separate the accountant from the transactor will fail, unless
pursued into the minutest details. The man who does the busi-
ness will give what accounts of it he pleases.
' '
The general chaotic condition of railway finance which has
been repeatedly referred to and the recommendations of the
Royal Commission led Parliament to insert a clause in the Rail-
way Companies Act, 1867, 18 giving to the shareholders a control
through the auditors, and imposing on the auditors a respon-
sibility which they never had before. This clause provided, as
briefly stated in a previous chapter, that no dividend should be
declared by a company until the auditors had certified that the
half-yearly accounts contained a full and true statement of the
financial condition of the company, and that the proposed divi-
dend was bona fide due after charging the revenue of the half-
yearly with all expenses which might be paid out of such revenue
in the opinion of the auditors. The auditors were empowered
to examine the books of the company at all reasonable times,
and to call for such further accounts, vouchers, papers, etc., as
they saw fit. They were also empowered to refuse to certify
any accounts or statements of the company until the directors
and officers of the company had produced the required accounts
and given their assistance as far as they could. Furthermore,
the auditors might at any time add anything to their certificates
or issue to the shareholders independently at the expense of the
company, any statement respecting the financial condition and
prospects of the company which they thought important for the
information of the shareholders.
Under the existing circumstances when every imaginable mys-
tification was thrown over the declaration of dividends, when
auditors never disclosed any of the numerous serious irregular-
16 Ibid
f> 1867, p. xlv.
17 Economist, May 18, 1867.
is 30 & 31 V. e. 127, s. 30.
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ities, and when general confusion seemed to hang over the finan-
cial affairs of the whole system, it was natural that the clause
was highly valued at the time of its passage. It was expected,
not without reason, that henceforth the auditors would no longer
have any excuse, when actions were brought against them for
neglect of duty.
19
So far so good. But in the act a further provision, as re-
ferred to before,
20 was made to the effect that in the declaration
of dividends and auditing of accounts, if the directors differed
from the judgment of the auditors with respect to the payment




" 21 be stated in the report to the sharehold-
ers, "and the company in general meeting may decide thereon,
subject to all the provisions of the law then existing, and such
decision shall for the purpose of the dividend be final and bind-
ing." This provision proved to be a loop-hole through which
the expected usefulness of the system of auditing, as shown in a
previous chapter, was practically nullified. . *'
As the systems of auditing adopted in 1845 and 1867 both
failed to be effective enough to restore confidence, it was sug-
gested that a committee of investigation might be effective in
settling the existing difficulties. But it was at onoe compre-
hended that the nature and composition of such committees of
railway companies would prevent them from doing anything
effective. They could be composed in all kinds of ways, they
could lay down every species of doctrine, and they could accept
as well as deny all sorts of statements. The investigation of
railway affairs was recognized as a difficult task even for an ex-
pert, and the task wholly surpassed the power of any untrained
man. 22
Moreover, experience had taught that a committee of investi-
gation was almost never both able and impartial. All the com-
petent people in a railway company, it was told, took a side
either for the directors or against them, and they would go into
the committee with a bias in their minds. Thus, in practice, the
is London Times, November 13, 1867, p. 4.
20 Cf. supra, p. 216.
21 Italics are mine.
22 Economist, December 21, 1867.
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reports of committees of investigation were either questioned or
denied. They often would "not settle so much as they unset-
tle. .
.,"
and they would "only add a new disputant and a
new set of contested figures" to the controversy.
23
Therefore, it appeared that the true remedy for the lack of
confidence was an independent audit of all the railway ac-
counts. 24 The government was urged to exercise what philoso-
phers called the "function of verification." The railways, by
which alone people could travel and traffic could be conveyed,
were regarded not only of sufficient magnitude to justify the
action of the government, but so important that the state would
be to blame if it did not act. The government was held as the
only uniform authenicator possible the only one which could
apply the same measure with the same weight to all railways in
the country. The shareholders themselves were reported to be
desirous of having a system of government audit and were
ready to share the expenses. "An optional audit of petitioning
railways is," said the Economist, 25 "both on grounds of theory
and reasons of practice, the sole outlet from the existing diffi-
culty." In fact, during the early part of 1867 several proposals
were presented to the Board of Trade, which, though varying
much in detail, contained the common recommendation that an
auditor should be appointed by that department to audit rail-
way accounts.26 Consequently in the Regulation of Railways
Bill of 1868, provisions were made for a more effective system
of auditing and inspection. When the bill was introduced, it
was generally conceded that a system of government audit of
railway accounts would do much toward restoring confidence.
But it was also recognized that in this very matter of restoring
confidence lay the danger of the system. The public might place
too much faith in the system. They might be led to believe that
the soundness of a company's proceedings and finance were
certified and even guaranteed by the government. Again it was
recognized that it was by no means an easy work for the gov-
ernment to audit efficiently and effectively the accounts of the
23 /bid., December 28, 1867.
24
Ibid.,
25 Economist, December 21, 1867.
26 Hansard, 187 : 1590.
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railway companies. An audit of business "from without" must
be such as would be of avail against directors who desired to
deceive. The details which auditors in such cases would have
to look into and the minuteness of the evidence they would have
to inspect, it was urged, could hardly be properly appreciated
by any but those who had practical experience in such matters.21
On account of the possible dangers and the great difficulties
which might arise from a system of government audit, it was
suggested that railways themselves might constitute a central
board of audit, and that they might for that purpose make use
of the existing machinery of the Railway Clearing House.28
Such a board under the control of the railways themselves, it
was believed, would be less likely to give false security than an
audit under the government. 29
The most important question which arose during the discus-
sion, however, was that as to what should be the scope of the
audit. An ordinary audit, such as the mere comparison of
payments and vouchers, was an operation which did not give
the protection which shareholders sometimes fancied it did.
On the other hand it did not appear politic to interfere too much
with the policy of railway companies. If the government should
give guarantee to all the railway accounts presented to the
Board of Trade, the various companies of other pursuit might
make similar demands.30
After much debate, provisions were made, in the act of 1868,
to repeal the restriction imposed by the Companies Clauses Act,
1845, that auditors should be shareholders, for the reason that
it had proven desirable in some cases to have independent audi-
tors who should be entirely unconnected with the company. 31
But what was entirely new and of great importance was the
provision for the appointment of auditors by the Board of
Trade. According to this provision, the Board of Trade, upon
application made in pursuance of a resolution passed at a meet-
ing of the directors or at a general meeting of the company,
27 Economist, May 18, 1867.
28 Sir Geo. Findlay 's book on the Working and Management of an Eng-
lish Railway has an excellent treatment of the Clearing House.
2 Hansard, 187: 1591.
so Ibid., 191: 1538.
si Hansard, 190: 1858.
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might appoint an auditor in addition to the two auditors of the
applying company, and such government auditors were to be
paid, by the applying company, a reasonable remuneration pre-
scribed by the Board of Trade. The government auditor was
to have the same duties and powers as the companies' auditors;
and the company might declare a dividend only when the
majority of these three auditors had certified that such dividend
was properly earned according to the rules laid down in section
30 of the Railway Companies, 1867.
It was regretted, however, that the act provided for only one
government auditor in each case where the company had two.
As a majority was to decide when a dividend might be declared,
it was apprehended that the official auditor might be overruled.
Then he would only have the liberty, according to the act, of
printing his protest at the expense of the company. Even ad-
mitting that the possibility of such a protest would be an ob-
stacle in the way of improper dividends and that the govern-
ment auditor might receive more consideration than those of the
company, nevertheless it remained a fact there were many dis-
putes in which the shareholders and the capitalists might be
indisposed to give the government auditor their proper sup-
port.
32
It was also urged both in and out of Parliament 33 that audit-
ing alone was not sufficient to prevent disorders in railway
finance, for frequently the books of unreliable companies were
well kept. The root of the evil was in the charging of the vari-
ous items in the books.
Another important provision contained in the Railway Regu-
lation Act of 1868 was that in case there were any difference of
opinion between the auditors, then it should be imperative, in-
stead of permissive, as was originally provided in the bill, that
the dissenting auditor should issue to the shareholders, at the
cost of the company, a statement containing the grounds on which
he differed from his colleagues and prepare such other state-
ments respecting the financial conditions and prospects of the
company which he deemed material for the information of the
shareholders. 34
32 Economist, March 21, 1868.
33 Hansard, 190 : 1960, and London Times, November 22, 1867, p. 6.
a* Hansard, 190: 1962.
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To strengthen the position of the securities-holders, the act
further provided 35 that the directors, or two-fifths of the holders
of shares, stocks, or preference shares, or half of the creditors,
might apply to the Board of Trade to appoint inspectors to ex-
amine a company's affairs, in case they produced evidence to
satisfy the Board of Trade. In so applying to the Board of
Trade the applicants, however, were required to meet all ex-
penses incurred in connection with the inspection, unless the
Board of Trade should direct the same or any portion thereof
to be borne by the company, and they might also be required to
give security for the payment of such expenses.
The government inspectors were empowered to examine all
the company's books, documents, etc., as well as to administer
oath
;
and the directors, officers and agents of the company were
required to produce, for the examination of the government in-
spection, all such books and documents. The latter were also
required under penalty 36 to render to the government inspectors
all reasonable facilities for discharging his duty.
Upon the conclusion of the examination, the inspectors were
to report their opinion both to the Board of Trade and the com-
pany, the latter being required to print and deliver a copy of
the same to the Board of Trade as well as to every applicant who
held any securities of the company.
Furthermore, the companies were authorized to appoint, on
their own accord, at any extraordinary meeting inspectors for
the purpose of examining into the company's affairs, and such
inspectors of the company were to have the same powers and to
perform the same duties as those appointed by the Board of
Trade.
This system of inspection was adopted for the purpose of
helping the shareholders to bring into their proper light without
involving the assumption of any serious responsibility by the
government. 37 Such inspection of private business did not es-
tablish any new principles, as a similar system had been intro-
ss 31 & 32 V. c. 119, as. 6-10.
36 In ease any director, officer, or agent of the company should refuse to
produce any books or documents, or to deny the facilities necessary for the
inspection, he should be held liable to a penalty of 5 for every day during
which the refusal continued. See sections 8 & 10, 31 & 32 V. c. 119.
37 Hansard, 190 : 1958.
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duced by the Companies Act of 1862, in the case of ordinary
joint stock companies. 38
The defect of this system of government inspection, as was
pointed out at the time, 39 was that the inspection was contem-
plated only in extreme cases. The limitations placed upon the
application for government inspection were said to be too cum-
bersome. It was urged that since the applicants were required
to give security for the cost of any government inspection, Par-
liament could have well afforded to require the consent of a
smaller proportion of the shares or debentures of a company for
any inspection.40 It would be almost impossible to make any
such inspection if a directorate objected to it. The demand for
an examination of a company's affairs, according to the pro-
vision, would be a penal proceeding which the directors would
always resist. It would be made, therefore, only when a railway
came to grief, while what was needed was a government inspec-
tion when the soundness of the company was not suspected and
not merely an inquiry when troubles had taken place.
Moreover, in spite of the great responsibility placed upon the
Board of Trade, no principle was laid down to guide that body,
as to what reasons were sufficient to justify an inquiry. Neither
was there any specific rule as to the kind of evidence on which
it should insist. Thus, it was apprehended that "the act might
be wholly unworkable if the Board of Trade were judicial and
exacting, and looked too narrowly into prima facie cases.
' ' 41
It was, however, conceded that the provision for the appoint-
ment of government inspectors would generally be of some use
in that the possibility of a searching inquiry would have much
indirect influence over directors.42
In spite of its defects, however, the system of government
audit and inspection was recognized to be a forward movement
in the regulation of railway finance. The holders of the securi-
ties of the companies were at least afforded a chance to get
government auditors and inspectors to act with their own, thus
bringing pressure to bear upon the directors. All good compan-
39 Economist, August 29, 1868, p. 992.
40 Ibid., March 21, 1868.
41 Ibid., August 29, 1868, p. 992.
42 Economist, March 21, 1868.
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ies would gain by taking advantage of the provisions of the
act; and the "fashion" being once established might compel
companies to follow the example. The discredit arising from
shutting out the light might be even worse than the discredit of
the unwelcome truth itself. Although the system of government
audit and inspection has been resorted to only occasionally, it
appears to have proven beneficial. Parliament has not only re-
tained the system of impartial audit, but has given it special
emphasis.
43
Indeed, as said a member of the New York Bureau
of Economic Research in 1901 before the United States Indus-
trial Commission,44 the English auditors are independent and
form "almost a fourth body a fourth cog in the wheel of
government." The fact that the government has the power to
appoint its own auditors to audit the accounts and to appoint
inspectors to examine the affairs of the companies seemed to
have considerable influence in preventing railway companies
from many irregularities. Thus it appears that the mere reser-
vation by the government of certain important privileges may
often prove quite effective in checking misconducts, even if such
privileges are seldom made use of.
It may be added that as years progressed, things became more
settled to normal or ' ' standard ' ' conditions. While the accounts
of some companies do not give as much as is desirable, they are
generally known to be true and straightforward, and seldom
make any attempt at dishonest concealment of vital points. The
general practice is that they are audited half-yearly. Besides
appointing professional auditors on behalf of the shareholders,
many companies have an audit committee appointed for the lat-
ter body, which meets regularly for the purpose of supervising
the accounts. Perhaps these measures taken by the companies
may to a certain extent explain why the privilege given by the
government for appointing government auditors has not been
taken advantage of by the shareholders.
43 In the
"saving" clause of the Coventry Bailway Bill, 1910, as to
general Railway Act, the only two topics which received special emphasis
were the impartial audit of accounts and the revision of the maximum rates.
See sec. 43, p. 17 of the Coventry Railway Bill, 1910.
**Eeport of the United States Industrial Commission, 1901, Vol. IX,
p. 93.
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